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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, ALLIANCE NETWORKS, AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
 
This dissertation explores the interplay between competitive strategy and alliance 
network structure in explaining firm performance in highly volatile environments (e.g., 
personal computers or consumer electronics). In particular, I examine the following three 
questions: (1) Which competitive strategies enable firms to gain superior performance? 
(2) How do these strategies affect the firm‘s networking behavior and lead to the 
formation of particular network positions? (3) What optimal combinations of competitive 
strategies and network structures maximize firm performance?  
Firms can outperform rivals by pursuing two types of competitive strategies: 
advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing. Each of these strategies creates different 
needs, motivations, and opportunities for collaborative activity. Therefore, certain 
regularities in the firms‘ strategic behavior in the previous period can lead to distinctive 
and recognizable patterns of networking behavior in the future period, which in turn leads 
to predictable types of network structure. This study shows that firms with superior 
advantage-creating strategies become embedded in sparse network structures and are 
more likely to form non-equity alliances in the future period, whereas firms with strong 
advantage-enhancing tendencies become embedded in dense network structures with 
many equity-based alliances in the future period. However, if different strategies lead to 
formation of different types of network structure, are these tendencies beneficial for firm 
performance? If not, what is the optimal combination of competitive strategy and 
network structure that maximizes firm performance? I argue that network structure 
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provides advantageous access to external resources that can both complement (enhance) 
the internal capabilities of the firm and substitute for the capabilities that a firm is 
lacking. I find that network structure plays both complementary and substitutive roles. 
However, my findings suggest dense network structure is more beneficial for firms that 
have superior either advantage-creating or advantage-enhancing capabilities, whereas 
firms with inferior internal capabilities can benefit more from a sparse network structure. 
I tested the proposed dynamic model on a sample of the largest 125 firms from computers 
and electronics industries that initiated 11,075 competitive actions and were embedded in 
a larger network of 36,766 alliances over 7 years.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
In today‘s hypercompetitive environments (D‘Aveni, 1994), firms do not control 
all resources necessary for persistently outperforming rivals. In industries such as 
personal computers or consumer electronics, products are complex systems that comprise 
many components and modules produced and supplied by a variety of independent 
suppliers (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 2003). For example, Apple‘s iPod consists of more 
than 400 components and modules, none of which is manufactured internally. Figure 1 
below illustrates Apple‘s ten major suppliers (that account for 85% of the iPod‘s costs) 
and alliances with firms with complementary products and services that upgrade and 
enhance the user‘s experience and value of the iPod.  
 
Figure 1: Apple’s iPod Collaborative Network 
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How do firms such as Apple frequently design innovative products, such as the 
iPod or iPhone? How is Apple able to continuously improve these products despite the 
lack of ownership and control of the resources needed for their development? To create 
an innovative complex product, firms need to be aware of ―who knows what‖ in the 
market (i.e., the most recent technologies and competences developed by other firms). 
However, this information is not available to all firms; only those that closely collaborate 
with other firms with specialized knowledge in different technological domains have 
ready access to such information. The awareness of the technological possibilities is a 
precondition for discovering new resource combinations (O‘Driscoll & Rizzo, 1996). In 
addition, once the product is designed, the firm needs to extensively collaborate and 
coordinate the activities of various suppliers as these components are continuously 
improved and updated (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 2003).  
This suggests that the ability of the firm to frequently create innovative products 
and to intensively improve and enhance their value depends on successful collaboration 
with partners from various industries and technological domains. These 
interdependencies can be effectively managed through forming strategic alliances, since 
alliances ease transfer of fine-grained information, curb opportunistic behavior, and 
encourage sharing of ideas and technologies (Uzzi, 1997). Because each firm needs to 
collaborate with many partners, firms are constantly embedded in a complex network of 
alliances. The structure of these alliance networks can provide advantageous access to 
valuable strategic resources and information that increases firms‘ potential to 
continuously create new innovative products or intensively improve the value of the 
existing modular products (Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001).  
Given the importance of alliance networks for the firms‘ competitive success, it is 
critical to understand (1) how and why firms form different types of alliance networks, 
and (2) how and why different firms benefit from different types of alliance networks. In 
this dissertation, I argue that for adequate understanding of these questions, it is critical to 
consider the type of competitive strategy a firm is pursuing. Different competitive 
strategies lead to the formation of different types of alliance networks, and each type of 
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competitive strategy requires an optimal structure of alliance network to maximize firm 
performance.  
More specifically, different strategies create different needs, incentives, and 
motives for collaboration with rivals. As a result, firms with different strategies engage in 
different patterns of collaborative activity. These networking patterns are stable over time 
and form a recognizable interfirm network structure, which is defined as a set of firms 
and a pattern of alliance ties that connect these firms (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & 
Tsai, 2004). Thus, to understand why firms form different types of network structures, we 
need to know their competitive strategies.  
Furthermore, if firms pursue different strategies and each strategy leads to a 
distinctive type of network structure, do these combinations of strategies and network 
structures have a positive effect on firms‘ performance? If not, what is the optimal 
network structure for each strategy type that maximizes firm performance? To answer 
these questions, I also examine which type of network structure is the most beneficial for 
each type of competitive strategy. Once the network structure is formed, it provides 
network level benefits for the firm beyond the immediate gains from each alliance. 
Different network structures provide firms with access to different types of network 
resources. The extent to which a firm will exploit such external resource potential 
depends on its competitive strategies. Different strategies may benefit from different 
types of network resources, and therefore it is important to examine which network 
structure is optimal for each strategy type. Hence, this dissertation examines the 
following three research questions:  
1. Which competitive strategies enable firms to gain superior performance in 
highly volatile environments?  
2. How do these strategies affect the firm‘s networking behavior and lead to 
the formation of particular network positions?  
3. What are the optimal combinations of competitive strategies and network 
positions for firms to gain superior performance?  
Figure 2 below shows the proposed theoretical model in this dissertation. Chapter 2 
examines the link between current strategy and future performance (question 1 above); 
Chapter 3 examines the relationship between past strategy and current network structure 
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(question 2 above); and Chapter 4 explores how current network structure and current 
competitive strategy interact in explaining future firm performance (question 3 above). I 
briefly discuss the content of each of these chapters below.  
 
Figure 2: Theoretical Model 
 
 
Competitive Strategy and Firm Performance 
In Chapter 2, I introduce two distinctive strategies: advantage-creating and 
advantage-enhancing, and examine how these strategies enable firms to outperform rivals 
in hypercompetitive environments. Strategy in this study is conceptualized as a pattern in 
the stream of firms‘ actions over time (Mintzberg, 1978) or a tendency of firms to act in a 
particular way. I use the term tendency to emphasize that firms engage in recurring 
patterns of strategic actions over time. For example, some firms show tendencies to be 
frequently first to introduce new products and services and to develop radically new 
technologies. Because these strategic tendencies enable firms to create new competitive 
advantages, I will refer to them as advantage-creating tendencies. Other firms exhibit 
strong tendencies to aggressively initiate competitive actions (such as product 
improvements, price cuts, advertising, capacity building) that enable them to protect or 
extend their existing market position. These tendencies enhance the existing competitive 
advantages of the firm, and I refer to them as advantage-enhancing tendencies. Firms 
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differ in their abilities to pursue each tendency. Some firms outperform rivals by 
possessing superior advantage-creating capabilities, whereas others have superior 
capabilities to aggressively protect and enhance their existing competitive advantages. 
Firms that possess superior abilities to exhibit simultaneously high advantage-creating 
and high advantage-enhancing tendencies will exhibit the best performance (Ireland, Hitt, 
& Sirmon, 2003). I will refer to this combined strategic tendency as strategic 
entrepreneurship.  
Figure 3 shows the propositions developed in this chapter. I will argue that each 
type of strategy positively affects firm performance and that firms that are capable of 
simultaneously pursuing both advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing strategies 
(i.e., firms capable of pursuing strategic entrepreneurship) will exhibit the best 
performance.  
 
Figure 3: Competitive Strategy and Firm Performance 
 
 
Competitive Strategy and Network Formation  
In today‘s competitive landscape, firms cannot rely on internally controlled 
resources alone to pursue advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing strategies. They 
must collaborate with other firms to gain access to information, skills, expertise, assets, 
and technologies and thus leverage their internal resources. Different strategic tendencies 
create different needs, motivations and opportunities for collaboration with other market 
participants (e.g., competitors, distributors, suppliers, and customers). Thus, certain 
regularities in firms‘ strategic behavior can lead to distinctive and recognizable patterns 
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of networking behavior, which in turn leads to predictable types of network structure. I 
focus on two types of alliance network structure: dense and sparse. A dense network 
structure refers to the degree of interconnectedness among a firm‘s partners, whereas a 
sparse network structure refers to the degree to which a firm maintains ties with firms 
from disconnected clusters. Figure 4 below shows the propositions developed in Chapter 
3. I will argue that firms with superior advantage-creating strategies will become 
embedded in sparse network structures and have many non-equity alliances (weak ties), 
whereas firms with strong advantage-enhancing tendencies will be embedded in dense 
network structures with many equity-based alliances (strong ties) in the future. When 
firms are strategically entrepreneurial, they dynamically change the network structure 
over time. They create many new structural holes (i.e., connections with partners who are 
themselves disconnected), and subsequently stimulate collaborative activity among 
partners to sustain their newly created advantages. 
Figure 4: Competitive Strategy and Network Structure 
Advantage-creating 
Strategy
Advantage-enhancing 
Strategy
Network Structure 
•Global Structural Holes / Weak Ties 
•Ego Network Density / Strong Ties
X
 
 
Competitive Strategy, Network Structure, and Firm Performance  
If some firms pursue advantage-creating strategic tendencies and become 
embedded sparse network structures, whereas other firms exhibit advantage-enhancing 
strategic tendencies and form dense network structures, are these combinations of 
competitive strategies and network structures beneficial for firm performance? I examine 
this question in Chapter 4. Different network structure provides firms with distinctive 
benefits. A dense network structure stimulates efficient exchange of information, assets, 
expertise, and ideas and provides effective mechanisms for reducing the partners‘ 
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opportunistic behavior and free riding. A sparse network structure provides firms with 
exclusive information about the most recent technological advances in different 
industries, increased power to control competitive information in the network, and access 
to diverse resources and capabilities controlled by the other market participants (Burt, 
1992; Coleman, 1988; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 
2000; Ahuja, 2000a). However, the extent to which a firm can capitalize on such network 
potential depends on the type of competitive strategy a firm is pursuing. Thus, different 
network structures and competitive strategies will interact in explaining firm 
performance.  
Figure 5: Competitive Strategy, Network Structure and Firm Performance 
 
I propose two alternative theoretical arguments for the interplay between the 
network structure and competitive strategy in explaining firm performance. First, network 
structure can play a role of complementor (or enhancer) of firms‘ capabilities by 
providing firms with resource potential needed for successful pursuit of a given strategy. 
For example, firms with strong advantage-creating capability will be better able to exploit 
the advantageous access to diverse network resources than firms that lack such 
capabilities. Similarly, firms with strong advantage-enhancing capabilities will have 
greater potential to exploit the advantages that dense network brings about. Second, the 
network structure can play a role of substitutor for capabilities that a firm is lacking. For 
example, a firm that has superior advantage-creating capability may use a dense network 
of collaborators as a substitute for its advantage-enhancing capability. A firm embedded 
in a dense network structure, in which all firms contribute significantly in improving an 
existing complex product, can use the advantage-enhancing capabilities of network 
partners to complement its advantage-creating capabilities.  
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Intended Contributions for Research and Practice  
This dissertation contributes to the research in corporate entrepreneurship, 
strategic alliance networks, and strategic management in general. It extends the research 
in corporate entrepreneurship area by emphasizing the role of advantage-enhancing 
capabilities (i.e., capabilities to protect and further extend the newly created competitive 
advantages) in explaining how firms gain superior performance in hypercompetitive 
environments. Corporate entrepreneurship research mainly focuses on firms‘ abilities to 
create consistently new competitive advantages and, through this intensive 
entrepreneurial activity, to earn above-average profits that persist over time (Sharma & 
Chrisman, 1999; Covin & Miles, 1999). This study shows how advantage-enhancing 
capabilities of firms strengthen the effect of entrepreneurial strategies on firm 
performance. As such, this study is among the first to empirically examine the Ireland, 
Hitt, and Sirmon (2003) proposition that firms need to be ―strategically entrepreneurial‖ 
to outperform rivals consistently.  
In addition, corporate entrepreneurship research generally assumes that firms act 
entrepreneurially because of purposeful enactment of internal organizational processes, 
methods, and practices that stimulate entrepreneurial discoveries (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996; Dess, Lumpkin & Covin, 1997; Ireland, Covin & Kuratko, 2009). However, 
entrepreneurship is an act of removing market ignorance (Mises, 1949). A discovery of 
new things necessarily implies that other market participants were unaware of the 
existence of available resources and technologies that could produce resource 
configurations that provide superior value for customers (Kirzner, 1979). However, the 
opportunities for removing this market ignorance are unequally accessible to firms. Firms 
are unevenly aware of such opportunities in part because of their position in the overall 
alliance network structure. Alliances provide access to preferential information about the 
newly developed resource potential by other market participants; and therefore, a firm 
favorably positioned in the alliance network structure will be more aware of the 
opportunities for developing more productive resource combinations (Burt, 1992; 2005). 
Thus, to understand why some firms (and not others) are capable of systematically 
outperforming rivals in hypercompetitive environments, we need to consider both the 
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entrepreneurial abilities of firms and the potential for entrepreneurial discovery in the 
network in which they are embedded. Chapter 4 integrates the research in corporate 
entrepreneurship and social network theory to explain more completely the sources of 
performance differences across firms in hypercompetitive environments.  
This integrative approach of strategy and structure also extends the research in 
interfirm alliance networks. This research has rarely examined how firms‘ strategies (and 
their strategic resources) enable firms to exploit the advantages provided by the favorable 
positions in the network structure. Recently, Zaheer and Bell (2005) examined how 
certain innovative capabilities of firms enhance the relationship between network 
structure and firm performance, and Zahra and George (2002) emphasized the importance 
of internal capabilities of firms in exploiting the external resources available through 
network structure. This study extends this research by arguing that different strategies can 
benefit from different types of network structures and, therefore, network structures (e.g., 
dense or sparse networks) are not universally beneficial for firms‘ performance. Firms 
need to construct their alliance networks according to their strategic needs. Hence, this 
dissertation has some important managerial implications.  
Finally, Chapter 3 addresses the paucity of research on the antecedents of network 
formation. Several researches have emphasized the importance of understanding the 
origins of network formation and have called for more research on how firms can 
strategically shape their positions in the network structure (Stuart & Sorenson, 2007; 
Salancik, 1995). This is especially critical for strategy research as several researchers 
have shown that certain network positions enable firms to improve their performances 
(e.g., Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996; 
Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000; Zaheer & Bell, 2005; Uzzi, 1997; Ahuja, 2000a). 
Previous research on the antecedents of network formation has mostly examined 
contextual factors such as key industry events (Madhavan, Koka, & Prescott, 1998), prior 
alliance experience (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996), the competitive environment 
and market stages (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), and structural network properties 
such as past network centrality (Gulati, 1999; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) and network 
density (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven‘s study (1996) is among 
the few that examined some agent-based antecedents of the rate of alliance formation. 
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Although these studies have advanced our understanding of the likelihood of firms to 
form alliances, they have not addressed the question of how and why different strategies 
lead to different types of network structure and why some firms are embedded in 
networks with many structural holes whereas others tend to get embedded in dense 
network structures with many strong ties among network partners. Chapter 4 shows that 
different types of competitive strategies lead to different types of network structures.  
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CHAPTER II: COMPETITIVE STRATEGY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces two competitive strategies that enable firms to gain 
superior performance in hypercompetitive environments: advantage-creating and 
advantage enhancing strategies. Advantage-creating strategic tendencies refer to firms‘ 
tendencies to frequently create new competitive advantages by discovering radically new 
technologies (i.e., innovativeness) and proactively introducing new products (i.e., 
proactiveness). Advantage-enhancing strategic tendencies refer to firms‘ tendencies to 
aggressively introduce competitive actions (e.g., quality improvements, new product 
versions, creative advertising, price cuts, sale incentives, market expansions) that protect 
or enhance the competitive position of its existing products and services.  
I argue that firms that exhibit superior advantage-creating or advantage-enhancing 
strategic tendencies will outperform rivals. In addition, I posit that when a firm is capable 
of simultaneously pursuing both types of strategies, it will maximize its performance. 
Understanding how these two strategies affect firm performance is important for at least 
two reasons. First, empirical examination of the interplay between these two strategies 
will advance the research in corporate entrepreneurship and strategic entrepreneurship. 
This study is among the first to empirically investigate (at the firm level of analysis) how 
the interaction between these two strategies affects firm performance. Second, by 
showing that these strategies enable firms to outperform rivals, I provide relevance and 
justification for using these strategies in explaining how firms become embedded in 
different network structures (I examine this question in Chapter 3).  
Theoretical Background 
Conceptualization of competitive strategy 
Researchers have taken different approaches in conceptualizing and 
operationalizing firm strategy. For example, strategy can be viewed as a plan that defines 
long-term goals and objectives (Chandler, 1962), or as a distinctive, favorable and 
defendable positioning in the industry (vis-à-vis rivals) (Porter, 1985), or as a pattern or 
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consistency in the firm‘s actions over time (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). In this study, I 
follow Mintzberg and Waters‘s (1985) view of strategy and conceptualize (and 
operationalize) competitive strategy as a recurring pattern (or a tendency) in a firm‘s 
competitive behavior (Mintzberg, 1978). For example, a firm can exhibit a consistent 
pattern (tendency) of entrepreneurial behavior by frequently discovering radically new 
products and technologies. Other firms may focus more on protecting and enhancing their 
existing products and services and exhibit a tendency to intensively introduce actions 
such as new product versions, price cuts, advertising, promotions, capacity expansions, or 
new product features.  
I also assume that strategy is driven by the firm‘s ability to manage its resources 
strategically (Barney, 1991). As Penrose (1959: 84) noted ―the type of product in which 
the consumer might be interested is in effect very often suggested…by the firm‘s 
resources.‖ Managers continuously face many choices about restructuring, bundling, and 
leveraging their internally controlled resources (Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007; Ireland et 
al., 2003). The pattern of these resource allocation choices is reflected in the patterns of 
the firm‘s actual competitive behavior over time. Because the researchers often cannot 
observe resource allocation decisions, this dissertation focuses on examining the patterns 
in the firm‘s externally-oriented and observable competitive activity (Grimm & Smith, 
1997). For example, a firm‘s ability to strategically use its resource potential to enhance 
its existing market position (i.e., to pursue advantage-enhancing tendency) is reflected in 
its intensity of introducing competitive actions such as updates and improvements of 
existing products, and new product versions, advertising campaigns, promotional events, 
price cuts, sale incentives, extended warranties, new capacity, new distribution channels, 
and extended dealership networks. Likewise, firms with strong advantage-creating 
capabilities will be frequently first to introduce new products and services and will 
frequently generate path-breaking technologies. The focus is, therefore, on the actual 
(i.e., realized) and observable strategic tendencies of firms, and it is assumed that these 
tendencies are reflections of the firm‘s capabilities. The term capabilities refers to the 
concept of dynamic capabilities defined as ―the firm‘s ability to integrate, build, and 
reconfigure internal and external [resources] to address rapidly changing environments‖ 
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997:516). Resources include all production factors, 
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organizational routines, processes, technologies, reputation, status, competences, and 
other tangible and intangible assets available to a firm (either owned by the firm or 
available through network partners).  
Figures 6 and 7 below illustrate how I conceptualize competitive strategy in this 
dissertation. The firms‘ internal capabilities (advantage-creating and advantage-
enhancing), although unobserved, are reflected in firms‘ observed competitive behavior. 
For example, advantage-enhancing capability is reflected in firms‘ intensity of 
introducing price cuts, sales incentives, advertising and promotional campaigns, product 
versions and improvements, building new capacity and distributional channels, or market 
expansions. Advantage-creating capability is reflected in the frequency with which a firm 
issues patents, the extent to which patents have impact on subsequent technologies, and 
the extent to which the firm is first to commercialize new products and technologies.  
Figure 6: Conceptualization of Competitive Strategy 
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Figure 7: Conceptualization of Advantage-Creating and Advantage-Enhancing 
Strategy 
 
Defining advantage-creating strategy 
D‘Aveni (1994) argued that in today‘s hypercompetitive environments, firms 
cannot gain sustainable competitive advantage over rivals. Rivals can quickly imitate or 
make obsolete any advantage and therefore firms can outperform rivals only when they 
are able to create a series of new (temporary) competitive advantages. To achieve this, 
research has suggested that some firms adopt an entrepreneurial strategy-making mode 
(Dess, Lumpkin, & Covin, 1997). This entrepreneurial strategy is often driven by the 
presence of an entrepreneurial mindset (McGrath & MacMillan, 2000), an entrepreneurial 
orientation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), or entrepreneurial leadership and an entrepreneurial 
culture within the firm (Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003) that encourages the discovery of 
radically new products and technologies. Researchers have recognized that some firms 
exhibit systematic and recurring patterns of such entrepreneurial behavior that can be 
reliably and objectively studied (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Jennings & Lumpkin, 1989).  
For example, researchers have identified that some firms show the tendency to be 
frequently first to introduce new products on the market (i.e., proactiveness) (Miles & 
Snow, 1978; Miller, 1983; Miller & Friesen, 1978; Covin & Slevin, 1991, Covin & 
Miles, 1999; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). These proactive firms generate, change, and shape 
markets and industries rather than merely responding to the changes in their environment 
(Miller & Friesen, 1978). Other firms exhibit tendencies to frequently produce 
―significant technological breakthroughs, and reinvent themselves and retain 
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technological leadership in their industry‖ (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Covin and Miles 
(1999) argued that this innovative tendency enables firms to frequently rejuvenate and 
redefine their organizations, markets or industries. Both of these tendencies – 
proactiveness and innovativeness – enable firms to create new competitive advantages 
frequently. I refer to these two tendencies of firms – to be first to introduce innovative 
products and services and to pursue technological leadership – as advantage-creating 
tendencies. Following the prior research in corporate entrepreneurship area, I consider 
proactiveness and innovativeness as two interrelated but distinct dimensions that produce 
advantage-creating strategic tendency
1
 (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; 2001). Below I discuss 
each dimension separately.  
Proactiveness 
According to Jennings and Lumpkin (1989), ―an organization is entrepreneurial if 
it develops a higher than average number of new products and/or new markets.‖ Lumpkin 
and Dess (1996; 2001) clarified that proactiveness, as a dimension of the broader 
entrepreneurial orientation construct, captures the tendency of firms to introduce 
pioneering products in the industry. They defined proactiveness as ―introducing new 
products or services ahead of the competition and acting in anticipation of future demand 
to create, change, and shape the environment‖ (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001; p. 431). Thus, 
firms with a proactive orientation are first to introduce a product, service, or technology 
on the market and thus to surprise their rivals and change the environment. Similarly, 
Miles and Snow (1978) described entrepreneurial firms as those that pursue a 
―prospector‖ strategy, which is characterized by being first on the market to introduce 
new products and services: ―The prospector‘s prime capability is that of finding and 
exploiting new product and market opportunities‖ (p. 55). Finally, Miller (1983) and 
Miller and Friesen (1978) referred to proactive firms as those that are first to introduce 
innovative products, technologies, or administrative techniques intended to shape the 
environment rather than merely react. Consistent with previous research, I define 
proactiveness as a firm’s tendency to be first to introduce new products, services, or 
technologies on the market (i.e., ahead of competitors).  
                                                          
1
 I discuss how these two dimensions are interrelated in more detail in the methods section (Chapter 5).  
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Innovativeness 
Innovation is one of the major sources of a firm‘s ability to create new 
competitive advantages. Innovation is ―simply the doing of new things or the doing of 
things that are already being done in new ways‖ (Schumpeter, 1947: 151). The concept of 
innovation and its impact on firm performance and economic growth has been studied in 
many different fields and, therefore, many definitions have been offered. However, one 
common characteristic underlying all definitions is the element of newness (i.e., creation 
and adoption of something new) (Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997). Accordingly, the 
innovation construct encompasses the generation, development, and implementation of 
new ideas and behaviors (e.g., Damanpour, 1991). Covin and Miles (1999) noted that 
innovations are critical for a firm‘s ability to gain competitive advantage because they 
enable firms (1) to regenerate (by frequently introducing new products and services and 
entering new markets), (2) to rejuvenate (by significantly changing their organizational 
processes, structure, and capabilities), (3) to renew their strategies and the way they 
compete in the marketplace, and (4) to shape their product market domain and attain first 
mover status (Covin & Miles, 1999). Firms can purposefully instigate innovation by 
developing an organizational culture and an entrepreneurial mindset that promotes 
experimentation and creativity and by intensively spending on research and development 
for maintaining technological leadership (MacGrath & MacMillan, 2000; Lumpkin & 
Dess, 1996).  
Researchers have distinguished between different types of innovation: 
administrative and technical, product and process innovation, or radical and incremental 
innovation (Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997). In this study, I focus on technical and 
radical innovations. Accordingly, in this dissertation innovativeness refers to a firm’s 
tendency to pursue technological leadership. I assume that a firm with the capability to 
frequently discover radically new technologies is better able to create new competitive 
advantages than a firm without such capability (Ahuja, 2001). Hence, innovativeness 
captures the firm‘s tendency to discover new technologies, whereas proactiveness refers 
to the firm‘s tendency to be first to introduce (or commercialize) new products, services, 
and technologies on the market.  
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Defining advantage-enhancing tendencies  
The proponents of the ―entrepreneurial‖ strategies, discussed above, implicitly or 
explicitly assume that competitive advantages of firms are not persistent. Competitive 
advantages (unique resources or market positions) in hypercompetitive environments are 
quickly eroded either by imitative efforts of other firms or by developing more innovative 
products and technologies that make the existing products obsolete; therefore, firms need 
to frequently create new advantages and disrupt the status quo (D‘Aveni, 1994). In 
contrast, some researchers have emphasized that even in the most volatile environments, 
some firms can sustain their advantages for a prolonged period (e.g., Makadok, 1998). 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) emphasized several mechanisms that firms can 
strategically use to protect and enhance the durability of their superior competitive 
position. For example, firms with superior learning capabilities can quickly accumulate 
experience and move down the learning curve, which in turn enables them to cut prices 
and thus prevent market entry. They can also have the ability to quickly develop a variety 
of product versions and preemptively occupy attractive market niches (e.g., spatial 
preemption of locations in geographic and product characteristics space). Additionally, 
firms may have marketing competences to develop recognizable brand name or ability to 
add intensively new product features and updates to increase customers‘ switching costs. 
Porter (1985) noted a wide variety of strategic and tactical moves that firms use to protect 
their competitive position, such as building extra capacity, preempting shelf space, and 
cutting prices. Finally, in highly competitive environments, it is crucial that firms have 
the ability to intensively update and improve their existing products and thus keep ahead 
of competitors (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Porter, 1991). This competitive activity can 
be depicted by the intensity with which a firm introduces actions such as price cuts, sale 
incentives, advertising, promotions, product improvements, new product versions, new 
capacity, or market expansions. Because this competitive tendency is likely to enhance 
and further develop the firm‘s existing competitive advantages, I refer to this tendency as 
an advantage-enhancing strategy.  
Figure 8 illustrates the distinction between advantage-creating and advantage-
enhancing tendencies. The top portion of Figure 8 illustrates D‘Aveni‘s (1994) view of 
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how firms with strong advantage-creating tendencies gain superior performance. Because 
it is assumed that advantages are short lived in hypercompetitive environments, firms 
must create a series of new competitive advantages. By the time rivals imitate the 
existing advantage, the firm has created a new short-term competitive advantage and thus 
will remain ahead of its competition.  
The lower portion of Figure 8 depicts the role of firms‘ advantage-enhancing 
capabilities in maintaining competitive advantage over rivals. Despite operating in a 
hypercompetitive environment, Apple introduced the iPod in 2001 and has managed to 
sustain its competitive advantage for more than seven years. Apple managed this despite 
the market entry of several powerful competitors (e.g., Creative, Dell, and Gateway) 
within one year of iPod‘s first introduction. The competitors offered close substitutes to 
the iPod: similar quality levels and lower prices. Despite its rivals‘ quick reaction, Apple 
has sustained the iPod‘s competitive advantage by introducing actions that continuously 
enhanced the iPod‘s value. For example, Apple intensively introduced updated versions 
of the iPod, such as the iPod shuffle, the iPod movie, the iPod nano, and the iPod Photo, 
offered complementary software (iTunes) and expanded memory, launched new creative 
advertising campaigns frequently, introduced many sales incentives and price cuts, 
teamed with Nike, Disney, Motorola, and Timex to introduce product bundles, and 
entered new international markets (more detailed information about iPod‘s advantage-
enhancing activity is shown in Table 17 in the appendix). The intensity of these value-
enhancing actions enabled Apple to stay ahead of competitors and sustain its advantage.  
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Figure 8: Advantage-creating and Advantage-enhancing Strategic Tendencies 
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During any period, a firm may have a number of new product introductions and 
new technological inventions; or it can undertake many advantage-enhancing actions for 
several existing products. Across all firms in the industry, some firms show superior 
advantage-creating tendencies while others have superior advantage-enhancing 
tendencies. Some of these firms might possess superior capabilities in both types of 
strategic tendencies simultaneously, while others may be inferior in both tendencies. Note 
that a firm with strong advantage-enhancing tendencies may not be frequently first to 
introduce new products and still gain sustainable advantage and earn profits. A firm that 
is an early follower or even a late entrant, but which has superior advantage-enhancing 
capabilities, can quickly supersede the first mover and become market share leader.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Advantage-creating tendencies, advantage-enhancing tendencies, and firm 
performance 
As argued above, although all firms may exhibit some degree of advantage-
creating and advantage enhancing tendencies, firms vary in their abilities to pursue each 
type of tendency. Some firms may focus on developing superior entrepreneurial abilities 
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to frequently create innovative products and technologies and thus earn above average 
profits. Other firms may be able to create only a few new advantages but may possess a 
strong ability to continuously enhance and expand their existing advantages and thus 
outperform rivals. Indeed, previous research has shown that pioneers and firms with 
entrepreneurial strategies possess a different set of skills, practices, and competences than 
firms that focus on protecting and enhancing their existing advantages and are often 
followers or late entrants (e.g., Kerin, Varadarajan, & Peterson, 1992; Miles & Snow, 
1978; Covin & Slevin, 1989). The underlying cause of the differences in firms‘ skills and 
competences to pursue both strategies is based on the assumption that all firms face 
resource constraints. Firms have limited resources and thus they must make choices in 
allocating their attention and resources either toward continuously exploring new 
products, markets, and technologies or toward exploiting and enhancing their existing 
advantages (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). Prior research has suggested that 
firms with superior advantage-creating or superior advantage-enhancing capability can 
outperform rivals.  
On one hand, firms that show innovative and proactive tendencies (i.e., 
advantage-creating tendencies) frequently create and act on first-mover opportunities. 
These entrepreneurial actions disrupt the status quo on the market and often render the 
existing products and technologies of rivals obsolete (D‘Aveni, 1994). These 
groundbreaking entrepreneurial actions are complex and difficult for rivals to imitate 
(Smith & Di Gregorio, 2002), which causes delayed rivals‘ responses. This in turn can 
enable the first mover firms to gain (at least temporarily) above-average profits. First 
mover advantage literature has suggested that the late entrants gain substantially less 
market share than early entrants do (see Kalyanaram, Robinson, & Urban, 1995). 
Robinson (1988) and Robinson and Fornell (1985) showed that the order of market entry 
alone can explain from 9% to 18% of the variation in market share and Makadok (1998) 
found that first movers (in the money market mutual fund industry) were able to 
sustainably charge higher expense ratios (higher fees for operating the fund). Hence, we 
can expect that firms that are frequently first to introduce new products and technologies 
on the market will earn greater profits than will the less innovative and proactive firms. 
Indeed, research in corporate entrepreneurship has shown that firms can pursue an 
   
21 
 
entrepreneurial strategy regardless of their size and that this entrepreneurial strategy (or 
posture) has a positive effect on firm performance especially in highly volatile 
environments (Covin & Slevin, 1989). In addition, several researchers have shown that 
firms with entrepreneurial orientation (measured by its degree of proactiveness, 
innovativeness, and risk taking) exhibit superior performance (e.g., Wiklund, 1999; 
Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003; Zahra, 1991). Hence,  
Hypothesis 1: Firms’ advantage-creating tendencies will be positively related to 
firm performance. 
On the other hand, firms with strong advantage-enhancing tendencies can gain 
superior performance either by adopting a ―wait-and-see‖ strategy and entering the 
market once the uncertainty is resolved or by being able to successfully protect a few 
well-established competitive advantages. These firms may possess superior marketing 
and promotional capabilities, reputation and recognizable brand name, economies of 
scale and learning experience advantages, or ability to continuously update and improve 
the value of the existing products and services. These capabilities enable them to catch up 
quickly with first movers even if they enter the market as later entrants and gain profits. 
This is because later entrants have opportunity to learn from pioneers‘ mistakes, to collect 
more comprehensive information about the probability of success of the new 
product/technology, and benefit from lower imitation costs and free riding (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). Prior research has provided empirical evidence for this argument. 
For example, the research in competitive dynamics has shown that firms that compete 
aggressively with a wide variety of competitive actions (such as series of price cuts, 
advertising, and product versions) can dethrone industry leaders and gain greater market 
share and profits (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999). In addition, Boyd and Bresser (2008) 
provided evidence that moderately late entrants (firms that enter markets neither too fast 
nor too late) enjoyed performance advantages. This finding also suggests that firms with 
advantage-enhancing strategies can outperform rivals. On one hand, firms with 
advantage-enhancing tendencies are less likely to enter markets as early movers (second 
or third) because of their predominant focus on extending the existing advantages. On the 
other hand, they are also less likely to wait too long to enter the new markets, as they 
possess superior advantage-enhancing capabilities to quickly mobilize resources and 
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imitate the first movers‘ products and technologies. This capability enables them to offer 
a wide variety of new product versions at lower prices than those offered by first movers.  
This suggests that both advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing capabilities 
can enable firms to gain superior performance. For example, Abegglen and Stalk (1985) 
noted that Sony and Matsushita have developed different types of capabilities and use 
different strategies to outcompete rivals. Sony regularly develops technological 
innovations and introduces pioneering products, whereas Matsushita is often a follower in 
an established market who quickly overtakes rivals and becomes market share leader 
because of its strong advantage-enhancing capabilities (e.g., manufacturing and 
marketing expertise).  
Hence, I expect that advantage-enhancing strategic tendencies will also be 
positively related to firm performance in the future.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms’ advantage-enhancing tendencies will be positively related 
to firm performance.  
Strategic entrepreneurship and firm performance 
Thus far, I have argued that a firm can gain profits either by being a frequent first 
mover or by being a capable follower. Strong advantage-creating capabilities enable a 
firm to frequently discover new technologies and be first to introduce new products on 
the market. On the other hand, strong advantage-enhancing capabilities enable a firm to 
enter markets as a later entrant, quickly surpassing industry leaders and gaining profits. 
But, what are the performance implications for firms that are able to develop both types 
of capabilities?  
Ireland et al. (2001) and Hitt et al (2002) argued that firms that are able to develop 
both capabilities will exhibit superior profits. The authors referred to this simultaneous 
pursuit of advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing strategies as strategic 
entrepreneurship. Firms that pursue strategic entrepreneurship can outperform rivals in 
two ways. First, these firms are capable of not only frequently creating new competitive 
advantages but also sustaining those advantages longer and thus fully capitalizing on the 
first mover opportunities. More specifically, strong advantage-creating capabilities will 
lead to frequent discovery of new first mover opportunities and at the same time, strong 
   
23 
 
advantage-enhancing capabilities will enable them to quickly build entry barriers or 
intensively improve the value of the new products and thus stay ahead of competitors (as 
Apple did with iPod, see Figure 8). Second, firms pursuing strategic entrepreneurship can 
outperform rivals (1) by quickly eroding rivals‘ competitive advantages and (2) by 
capitalizing on rivals‘ newly created advantages. In the former case, advantage-creating 
capabilities lead to formation of new product categories and discoveries of radically new 
technologies; this innovative and proactive activity can make rivals‘ technology obsolete 
and can erode rivals‘ well-established monopolistic position on the market (because the 
new product category may offer superior value to that offered by the rival‘s established 
products). In the latter case, advantage-enhancing capabilities will enable them to 
effectively imitate rivals‘ newly created products and technologies and capitalize on 
pioneers‘ expenses in research and development of new products and technologies (e.g., 
costs of obtaining regulatory approvals, educating customers, developing infrastructure, 
learning from pioneers‘ experiences, and lower imitation costs through reverse 
engineering) (Porter, 1980; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). This suggests that a firm 
with both types of capabilities will be better able (1) to discover and fully capitalize on 
the first mover opportunities and (2) either to eliminate rivals‘ advantages or capitalize on 
their investment in research and development of new products and technologies. 
Consequently, the firms that possess both advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing 
capabilities will earn higher profits compared with firms that have either capability (but 
not both).  
Hypothesis 3: Firms pursuing strategic entrepreneurship (high advantage-
creating and high advantage-enhancing) will exhibit highest performance. 
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CHAPTER III: COMPETITIVE STRATEGY AND ALLIANCE NETWORK 
FORMATION 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that firms could develop superior internal 
capabilities that enable them to pursue intensively advantage-creating and advantage-
enhancing strategies. However, the differences in the firms‘ internally controlled 
resources and capabilities can only partially explain performance differentials across 
firms. Firms‘ ability to persistently outperform rivals depends also on the advantageous 
access to external information and resources uniquely held by other market participants 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). The increased competitive pressure and the unprecedented pace of 
technological change in most industries today (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; D‘Aveni, 1994) have 
made collaboration with other firms a necessary condition for sustained success in the 
marketplace. This increased collaborative activity, strategically initiated by firms in their 
efforts to outcompete rivals, leads to formation of a network of interfirm relationships (in 
the form of strategic alliances, joint ventures, and long-term agreements) at the system 
level. Each firm in the alliance network maintains a distinct portfolio of alliances and has 
a distinct pattern of alliance ties with other network members, which in turn provide 
different potential for gaining access to network resources (Gulati, 1998; Gulati, Nohria, 
& Zaheer, 2000). Applying social network theories, researchers have shown empirically 
that several network positions (e.g., brokerage position, ego network density, centrality) 
and configurations (e.g., diversity of ties, proportion of strong/weak ties) provide firms 
with advantageous access to network resources, which in turn is positively related to 
firms‘ performance (e.g., Zaheer & Bell, 2005; Ahuja, 2000a; Rowley, Behrens, & 
Krackhardt, 2000; Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2000; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 
1996).  
In this dissertation, I argue that the effect of network structure on firm 
performance is contingent on the type of competitive strategy the firm is pursuing. 
However, before I examine which type of network structure is optimal for a given type of 
strategy, it is important to understand how firms with different strategies become 
embedded in different network structures. Firms purposefully form alliances to support 
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their competitive strategies. The degree to which a firm has the ability to pursue 
advantage-creating or advantage-enhancing tendencies leads to different managerial 
choices and motivations about (1) the intensity of interorganizational collaborative 
activity, (2) the type of alliance partners, and/or (3) the type of alliance governance form 
(equity vs. non-equity). Thus, it is likely that the network structure is also a function of 
firms‘ strategies, because different strategies produce different needs and motivations for 
collaboration with other market participants. Hence, in this chapter, I examine how firms 
actually construct their network structures (i.e., how different strategies lead to different 
types of network structure).  
The prevailing preoccupation in the networks literature has been in understanding 
how the firm‘s network position leads to certain outcomes; less emphasis has been placed 
on how the firm arrives in that network position. A few studies that have tried to explain 
the origins of network positions have mainly focused on how previous network positions 
provide opportunities for alliance formation and how these tendencies lead to formation 
of certain network positions (e.g., Gulati & Garguilo, 1999; Gulati, 1999; Powell, Koput, 
& Smith-Doerr, 1996). Although these studies have increased our understanding of 
network structure formation, we still have ―very little systematic knowledge of how 
strategic actors construct their networks‖ (Stuart & Sorensen, 2007: 219, emphasis 
added). As Stuart and Sorensen (2007) noted, firms are not randomly assigned to network 
positions. Firms strategically and purposefully engage in collaborative activity in an 
effort to enhance their ability to gain or sustain competitive advantage. Different firms 
exhibit different strategies and these strategies create different needs, motivations, and 
incentives for collaborative activity. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that particular 
regularities in the strategic behavior of firms may lead to recognizable patterns of 
networking behavior, which in turn may result in being located in predictable network 
positions.  
This study adopts a resource-based view of alliance formation (Eisenghardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996). It assumes that alliances and the resulting network structure are 
driven by the firms‘ needs for resources or capabilities that are controlled by other firms. 
Firms have different strategic needs because they pursue different types of strategies and 
therefore certain strategies are associated with certain types of network structure. This is 
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not to say that firms are purposefully constructing their alliance network structure. Firms 
form alliances to satisfy their strategic needs, and these individual decisions aggregate to 
certain types of alliance network structure that may be the unintended outcome of this 
networking activity. Firms purposefully create alliances, but they may unintentionally 
become embedded in a certain network structure. I will argue that different firms exhibit 
recurrent patterns of strategic behavior and hence have different needs for external 
resources; therefore, they are consistently embedded in certain network structures. Thus, 
although the overall alliance network is constantly changing, firms with particular 
strategic tendencies tend to maintain stable network positions.  
Theoretical Background 
Previous research has identified two general sets of factors that affect firms‘ 
likelihood to form alliances: resource needs and social opportunities (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996). The first set of factors assumes that firms act strategically to 
outcompete rivals and earn profits. Therefore, firms form alliances to gain access to 
resources needed to accomplish certain strategic goals. For example, firms may use 
alliances to reduce the transaction costs and increase their operational efficiency. 
According to transaction cost economics, firms purposefully form joint ventures when the 
costs of writing and executing contracts are too high (because of a small number of 
bidders, asset specificity and hold up issues, a high degree of uncertainty, or significant 
incentives for partners to act opportunistically) and, at the same time, it is inefficient to 
internalize the production process (because the firm lacks such competences) 
(Williamson, 1975). Another explanation for alliance formation is based on resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This theory suggests that firms 
strategically form alliances to effectively manage symbiotic interdependencies 
(interdependencies between supplier and buyer) and competitive interdependencies 
(interdependencies between competitors). Furthermore, strategy researchers have focused 
on various characteristics of the firm such as top management team characteristics, 
employing an innovative strategy (Eisenhardt et al., 1996), and the availability of 
technical and commercial capital (Ahuja, 2000b) to explain the likelihood of firms to 
form alliances. Another research stream builds on exchange theory (Emerson, 1962) and 
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emphasizes the need for collectively achieving strategic goals through enhanced 
coordination, reciprocity, and mutual support (Oliver, 1990). Thus, according to this 
research, the motivation to form alliances is found in the achievement of collective goals. 
Finally, research based on institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1983) has highlighted the need for organizational legitimacy as an important 
motive for forming alliances (Baum & Oliver, 1991). This research argues that firms 
form alliances to improve their reputation and image, to signal creditworthiness, to gain 
government approval, to increase their attractiveness as worthy alliance partners, or to 
increase investors‘ confidence in their business activities (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007).  
The other set of factors focuses on the social opportunities for forming new 
alliance ties. Firms may have needs for external resources but may not have many 
opportunities for accessing the needed resources. Firms differ in the amount of 
information they have about which partners have complementary resources, which 
potential partners are actually interested in collaborative activity, and which firms might 
be reliable and valuable partners. Gulati (1999) showed that firms‘ awareness of potential 
partners is a function of their prior alliance experience and their favorable position in the 
network structure. Ahuja (2000a; 2000b) found that a focal firm is considered an 
attractive partner when it possesses a high degree of technical (innovative) and 
commercial capital. Prior alliance experience also provides information (often through 
third-party referrals) about the complementarity of the resources held by the potential 
partners, as well as the partners‘ trustworthiness and the likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior (Gulati, 1998; Gulati & Garguilo, 1999).  
In this chapter, I argue that firms vary in both their strategic needs for resources 
and their access to social opportunities for alliance activity as a function of their 
competitive strategy. Different strategies create different needs and opportunities for 
firms to obtain network resources. In particular, I focus on how two types of strategic 
tendencies – advantage-creating and advantage enhancing – lead to firms forming either 
dense or sparse network structures. Network density refers to a network structure in which 
a large proportion of a firm‘s network partners are connected with one another. Thus, a 
firm is embedded in a dense network when all of its alliance partners are connected with 
each other. Coleman (1988) argued that actors (individuals or firms) can benefit from 
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being embedded in a dense network because it creates norms, obligations, and 
reciprocity; promotes the development of trust; and ease the transfer of information and 
resources. In contrast, other firms might be embedded in a sparse network structure, 
which provides opportunities for them to bridge structural holes. Structural holes are the 
disconnections between two clusters of actors; brokers are the firms that bridge between 
the two disconnected clusters of actors. Burt (1992) argued that actors embedded in 
networks with many structural holes enjoy competitive advantage because (1) they have 
faster access to diverse and nonredundant information because they bridge different 
knowledge and information pools, which tend to be homogeneous within the same cluster 
and heterogeneous across different clusters, and (2) they have the power to control the 
flow of information and resources from one to another part of the network.  
I will argue that firms with advantage-creating strategic tendencies will tend to be 
embedded in sparse networks with many structural holes, whereas firms with an 
advantage-enhancing strategy will be embedded in dense network structures. In addition, 
because a sparse network structure is often associated with weak ties (Granovetter, 1973), 
whereas strong ties enhance the stability of dense network structures, I also examine how 
advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing strategies affect firms‘ tendencies to form 
weak and strong ties. In this study, weak ties refer to non-equity alliances (e.g., licensing, 
long-term supply contracts, marketing and distribution agreements), whereas strong ties 
refer to equity alliances (e.g., joint ventures and other strategic alliances in which partners 
exchange equity). Strategic alliances refer to ―any voluntarily initiated interfirm 
cooperative agreement that involves exchange sharing, or co-development, and it can 
include contributions by partners of capital, technology or firm-specific assets‖ (Gulati, 
1995:621).  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Advantage-creating tendencies and network structure 
An advantage-creating tendency refers to the tendency of a firm to develop 
radically new products and technologies (innovativeness) and to frequently be first on the 
market to introduce new products and services (proactiveness). I argue that firms with 
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advantage-creating tendencies are more likely to form new alliances with partners outside 
their current network. This behavior in turn will lead to forming sparse network structures 
with many structural holes.  
First, proactive firms, by definition, tend to frequently introduce new products 
ahead of competitors (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). This frequent discovery of new products 
creates a greater need for acquiring or developing new and different resources and 
capabilities. For example, when a firm introduces a pioneering product it often needs to 
form new relationships with suppliers, distributors, manufacturers, customers, or other 
firms with complementary products, technologies, or services. Although some of the 
existing partners may provide adequate resources and capabilities, it is likely that the 
introduction of radically new products will require new sets of partners with more 
compatible and sophisticated resources. As a result, proactive firms will frequently bring 
new partners into their networks and thus are less likely to be locked in dense networks. 
In support of this argument, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) found that firms in 
emergent-stage markets have a higher rate of new alliance formation than firms in other 
market stages (e.g., in growth stage or mature stage markets).  
Firms with proactive tendencies also continuously search for new partners to 
explore new opportunities to offer superior value to customers. Sarkar, Echambadi, and 
Harrison (2001: 702) argued that proactive firms exhibit greater ―efforts to identify 
potentially valuable partnering opportunities and to initiate preemptive actions in 
response to identified opportunities.‖ These exploratory tendencies lead to frequent 
discoveries of unique ways for creating product bundles that provide greater value to 
customers (e.g., Apple collaborated with Disney, Nike, and GM to create product bundles 
with iPod). This continuous recognition of partners with complementary resources or 
products from a wide range of indsutries leads to formation of new structural holes.  
Proactive firms are not only first to introduce innovative products, but are also 
more likely to enter new markets with new or existing products. Proactive firms actively 
seek for opportunities where their newly created products provide superior value (i.e., 
better quality for similar price, or similar quality for significantly lower price, or both) to 
customers in different markets and market segments (Kirzner, 1973). For example, firms 
increasingly use alliances and joint ventures to accelerate entry into international markets 
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by gaining access to local market knowledge, sharing investment risk and resources 
(Garcia-Canal, Duarte, Criado, & Llaneza, 2002). This again leads to formation of 
network structures with many structural holes – in this case by forming alliances with 
partners across geographical regions and countries.  
Firms that pursue advantage-creating tendencies are also more innovative than 
their rivals. The discovery of new technologies increases both (1) the potential of the 
innovative firm to discover new resource combinations through forming alliances with 
firms with complementary resources and (2) the likelihood that other firms will approach 
the innovative firm with new ideas for collaborative activity. Shane (2000), for example, 
observed that the discovery of three-dimensional printing (3DP) technology generated 
opportunities for many firms from technologically distant industries (e.g., 
pharmaceuticals, orthopedics, surgical models, retail consumer goods) to combine their 
own resources and competencies with the newly developed technology. This suggests 
that when a firm discovers a radically new technology it increases the range of 
opportunities for discovering more productive resource combinations with diverse 
partners. Ahuja (2000a) argued that innovative firms are considered attractive partners 
and are often approached by other firms with ideas for combining their complementary 
resources. This further suggests that innovative firms will be more likely to form new 
alliance ties and thus bring new partners into their networks. Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1996) provided empirical evidence that innovative firms are more likely to 
form new alliances than their less innovative rivals do.  
Finally, firms with a history of innovative activity are attractive alliance partners 
for gaining legitimacy. Allying with innovative partners often provides assurance that the 
new entrepreneurial venture is highly likely to succeed. As Dacin, Oliver, and Roy (2007: 
177) noted, ―investor confidence in a novel or seemingly risky initiative may be secured 
by entering into a strategic alliance with a partner who exhibits strong support, 
experience, and confidence for the uncertain business activity by its willingness to share 
risk in the investment.‖ Because new industry players will have greater need to legitimize 
their entrepreneurial activity (Baum & Oliver, 1991), they are more likely to seek to form 
an alliance with a firm having a reputation for successful innovating. This again suggests 
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that innovative firms will have more opportunities to establish alliances with new 
partners and therefore will tend to form more structural holes.  
Hypothesis 4: Firms exhibiting higher advantage-creating tendencies 
(proactiveness and innovativeness) will have more structural holes in their 
alliance network structure in subsequent periods.  
Advantage-creating tendencies and weak ties 
Firms exhibiting high levels of advantage-creating tendencies will also be more 
likely to form non-equity alliances rather than equity alliances as compared with firms 
that are less proactive and innovative, because non-equity alliances provide more 
flexibility for entrepreneurial firms both to form new alliances and to dissolve the old 
ones.  
As argued above, proactive firms are continuously first to develop and introduce 
new products. This tendency creates a greater need to form new alliances because the 
new products and technologies are likely to be incompatible with the competencies of the 
current set of alliance partners. As firms move from one product to another (or as they 
introduce radically new technologies), the old collaborative relationships may no longer 
be effective and/or productive. Proactive firms will therefore not only create many new 
alliances but also will terminate their alliances sooner and at a higher rate than firms that 
are not proactive. This is not to say that all types of alliances will become unproductive 
or ineffective. For example, a distributor or a manufacturer may successfully adjust 
operations to serve the newly developed product, which may lead them to renew and 
extend the alliance contract. On average, though, it is more likely that firms with greater 
advantage-creating tendencies will have greater need to restructure their alliance portfolio 
than firms that rarely introduce radically new products and technologies. This tendency 
requires greater flexibility to exit the old alliances, given that all firms face limitations 
about the number of alliances they can enter and reasonably maintain.  
This flexibility can be more efficiently achieved by forming non-equity alliances. 
Non-equity alliances do not involve exchange of equity between partners and typically do 
not entail hierarchical controlling mechanisms and joined ownership structure (Gulati, 
1995; Gulati & Singh, 1998). As a result, non-equity alliances are less costly and require 
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less time to terminate (Harrigan, 1988). Equity alliances, on the other hand, involve 
shared equity and more formal organizing mechanisms such as authority and command 
systems, incentive systems, or standard operating procedures (Gulati & Singh, 1998). As 
such they provide less strategic flexibility because they are ―normally considered more 
difficult than a contractual agreement[s] to establish, terminate, and fundamentally 
change‖ (Osborn & Baughn, 1990: 505). Because proactive and innovative firms 
continuously generate new opportunities for collaborative activity and therefore exhibit 
greater rate of alliance turnover, the non-equity alliances would be more suitable for 
pursuing an advantage-creating strategy, as compared with equity alliances. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 5: Firms exhibiting higher advantage-creating tendencies 
(proactiveness and innovativeness) will have more non-equity alliances in their 
alliance network in subsequent periods.  
Advantage-enhancing tendencies and network structure 
Firms exhibiting advantage-enhancing tendencies intensively and continuously 
enhance the value of existing products and services. In highly competitive environments, 
this advantage-enhancing tendency is highly dependent on close collaboration and 
coordination of activities among several firms. Baldwin and Clark (2003) noted that firms 
in industries such as personal computers or consumer electronics have adopted modular 
system designs to cope with the high pace of technological change. ―A modular system is 
composed of units (or modules) that are designed independently but still function as an 
integrated whole‖ (p. 151). Modules thus refer to a group of interrelated components or 
subsystems (e.g., peripherals, processors, software applications, displays) that, combined 
with other modules and components, form a complex product (such as a computer or an 
iPhone). To deal with this enormous product complexity, firms in these industries 
specialize in developing one or few modules (or components). This greater flexibility by 
the module providers permits greater experimentation and innovation, which in turn leads 
to frequent improvements and upgrades of different components of the whole product. 
However, because each component/module is continuously modified by 
independent firms, the module providers must communicate and interact intensively. A 
complex product comprises components and modules that are highly interrelated; any 
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change in one component requires appropriate adjustments of other components. Garud 
and Kumaraswamy (2003) noted that the improvements of different components (or 
modules) cannot be effectively integrated into the whole product through arm-length 
relationships. Instead, integration requires formation of alliances and joint ventures that 
facilitate the exchange of fine-grained information about each module‘s functions: how a 
particular module interacts with other modules, and how all components and modules fit 
together in the whole product. Alliances help coordination among module suppliers and 
thus ensure that the improvements and upgrades in the performances in one module will 
be compatible with other components. For clarity, it is useful to distinguish between a 
firm architect and a firm module-designer (Baldwin & Clark, 2003). A firm architect is 
responsible for the design of the whole product (e.g., Apple is an architect of iPod); while 
a firm module-designer is responsible for manufacturing and designing particular 
modules and components. I argue that both firm architects and firm module-designers 
that exhibit strong advantage-enhancing tendencies will tend to form a dense network 
structure.  
The firm architect is likely to encourage its network partners to collaborate with 
one another for at least two reasons. First, as Garud and Kumaraswamy (2003) noted, 
standardization can be achieved through close collaboration among component providers. 
Standardization refers to ―the use of the same component in multiple products…‖ (p. 
132). Standardized components involve lower costs: a standard component can be used in 
several versions of the product, thus providing greater economy of scale and scope and 
higher performance. Another reason for firms with advantage-enhancing strategy to 
develop dense network structure is the increased need for ensuring greater compatibility 
among various components of the complex product. As argued above, when independent 
firms are continuously improving a complex product (e.g., 90% of iPod‘s components are 
outsourced), the process requires intensive communication to assure compatibility (1) 
between the firms‘ architects and module (components) designers, and (2) among all 
firms component-designers. Dense alliance networks enhance information exchange 
among network partners and prevent information spillover outside the network by 
imposing strong norms, expectations, and sanctions for network members (Coleman, 
1988). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the firm-architect (in an attempt to enhance 
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the market position of their existing modular products), will work hard to encourage 
partners to collaborate with one another and create dense network structures.  
However, this cannot be accomplished unless network partners (module 
designers) also have strong incentives to collaborate. For a firm module-designer, 
information exchange about specific characteristics of the other components/modules as 
well as updates and improvements of the other components are crucial for achieving 
greater alignment and compatibility. Greater compatibility in turn provides greater 
operational efficiency and avoids unnecessary delays and product malfunctioning. 
Because the success of a complex product in the marketplace affects the profitability of 
all participating firms, module designers also have strong incentives to closely 
collaborate.  
This suggests that both firm architects and firm module designers will seek to 
closely collaborate with one another to continuously improve the existing modular 
product and thus create a dense network structure.  
Hypothesis 6: Firms exhibiting higher advantage-enhancing tendencies will have 
higher degree of network density in the subsequent periods.  
Advantage-enhancing tendencies and strong ties 
While advantage-creating tendencies require greater flexibility in restructuring the 
alliance portfolio, advantage-enhancing tendencies require a more stable network in 
which partners develop trustful relationships and intensively collaborate to develop 
compatible components. Network stability can be enhanced when firms form equity 
alliances. One characteristic of equity alliances is that they are more difficult and costly 
to dissolve (Das & Teng, 2000; Gulati, 1995). This characteristic reduces high alliance 
turnover rate, and thus strengthens the current network structure.  
As argued above, advantage-enhancing tendencies in the context of modular 
product design require intensive exchange of information for effective coordination 
among all partners responsible for manufacturing various components. Equity alliances 
in this respect are more effective in managing such interdependencies than are non-equity 
alliances. Equity alliances typically involve some form of governance structure and 
hierarchical elements such as authority and incentive systems, standard operating 
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procedures, dispute resolution procedures, and nonmarket pricing systems that enable 
coordination between partners (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Gulati and Singh (1998) showed 
empirically that firms are more likely to form equity alliances when they face a higher 
degree of interdependency.  
In addition, equity alliances promote trust development and deter opportunistic 
behavior (Gulati, 1995). Trust between partners is critical if they are to share confidential 
information and knowledge. Reduced concerns that partners will act opportunistically 
encourage firms to invest in transaction-specific assets and be more willing to share 
knowledge and resources and thus jointly develop new competences. This mutual 
commitment toward achieving a common goal is an essential precondition for continuous 
improvement and enhancement of the value of an existing modular product.  
Hypothesis 7: Firms exhibiting higher advantage-enhancing tendencies will have 
more equity alliances in subsequent periods.  
Strategic entrepreneurship and network structure 
Although advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing strategies are distinct, it is 
also possible that some firms are able to pursue both simultaneously. These firms have 
been identified as following a strategy of ―strategic entrepreneurship.‖ Following Ireland, 
Hitt, and Sirmon (2003), strategic entrepreneurship is defined here as the simultaneous 
pursuit of advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing strategies at high levels relative 
to other industry participants. As argued above, however, advantage-creating and 
advantage-enhancing tendencies lead to different types of network structures.  
On the one hand, proactive advantage-creating tendencies create a greater need 
for restructuring the alliance portfolio and seeking out new partners with complementary 
resources and capabilities, because being first in the market to introduce a new product 
often requires a new set of partners. Similarly, innovative advantage-creating tendencies 
create more opportunities for forming alliances with new partners because (1) innovative 
firms are attractive partners and (2) innovative technologies generate new entrepreneurial 
opportunities. This leads to forming sparse network structures. On the other hand, firms 
that pursue strategic entrepreneurship also have strong advantage-enhancing abilities that 
stimulate the formation of dense network structures. They are likely to subsequently 
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encourage the new firms to closely collaborate with their other network partners because 
network coordination is critical for continuously enhancing the current competitive 
advantages. Their new partners will also have incentive to collaborate because it is to 
their benefit to become valued partners within the innovative firm‘s network.  
So, within what type of network structure will ―strategically entrepreneurial‖ 
firms be embedded? Firms that pursue strategic entrepreneurship will exhibit dynamic 
network structures with moderate levels of network density and structural holes. 
Advantage-creating tendencies will continuously create new alliances and bring new 
partners into the network and thus form new structural holes, whereas advantage-
enhancing tendencies will encourage those new partners to form ties with the other 
network partners and thus close up the structural holes. This dynamic cycle of creating 
and closing structural holes will change the level of density and structural holes in the 
firm‘s network. Thus, we can expect that the relative degree to which a firm pursues 
advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing tendencies at any given time will determine 
the type of their network structure. Specifically, an increase in advantage-creating 
tendencies will increase the number of structural holes, whereas an increase in advantage-
enhancing tendencies will decrease the number of structural holes. Alternatively, an 
increase in advantage-creating tendencies will decrease network density, whereas an 
increase in advantage-enhancing tendency will increase network density. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 8a: There will be a negative interaction between advantage-creating 
and advantage-enhancing tendencies of firms in explaining the future degree of 
network density. 
 
Hypothesis 8b: There will be a negative interaction between advantage-creating 
and advantage-enhancing tendencies of firms in explaining the future number of 
structural holes in the alliance network structure.  
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CHAPTER IV: COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, ALLIANCE NETWORK STRUCTURE 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2, I argue that firms vary in their capabilities to pursue advantage-
creating and advantage-enhancing tendencies. In Chapter 3, I show that each type of 
strategic tendency tends to lead a firm to be embedded in a different type of network 
structure. This chapter explores how these combinations of strategic and networking 
tendencies affect firm performance. More specifically, I address the following questions: 
If advantage-creating tendencies lead to sparse network structures, whereas advantage-
enhancing tendencies lead to dense network structures, are these combinations of strategy 
and network structure the most beneficial for the firm‘s performance? If not, what is the 
optimal network position for a given strategic tendency that enhances a firm‘s 
performance? Answers to these questions are important both (1) for gaining greater 
understanding of how firms should construct their networks and (2) for providing a more 
complete explanation of the causes for conflicting findings about the relationship 
between network structure and performance (e.g., Ahuja, 2000a; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). 
First, providing empirical support for the optimal fit between different strategies and 
network positions can provide basis for developing normative propositions; that is, how 
should managers construct their networks to enhance the effect of their strategy on firm 
performance? Second, the empirical research on social networks has demonstrated 
conflicting findings about which type of network structure (sparse vs. dense network) is 
more beneficial for the firm. This study tries to reconcile these opposing perspectives by 
arguing that the effect of the network structure on firm performance is contingent on the 
type of strategy the firm is pursuing.  
Theoretical Background 
Previous research has mainly examined how the firm‘s position in the network 
structure directly affects firm performance. The main argument is that certain positions in 
the network structure provide firms with unique resources and strategic information 
(controlled by other network members) that is not available to other firms. Because some 
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firms consistently occupy such advantageous network positions (and thus preferential 
access to network resources), they are able to gain a sustainable competitive advantage 
over rivals (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000).  
Two basic arguments exist about which type of alliance network structure is the 
most beneficial for an actor. The first argument is that dense network structures (network 
structures in which all actors are highly interconnected with one another) are conducive 
to developing strong norms, reciprocity, and trust. These collective network properties on 
one hand encourage efficient exchange of information, resources, and ideas and on the 
other hand, curb partners‘ opportunistic behavior by enforcing sanctions (Coleman, 
1988). The second argument is that sparse network structures with many brokerage 
opportunities provide benefits for actors. Brokerage opportunities exist when a focal actor 
links other disconnected members of its network. The absence of ties between 
disconnected others is called a structural hole (Burt, 1992). When an actor spans many 
structural holes in its network, the actor enjoys two types of benefits: (1) preferential 
access to nonredundant information, and (2) the power to control the information flow 
between disconnected parties.  
The mechanisms through which these network structures provide benefits for 
network members are quite different. Network density (also called network closure) 
primarily works through solidarity, coordination, and collective action; whereas network 
brokerage works through providing opportunities for entrepreneurial action. To some 
extent, network density and network brokerage offer alternative ways for actors to gain 
benefits. For example, network density eases coordination among network members, 
whereas sparse networks may hinder the cooperative exchange of information among 
members. In operational terms, the two types of network structure more clearly appear to 
be mutually exclusive. A sparse network structure with many brokerage opportunities 
implies that the network structure is not dense. When a focal firm‘s partners are 
disconnected, it has a maximum number of structural holes, whereas when all of its 
partners are connected, the focal firm has a maximum density score of one.  
Empirical research at the firm level of analysis (i.e., when actors are firms, not 
individuals) has also produced conflicting findings. Uzzi (1997) documented that firms 
embedded in a dense network have access to fine-grained information and knowledge 
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from network partners and exhibit a higher likelihood of surviving. Ahuja (2000a) also 
found that network density is more beneficial for firms‘ innovative performance. In 
contrast, research has also found that firms embedded in a sparse network structure 
exhibit greater revenue growth (Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2000) and enjoy greater 
market share (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). 
In general, research has taken two approaches in reconciling these opposing 
arguments. On one hand, Burt (2000) and Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) posited that 
network density and brokerage are complementary arguments and thus an actor can 
simultaneously gain benefits from brokerage and closure. For example, actor A may 
benefit from its membership in two dense clusters X and Y, whose members are 
disconnected. Thus, actor A can enjoy the benefits from its membership in X and Y, and, 
at the same time, enjoy brokerage position between the members of X and members of Y.  
On the other hand, some researchers propose a contingency perspective in 
explaining how network structure provides benefits for network members. Rowley et al. 
(2000) argued that whether a firm will benefit from a dense or sparse network structure 
depends on the type of competitive environment it faces. They argued that in stable 
environments (e.g., the steel industry), network density increases firms‘ performances, 
whereas in dynamic environments (e.g., the semiconductor industry) sparse network 
structures will be more beneficial. Their empirical findings showed that the effect of 
network density on firm performance was stronger in stable environments. Zahra and 
George‘s (2002) work suggested that whether a firm will exploit the resources embedded 
in the network structure will depend on their internally developed absorptive capacity 
(i.e., their ability to recognize, assimilate, and exploit external knowledge and 
information). Building on this argument, Zaheer and Bell (2005) showed that more 
innovative firms have a greater ability to extract value from a sparse network structure, 
and thus exhibit better performance. Finally, discussing the conflicting findings in the 
literature, Ahuja (2000a) also speculated that which type of network structure (sparse 
versus dense) would be more beneficial for a firm may depend on what it seeks to 
achieve through the network structure.  
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Theory and Hypotheses 
This dissertation also adopts a contingency perspective. I posit that whether a firm 
will benefit from a sparse or dense network structure depends on the type of competitive 
strategy it exhibits. Each type of network structure provides distinct benefits that are 
differentially relevant for each type of strategy. I develop two theoretical explanations for 
the interplay between network position and firm strategy in explaining firm performance: 
(1) network as complementor of firms‘ capabilities and (2) network as substitutor of 
firms‘ capabilities.  
Network-as-complementor. The first potential role of a network involves having 
the resources provided by a particular network position that complements and enhances a 
given type of strategy. Specifically, a firm with strong advantage-creating tendencies can 
better exploit the diverse and unique information provided through a sparse network 
structure than a firm with low emphasis on such a strategy. Similarly, a high level of 
advantage-enhancing capabilities enables firms to better realize the resource potential 
provided by a dense network.  
Network-as-substitutor. The second potential role of network refers to the use of 
network position as a substitute for capabilities that a firm is lacking. The rationale for 
the beneficial impact of this role builds on the strategic entrepreneurship argument that 
firms need to have both high advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing capabilities. 
Thus, a firm with strong advantage-creating capabilities may use the capabilities of a 
dense network of collaborators to enhance its advantage-enhancing capabilities. 
Likewise, a firm with strong advantage-enhancing capabilities may use a network 
structure rich with structural holes to gain access to innovative partners outside of their 
cluster, and thus substitute for their lack of internal advantage-creating capabilities. I next 
discuss how each combination of strategy and structure might positively affect firm 
performance.  
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Advantage-creating tendencies and firm performance 
A complementary role of a sparse network structure  
Firms that span structural holes are more at ―risk‖ of discovering profit 
opportunities (Burt, 1992). I refer to profit opportunity as a situation in which a firm 
becomes aware of a unique combination of resources (internal, external, or both) that 
could produce superior value for customers. Network positions create such situations by 
providing unique access to information, resources, or technologies that could be used to 
create a product or service that is superior to those hitherto offered by competitors. A 
firm embedded in a network structure rich with structural holes has greater awareness of 
and access to a diverse set of resources and competences uniquely held by firms in 
different industries and industry segments. However, the access to resources and the 
ability (and motivation) to exploit those resources are distinct processes (Portes, 1998). 
The network position only provides the potential for gaining valuable and advantageous 
information and resources. A mere exposure to diverse network resources is insufficient 
for creating new competitive advantages. A firm needs the capability to create unique 
resource configurations by combining its internal resources with those available through 
network ties. Zahra and George (2002) noted that firms can utilize the external resources 
and information if they have developed routines and processes to analyze, interpret, and 
make sense of new information, if they possess the capability to re-combine the 
externally acquired resources with their own internally developed resource potential, and 
they have the ability to utilize the newly created resource base in developing pioneering 
products.  
A firm with strong advantage-creating tendencies (innovative and proactive) will 
be better able to utilize the diverse resource potential available through network ties. 
These innovative and proactive firms are recognized by their ability to continuously 
experiment with new products and technologies and stay alert to the changes in their 
environments. They also have greater experience in developing new resource 
configurations than less innovative and proactive firms (Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko, 
2009). Building on this argument, Zaheer and Bell (2005) tested the interaction between 
innovative capabilities and sparse network structure in explaining firm performance and 
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found that highly innovative firms with access to many structural holes outperform rivals. 
This suggests that more innovative and proactive firms will be better able to utilize the 
access to diverse information provided by sparse network structures, and will thus 
perform better in the future. Thus, in this case, the network rich with structural holes 
complements and enhances the firm‘s advantage-creating tendencies. 
Hypothesis 9: The number of structural holes in the alliance network structure 
will strengthen the relationship between advantage-creating tendency and firm 
performance.  
A substitutive role of a dense network structure 
Alternatively, a firm with strong advantage-creating tendencies can use a dense 
network structure to substitute for the lack of advantage-enhancing capabilities. This 
combination of strategy and network structure would be especially beneficial for firm 
designers that develop strong capabilities for frequently creating innovative product 
designs. Once the new complex product is designed, the responsibility for its continuous 
enhancement can be shifted to network partners. A dense network structure facilitates 
information flow and encourages an intensive exchange of ideas and resources that can 
lead to frequent improvements and updates of existing products. Thus, instead of building 
its own advantage-enhancing capabilities, a firm can focus on developing superior 
advantage-creating capabilities and maintain a dense alliance network structure as a way 
of substituting for lacking the internal advantage-enhancing capabilities. For example, 
Apple‘s superior advantage-creating capabilities led to discovering the iPod, but the 
continuous enhancement and improvement of the iPod (i.e., advantage-enhancing 
activity) is mainly carried out in close collaboration with the other component providers 
in its network. This combination of an advantage-creating strategy and a dense network 
structure enables Apple to sustain its advantages over rivals. In addition, Linden, 
Kraemer, and Dedrick (2007) showed that Apple captured a far larger portion of the 
iPod‘s gross profit margin than did any of the other component providers, retailers, and 
distributors. This further suggests that firms with advantage-creating tendencies can 
enhance their performance when they are embedded in a dense network structure and 
thus use partners‘ capabilities to substitute for advantage-enhancing capability.  
   
43 
 
Hypothesis 10: The degree of density in the alliance network structure will 
strengthen the positive effect of advantage-creating tendency on firm 
performance.  
Advantage-enhancing tendencies and firm performance 
A complementary role of dense network structure 
As argued in Chapter 3, firms are increasingly becoming specialized in 
manufacturing one or a few components of a complex product. No single firm can have 
all the capabilities needed to continuously enhance and upgrade the value of an existing 
complex product. Therefore, it is crucial for a firm to collaborate with other component 
providers and encourage the other component providers to collaborate. I argue that firms 
with advantage-enhancing tendencies embedded in a dense network will be more 
successful in inducing partners (component providers) to commit their time and resources 
to continuously improve an existing product. Thus, in this case, dense network structure 
will play a complementary role to the firm‘s advantage-enhancing capabilities.  
A firm with a strong commitment to advantage-enhancing activity is more likely 
to generate reciprocal expectations from network partners to match its inputs by investing 
extra time and resources in the joined project. A dense network enhances this process 
because it encourages the development of norms, solidarity, and obligations and leads to 
the development of shared behavioral expectations (Rowley, 1997). In addition, when all 
firms are interconnected, the information about an actor‘s behavior deviating from the 
established norms is quickly disseminated throughout the network, and is immediately 
sanctioned (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997). In addition, a dense network eases the 
exchange of ideas, information, and resources among network members, which creates 
system-level benefits for all participating firms. The increased input of all network 
partners creates synergy at the network level and thus enables each individual partner to 
gain greater benefit for their input. The intensive information-exchange also reduces the 
possibilities of product malfunctioning, which can adversely affect product sales and firm 
performance. This suggests that a firm with a strong focus on an advantage-enhancing 
strategy will be better able to extend its existing competitive advantages when it is 
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embedded in a dense network. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the network density 
will augment the effect of advantage-enhancing strategy on firm performance.  
Hypothesis 11: The degree of density in the alliance network structure will 
strengthen the positive effect of advantage-enhancing tendencies on firm 
performance.  
A substitutive role of a sparse network structure 
A firm with strong advantage-enhancing tendencies may use a network with high 
degree of structural holes to substitute for its advantage-creating capabilities. Because a 
sparse network provides preferential access to information and technologies from a wide 
range of geographical and technological clusters, a firm can substitute for its lack of 
advantage-creating capabilities in at least two ways. First, a firm that maintains alliances 
with firms from different clusters (industries or regions) can recognize more 
opportunities for entering new product markets. Second, because brokerage ties provide 
timely information about technological advances from distant network clusters, these 
firms have greater awareness of collaborative opportunities with inventors. This suggests 
that a firm with strong advantage-enhancing capabilities, embedded in a network with 
many (global) structural holes, is in a better position to identify innovative firms and 
offer collaborative activity to these firms. At the same time, because of their strong 
advantage-enhancing capability, they are attractive partners for innovative firms. 
Innovative firms have also a need to identify firms with strong advantage-enhancing 
capabilities to successfully commercialize their new products and technologies 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).  
Furthermore, a sparse network structure also provides quick access to information 
about new industries and technological trends. This can increase a firm‘s ability to more 
accurately anticipate the introduction of pioneering products and technologies. The 
timely information provided through the network can enable a firm to begin developing 
capabilities to enter the newly created product market as an early follower. Early entry 
into new markets is especially crucial for firms with strong advantage-enhancing 
capabilities. Huff and Robinson (1994) showed that the ability of later entrants to catch 
up with the pioneering firm increases as the time decreases between market entry of 
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pioneering firm and the market entry of later entrants. Similarly, Lilien and Yoon (1990) 
found that early followers that enter the market in the early stages of the product life-
cycle (e.g., introductory or growth stages rather than late-growth or maturity stages) have 
higher product success rates. Thus, firms can fully capitalize on their superior advantage-
enhancing capabilities when they are embedded in a sparse network structure, and thus 
network structure again plays a substitutive role for the firm‘s advantage-creating 
capabilities.  
Hypothesis 12: The number of structural holes in the alliance network structure 
will strengthen the relationship between advantage-enhancing tendencies and 
firm performance.  
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CHAPTER V: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection 
I draw a sample of firms from the computer and electronics industries to test the 
theoretical propositions. These industries are characterized by intense alliance activity, 
short product life cycles, frequent updates of products and services, and intense rivalry 
(Mendelson & Pillai, 1999). For example, the computer industry‘s share of the total 
number of granted patents across all industries increased from 5% in 1960s to 20% in the 
late 1990s, and the patent activity in the electronics segment remained at about 18% of 
the total number of patents granted in all industries (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). 
Furthermore, the frequency of new product introductions by the firms in these broad 
industry segments has substantially increased to almost one new product introduction per 
year (Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007).  
The computer and electronics industries are a very broad segment and include a 
number of four-digit SIC codes. However, one commonality that all firms in this industry 
share is the use of the integrated circuit chip as a core technology; thus, they are close 
competitors and collaborators across a wide range of product markets. For example, the 
integrated circuit chip is used as a base for producing a wide variety of products such as 
computers (e.g., laptops, desktops, workstations), computer peripherals (e.g., printers, fax 
machines, scanners), consumer electronics (e.g., camcorders, digital cameras, TVs), and 
other electronic products (Mendelson & Pillai, 1999).  
Firms were selected from the following four three-digit SICs: 357 (computer and 
office equipment), 365 (household audio and video equipment and audio recordings), 367 
(electronic components and accessories), and 386 (photographic equipment). 
Additionally, I included the computer software industry (SIC 7372 – prepackaged 
software and 7373 – integrated systems design), as firms in this industry are often both 
collaborators and competitors to the firms in the computer hardware and consumer 
electronics industry. From the population of 598 firms for which COMPUSTAT had 
available financial data, I selected firms based on the following criteria: total revenues > 
= $1 billion and number of employees > = 1,000. These criteria yielded a sample of 103 
firms. I chose to sample large and publicly more prominent firms to reduce the concerns 
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of the so-called newspaper bias (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004). One of the 
main sources of data collection in this study is content analysis of published new articles, 
which sometimes can be susceptible to bias toward more prominent firms (see below for 
more detail about my content analysis approach).  
It is possible, however, that some smaller companies are major competitors in 
these industries and draw substantial attention from the media, despite not reaching the 
criteria of at least 1,000 employees and at least $1 billion in sales. To identify these firms, 
I conducted an additional search for announcements of firms‘ competitive activities in 
nearly 8,000 newspapers and magazine articles available through Factiva (see below for 
more information). I searched for general news (i.e., media coverage) using the following 
key word criteria: company name in the headline, time period (1993 to 1999), and 
Factiva code (in = i3302) for the ―computer and electronics‖ industry. The total number 
of news articles that were generated was used to rank all firms that did not satisfy the 
initial selection criteria (i.e., >1,000 employees and >$1,000 million sales). All firms with 
a news count greater than the news count of the lowest ranked firm in my initial sample 
were added back to the sample. This procedure yielded an additional 22 firms. The final 
sample included 125 major competitors in the computer (hardware and software) and 
electronics industries (because of missing data, this number varied in the regression 
analysis over time). The distribution of firms by 3-digit SICs are as follows: 47 firms in 
SIC 357 (computer and office equipment), 54 firms in SIC 367 (electronic components 
and accessories), 16 firms in SIC 737 (prepackaged software and integrated systems 
design), 4 firms in SIC 386 (photographic equipment) and 4 firms in SIC 365 (audio and 
video equipment).  
Alliance Network: Data and Measures 
Data 
I used the SDC database (a product of Thomson Financial) as a main source for 
collecting alliance data. I used ―Joint Ventures/Strategic Alliances‖ section of SDC 
database to access data on newly formed alliances. Compared with other similar data 
sources (e.g., MERIT-CATI, CORE, RECAP, or Bioscan), the SDC database is the most 
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comprehensive. It includes the widest range of industries and sectors, alliances with both 
public and private firms, and an extensive searchability across a large number of items 
coded with high accuracy (e.g., current status of the alliance, date of announcement and 
termination of the alliance, equity vs. non-equity alliances, nation, SIC code of partners, 
type of alliance across different business functions, parent company identification 
number - CUSIP) (Schilling, 2009). I searched alliances for each firm using its unique 
CUSIP number. The CUSIP numbers are unique for each firm and allow for reliable 
merging of the data across all three databases used in this study: COMPUSTAT, NBER 
Patent Citations Database, and SDC Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances. To 
adequately compute my network measures (e.g., network density) I collected complete 
network data, including the alliances formed both by my sample firms and by the 
partners of my sample firms. More specifically, I first searched for all alliances 
established by the 125 firms in my sample (by CUSIP number) between 1990 and 2003. 
This search identified 4,561 alliances among 2,502 unique firms. To construct a full 
network, I then searched for alliances that these 2,502 firms have formed over the same 
period. This search generated 36,766 alliances. Table 18 in the appendix reports detailed 
summary statistics on the alliances.  
I created matrixes for each year. These matrixes were of different sizes for each 
year. The number of unique firms varied from a minimum of 1,806 in 1990 to a 
maximum of 3,934 in 1995. The SDC database provides data for alliance termination 
date for many of the alliances. I used these data to remove the alliance ties in the year 
when the alliance was dissolved. However, several researchers have suggested that 
alliance termination data are not as reliable (or reported) as alliance formation data, 
which can cause overrepresentation of the alliances for some firms (e.g., Gulati, 1995). 
To reduce these concerns, I followed the prior research and used ―moving-window‖ 
approach. The prior research has used three- or five-year moving windows (e.g., Stuart, 
2000; Lavie, 2007). I chose the more conservative three-year moving window (i.e., I 
considered only the alliances formed in the past three years).  
Because matrixes were sized differently in each year (i.e., a different number of 
firms appeared in the network in each year), I used the ―time stack‖ function available in 
UCINET VI (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) to generate even matrixes for each 
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subsequent three-year period (including all firms that had established alliances in a given 
three-year period). Then, I added the matrixes at time t-1 and t-2 to the matrix of time t. 
For example, the alliance matrix in year 1999 was formed by adding the matrixes for 
years 1997, 1998, and 1999; similarly, the alliance matrix in year 1998 was the sum of 
the matrixes in years 1996, 1997, and 1998. The number of unique firms in each of the 
three-year stacked matrixes varied from 5,156 to 8,307 firms. The network structure 
measures for each firm were computed from each three-year matrix.
2
 
Measures 
Structural holes 
I measured structural holes using Freeman‘s (1979) betweenness centrality index, 
which can be formulated as follows:  
                                                                
,where gij is the number of shortest paths from node i to node j, and gijk is the number of 
times those paths pass through k. I used UCINET VI (Borgatti et al., 2002) to compute 
the normalized betweenness centrality score (normalized score is computed as 
betweenness centrality score divided by the maximum betweenness centrality score) for 
each of the focal firms in the sample. Betweenness centrality ranged from a minimum of 
0 to a maximum of 1.  
Betweenness centrality indicates the extent to which a given actor ―lies‖ between 
many other points in the network. I chose the measure of betweenness centrality over 
Burt‘s (1992) measure of constraint (whose inverse is used frequently as a measure of 
structural holes) because betweenness centrality takes into account both local structural 
holes (i.e., whether an actor‘s direct partners are disconnected) and global structural holes 
(whether an actor‘s structural holes span two disconnected clusters of firms). Figure 9 
illustrates the distinction between betweenness centrality and network constraint. Table 1 
below shows the scores of betweenness centrality and the inverse of network constraint 
                                                          
2
 Because licensing agreements may not provide a substantial flow of resources between firms, I also 
computed all network measures excluding these types of alliances. For a robustness check, I ran all models 
using non-licensing matrixes. The results were equivalent to those using all types of alliances.  
bk= 
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(local number of structural holes) for actors: 21, 20, 1, 4, and 12. Actor 21 has the 
greatest score on betweenness centrality (135), but the lowest score on the inverse of 
network constraint (.59). This is because actor 21 spans only 3 structural holes, but these 
structural holes separate distant network clusters. Thus, the structural position of actor 21 
provides the greatest potential to access diverse and unique resources from distant 
network clusters, although it does not broker between disconnected firms as much as do 
other actors. On the other hand, actors 20, 1, 4, and 12 span more structural holes, but 
these structural holes separate firms located within a single cluster of firms. This 
indicates that the inverse measure of constraint increases proportionally with the number 
of structural holes regardless of the ―significance‖ of the structural hole within the 
network as a whole. For example, actor 4 is much more embedded in a network of 
interrelated firms than actor 21, and still has a higher inverse constraint score than actor 
21. This suggests that betweenness centrality captures not only the extent to which a firm 
spans structural holes, but also the degree to which the structural hole separates clusters 
of firms.  
One additional reason for using betweenness centrality is that both network 
density and constraint are ego network measures and are highly correlated (i.e., the more 
ties between an actor‘s partners the greater the constraint). Betweenness centrality, on the 
other hand, is based on the whole network. This provides greater confidence of the 
regression results as all relationships are tested on both ego network measures (network 
density) and global network measures (betweenness centrality). Note also that these two 
measures are, as expected, negatively correlated, although very low correlation exists 
between the two measures. This reduces the potential for multicollinearity problems in 
the regression analysis.  
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Table 1: Scores of Network Constraint and Betweenness Centrality 
21 20 1 4 12
Degree Centrality 5 5 5 5 5
Betweenness 135 112 112 42.83 42.83
Constraint (reversed) 0.59 0.80 0.80 0.62 0.62
Actors
 
Figure 9: Network Constraint versus Betweenness Centrality 
 
Figure 10: Network Constraint versus Betweenness Centrality 
 
 
Size of the nodes is proportional with the 
score of betweenness centrality 
Size of the nodes is proportional with the score 
of reversed constraint 
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Network density  
I also used UCINET to compute the firms‘ density scores. Network density is 
computed as the proportion of actual ties in the focal firm‘s network divided by the total 
number of possible ties in the firm‘s network, multiplied by 100. Following Rowley et al. 
(2000), I included both strong and weak ties to compute ego network density. This 
measure indicates the extent to which a firm‘s partners are interconnected (Scott, 1991; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). For example, Firm A in Figure 10 has a low network density 
and Firm B has a high degree of network density. The density score can vary from 0 (all 
partners are disconnected) to 100 (all partners are connected with one another).  
Figure 11: Network Density 
Low Network Density High Network Density
Firm A Firm B
 
 
Proportion of strong ties  
Strong ties refer to equity-based alliances, whereas weak ties are called non-
equity alliances. The proportion of strong ties was computed as the ratio of the number of 
strong ties to the total number of ties in the focal firm‘s alliance portfolio. 
Advantage-enhancing Strategic Tendencies: Data and Measures 
Data 
Advantage-enhancing strategic tendencies refer to the firm‘s tendency to 
aggressively introduce competitive actions that protect or enhance the competitive 
position of its existing products and services. Competitive action is defined as any 
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externally directed, specific, and observable competitive move initiated by the firm to 
enhance the firm‘s competitive position (Ferrier et al, 1999; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & 
Chen, 1991). The data collection method used in this study was structured content 
analysis (Jauch, Osborn, & Martin, 1980). Content analysis is a technique for reducing a 
text into manageable content categories, which are meaningful units of information that 
can be analyzed and interpreted. This technique enables a researcher to generate a unit-
by-variable matrix suitable for quantitatively testing hypotheses (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000). Following the research in competitive dynamics, I used content analysis to 
identify publically announced competitive moves of firms. The primary source of data for 
measuring firms‘ advantage-enhancing tendencies was Factiva, an electronic online data 
base. Factiva is one of the most comprehensive databases for business news and 
information covering more than 2,100 newspapers (including the Wall Street Journal, the 
Financial Times), 3,500 magazines (e.g., the Economist and Computerworld), 500 
newswires (including Dow Jones, Reuters, and the Associated Press), transcripts from 
280 media programs (e.g., BBC, CNN, NBC, ABC, Fox) and 12,000 of the world‘s top 
news and business Web sites. Factiva is used extensively by firms such as Microsoft, 
Ford, Seiko Epson, De Beers and Ernst & Young for competitive intelligence and 
knowledge management purposes (www.factiva.com). Factiva provides full articles in 
electronic form, which enhances the researchers‘ ability to reliably code the competitive 
activity of firms. In addition, because of its global scope, the use of Factiva as a news 
source provides greater confidence that the published news articles are not biased toward 
covering only the competitive actions of the firms that predominantly sell in the North 
American market. 
Measures 
To identify advantage-enhancing competitive actions, I followed the coding 
procedure developed in previous research in competitive dynamics (e.g., Ferrier, Smith, 
& Grimm, 1999; Boyd & Bresser, 2008; Smith et al., 1991; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2006). I first randomly selected five firms from each of the six industry segments 
(described in the sample selection section above). For each of these firms, I downloaded 
news articles using a general key word searching criteria available in Factiva: company 
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name (e.g., Sony/f30/ – the company name in the first 30 words of the article), year = 
1999, and Factiva-specific industry code (in = i3302 – for computers and electronics 
industry). I then tried to identify inductively all possible advantage-enhancing actions 
these firms carried out in 1999. I focused on market-based and externally oriented actions 
that indicated a firm‘s attempt to enhance and improve its market position. After 
consulting with two experts with extensive prior experience in the consumer electronics 
and computer industries, I identified the following four advantage-enhancing competitive 
actions: marketing (advertising and promotions), improvements (product improvements 
and new versions of an existing product), price cuts (price cuts and sales incentives), and 
market expansions (new capacity, new distribution channels, expansion of dealership 
network, and winning of new supply contracts).
3
 Table 2 below shows examples of the 
news announcements for each action category.  
I developed key word searching criteria using a combination of Factiva‘s 
intelligent indexing and Boolean search operators. Table 21 in the appendix shows the 
key-word criteria used in Factiva search engine to retrieve relevant articles. I also provide 
more detail about the process of developing key word queries. Using these queries, the 
search generated 42,481 news articles. The articles were exported into an Excel 
spreadsheet. The data were carefully screened for duplicates and irrelevant news (e.g., 
news about stock prices, analyst commentaries, legal actions). Only the earliest news 
announcement of each action was retained. After cleaning and coding all articles, I 
identified 11,075 competitive actions initiated by the 125 firms between 01/01/1993 and 
12/31/1999. To estimate the reliability of the coding, two coders independently coded a 
randomly selected subsample of 1% of the total number of news items (110 news 
articles). To estimate inter-rater reliability of the coding process, I used Perreault and 
Leigh‘s (1989) index, which is formulated as follows:  
Ir={[(Fo/N) – (1/k)][k/(k-1)]}^.5. 
where, Fo is number of correct choices (agreement), N is total number of choices, and k 
is number of action categories. The estimated interrater reliability was .85, which exceeds 
the convention of 0.70 (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). On average, firms introduced about 3.3 
                                                          
3
 New products are excluded from this list and are used exclusively for measuring proactiveness (see 
below). 
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marketing actions (range from 0 to 86), 7.7 improvements (min 0 to max 153), 1.1 price 
cuts (min 0 to max 32), and 1.84 market expansions (min 0 to max 35). The average 
number of competitive actions per firm/year (i.e., the average advantage-enhancing 
activity) was 19 (min 0 to max 250). The confirmatory factor analysis (discussed below) 
provided evidence for treating advantage-enhancing tendency as a distinctive construct. 
The estimated factor scores were used in the regression analysis.  
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Table 2: Selected News Reports on Advantage-enhancing Actions 
Product 
Improvements 
Dec. 10, 1997 SUNNYVALE, Calif., (Reuters) - Advanced Micro Devices Inc. 
Wednesday unveiled an upgrade to its flash memory chip family which will extend 
battery life in hand-held portable devices such as cellular telephones and pagers.  
Product 
Improvements 
Feb. 28, 1995. PRINCETON, N.J.--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- --Dataram Corp., a leading 
developer, manufacturer, and marketer of memory and storage products, today 
announced the immediate availability of memory upgrades for Digitals‘ AlphaServer 
1000 4/200. Dataram‘s DR70 memory upgrade is available in 16, 32, 64, and 128 MB 
capacities.  
New Product 
Version 
1/16/1998 Tewksbury, Massachusetts based Avid Technology Inc has unveiled an 
upgraded version of its video production system Avid Xpress version 2.0 with 
enhanced graphics, titling and audio features. The system will begin shipping next 
month in four new configurations with prices beginning at $9,995. 
New Product 
Version 
6/12/1998 -Oracle Corp has released Version 3.0 of its Video Server product, 
boasting numerous enhancements and new features to the software that was first 
introduced in 1993 for interactive TV video-on-demand. Video Server 3.0 is designed 
to, along with Oracle8 database server, offer the central components for interactive 
applications.  
Price cuts 4/17/1995-CUPERTINO, Calif. (Reuter) - Apple Computer Inc. said Monday it was 
cutting prices on its entry-level PowerBook 150 notebook computers by 27%. Under 
the new pricing, the PowerBook 150 with 4 megabytes RAM and a 120 megabyte hard 
drive will cost $1,069, down from $1,469 previously. 
Price cuts 2/13/1997-Bracknell-based Dell Computer has slashed up to 16% off the price of its 
Optiplex business desktop computers in a bid to put pressure on its main rivals 
Compaq and Gateway.  
Market 
expansion:  
1/14/1999-Apple Computer, Inc. has expanded its online store into France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Holland and Belgium, following the launch of the UK store last May. 
European customers can now take advantage of Apple‘s build-to-order capabilities for 
G3 systems. 
Market 
Expansion:  
11/30/1998-MILPITAS, CALIF.--Solectron has purchased 40 acres of land in 
Timisoara, Romania and has started building a new manufacturing campus. The 
move, the firm said, brings to Europe an expanded, full-service, high-volume, low-cost 
manufacturing hub for Solectron‘s growing regional customer base.  
Marketing: 
Promotion 
May 8, 1995--SANTA CLARA, Calif. – (BUSINESS WIRE) – Intel Corporation 
today announced it is donating $1 million to Smart Valley, Inc. to support the Smart 
Schools Project. The donation will include cash, expertise, and equipment such as 
Intel‘s ProShare Video Systems and Pentium Processor Systems.  
Marketing: 
Advertising 
8/17/1995-SEATTLE, Aug 17 (Reuter) - Microsoft Corp. has bought rights to use the 
Rolling Stones song "Start Me Up" as the theme to its advertising campaign for the 
new Windows 95 operating system, a spokeswoman for the software giant said 
Thursday.   
Marketing: 
Advertising 
April 26 ,1996-ROCHESTER, N.Y., (Reuter) - Eastman Kodak Co said Friday it has 
introduced a new television advertising campaign to strengthen its brand this week 
under the theme "Take Pictures.‖  
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Advantage-creating Strategic Tendencies: Data and Measures 
An advantage-creating strategic tendency is defined as a firm‘s tendency to 
frequently create new competitive advantages by discovering radically new technologies 
(i.e., innovativeness) and introducing new products, services, or technologies on the 
market ahead of competitors (i.e., proactiveness). Thus, advantage-creating strategy 
comprises two dimensions: proactiveness and innovativeness. In an operational sense, I 
consider these two dimensions as formative rather than reflective. Formative measures 
are viewed as causes of the latent construct, whereas reflective measures are viewed as 
reflections (or manifestations) of the latent construct, and thus they are caused by the 
latent factor (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006; Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). The 
advantage-creating tendency is behavioral, higher-order construct that is caused by firms‘ 
innovative and proactive activity. This implies that firms can exhibit advantage-creating 
tendency by pursuing different degrees of innovative and proactive activity. Thus, a firm 
may create new competitive advantages either by discovering new technologies or by 
creating new product categories or both. Therefore, although these two dimensions can be 
related, they can also vary independently (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Previous research 
suggests a positive relationship between innovativenses and proactiveness (e.g., Comanor 
& Scherer, 1969; Hagadoorn & Clodt, 2003) and that this relationship may be sequential 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). For example, high innovativeness may increase the firm‘s 
potential to introduce new products. However, the firm can also introduce new products 
(proactively) without possessing radically new technology. I, therefore, consider 
proactiveness and innovativeness related but independent dimensions (i.e., they can 
differentially explain other outcome variables) that capture a distinctive portion of the 
advantage-creating tendency construct.  
Proactiveness: Data and Measures 
I also used the content analysis approach described above to measure 
proactiveness. The announcements of new product introductions were identified using the 
criteria shown in Table 21 in the appendix (also used for identifying product versions and 
improvements). I identified 3,488 news articles with announcements of new products and 
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versions. Then, I read each article to identify key words that indicate the firms‘ 
proactiveness. To capture the proactive tendency of firms, I searched for key words in the 
news reports that indicated the ―pioneering‖ nature of the new product. Some examples 
of the identified key words of proactive tendency are ―first company to offer,‖ ―industry 
first,‖ ―industry‘s only,‖ ―world‘s first,‖ ―set industry standards,‖ ―revolutionary,‖ 
―breakthrough,‖ ―pioneering,‖ ―the only device on the market,‖ and ―new world 
standard‖ (the full list of identified phrases is shown in Table 19 in the Appendix). Using 
these words and phrases as a guideline, two raters independently coded all 3,488 news 
articles with new-product announcements. The two coders identified 587 announcements 
of new products that indicated the firm‘s proactiveness. Table 3 below shows examples 
of news reports that indicated the ―pioneering‖ nature of the products. Firms‘ 
proactiveness was measured as the number of pioneering products that a firm initiated in 
a given year. To capture the firm‘s tendency to be proactive, I averaged this count over 
the past three years for each firm. On average, firms initiated about 0.73 pioneering 
products a year, ranging from minimum 0 to maximum 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
59 
 
Table 3: Selected News Reports on “Proactive” New Products 
 
 
 
To provide greater confidence in the content validity of the news reports, I also 
searched for at least two additional independent news sources for each announcement of 
a ―proactive‖ new product. To illustrate, Table 4 below shows several news reports from 
various newspapers, magazines and newswires that announced the introduction of the 
Proactiveness 3/3/1995 PALO ALTO, Calif. (Reuter) - Hewlett-Packard Co., aiming to exploit the rapid 
growth of the mobile computing market, will announce Monday the industry’s first 
wireless printers. The printers use infrared technology that allows them to take orders from 
laptops and other mobile computers.  
Proactiveness Tokyo, Nov. 6, 1996- (Jiji Press)-Fujitsu Ltd. said Wednesday it will launch the world’s 
first personal computer equipped with a DVD-ROM drive, a computer peripheral device 
that reads information on digital videodiscs, in Japan in mid-December. The FMV 
Deskpower T20D, powered by Intel Corp‘s 200-megahertz Pentium microprocessor, will 
allow users to enjoy high-quality video on DVDs, a new large-scale digital storage. They 
can also use CD-ROMs and DVD-ROMs as well as music CDs. 
Proactiveness 3/3/1995 PALO ALTO, Calif. (Reuter) - Hewlett-Packard Co., aiming to exploit the rapid 
growth of the mobile computing market, will announce Monday the industry’s first 
wireless printers. The printers use infrared technology that allows them to take orders from 
laptops and other mobile computers.  
Proactiveness Tokyo, Nov. 6, 1996- (Jiji Press)-Fujitsu Ltd. said Wednesday it will launch the world’s 
first personal computer equipped with a DVD-ROM drive, a computer peripheral device 
that reads information on digital videodiscs, in Japan in mid-December. The FMV 
Deskpower T20D, powered by Intel Corp‘s 200-megahertz Pentium microprocessor, will 
allow users to enjoy high-quality video on DVDs, a new large-scale digital storage. They 
can also use CD-ROMs and DVD-ROMs as well as music CDs. 
Proactiveness Oct 1, 1999. Adobe launches "revolutionary" design software. KUALA LUMPUR: Adobe 
Systems Inc has launched the Adobe InDesign, touted to be a revolutionary product 
designed to change the way professionals view layout applications. 
Proactiveness SANTA CLARA, Calif.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Oct. 15, 1997–3Com Corp. 
(NASDAQ:COMS), a leader in providing networking solutions for the retail industry, 
today launched its Point of Sale (POS) Partners Program to deliver the industry’s first 
complete enterprise-wide, standards-based networked POS solution. The first-of-its-kind 
in the networking industry, the 3Com POS Partners Program brings a new level of 
functionality, performance, and investment protection to the point of sale. 
Proactiveness SUNNYVALE, Calif.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Nov. 4, 1998–SanDisk Corporation 
(Nasdaq:SNDK) today introduced the world’s first solid-state flash memory card in the 
new CompactFlash Type II form factor approved by the CompactFlash Association (CFA) 
last March.  The new card can store 160 megabytes (MB) of data, audio and images. 
SanDisk, inventor of CompactFlash(TM) (CF(TM)), is a founding member and technical 
chairman of the CFA. 
Proactiveness SAN JOSE, Calif.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–May 11, 1999–Sony Tuesday announced a 
breakthrough in tape recording density, by demonstrating the ability to store one billion 
bits of data on a square inch of tape.  This achievement was made possible by 
incorporating the first use of magneto-resistive (MR) heads in a helical scan tape 
mechanism. This achievement demonstrates the viability of Sony‘s next generation of AIT 
(AIT-3), which will provide 100GB of uncompressed data in a compact media cartridge 
and 3.5 inch drive form factor. 
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Hewlett-Packard‘s new wireless printer. The reliability of the proactive tendency is likely 
to be higher when several independent media sources clearly indicate that the new 
product is the first of its kind on the market.  
Table 4: Example of Multiple News Sources 
 
To test the reliability of the coding, I asked two PhD students in Business 
Administration to code 1% (35) randomly selected articles from the 3,488 news articles 
with new product announcements. The students were asked to identify new product 
announcements that indicate the firm‘s proactive tendency. The Perreault and Leigh‘s 
(1989) interrater reliability index was .78.  
Innovativeness: Data and measures 
I used patent and patent citations data to approximate a firm‘s tendency to 
innovate. The patent data were obtained from NBER Patent Citations Database. This 
database provides detailed information on patents applied for and granted by the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) over the period 1963 to 2002. This database 
includes both the application date (the date on which the inventor filed for the patent) and 
the grant date (the date when the patent was actually granted). Because the timing of the 
application date is closer to the date of the actual discovery of the invention, I used the 
Date News source Short Description 
Oct 9, 1995 InformationWeek Hewlett-Packard is rolling out the market's first mobile wireless printer. 
The five-pound DeskJet 340 relies on the increasingly popular infrared 
technology for its wireless capabilities. An infrared adapter that plugs into 
the printer's parallel port enables wireless printing from up to three feet 
away… 
Sep 19, 1995 M2 Presswire HEWLETT-PACKARD: HP announces industry's first mobile printer 
that supports wireless printing… 
Mar 6, 1995 ComputerWorld HP sparks interest in infrared New LaserJets will become wireless…Red 
hot market Infrared ``will be hot,'' predicted Randal Giusto, an analyst at 
BIS Strategic Decisions in Norwell… 
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application date to identify the number of patents that each firm was involved with in a 
given year
4
 (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001).  
NBER database also includes information about citations received and citations 
made for each patent. Citations made refer to the number of previous patents that are 
cited in a given patent‘s application document, whereas citations received refer to the 
number of subsequent patents that have cited a given patent. Citing any prior knowledge 
is a legal duty and is critical information for clearly specifying the patent‘s property 
rights (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). Research has shown that high patent citation 
counts are important indicators of the path-breaking nature of an invention. An invention 
that is cited by many subsequent patents is likely to provide the basis for many future 
technological discoveries (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Trajtenberg, 1990). I used citations 
received to approximate the impact or ―radicality‖ of each patent (see below for more 
detail).  
Previous research using patent citations data have highlighted several issues that 
need to be adequately addressed. First, not all patents have the same citation ―window.‖ 
More recent patents have shorter time periods in which to be cited. To avoid this 
problem, all patents were compared only with the patents in the same year. In addition, as 
recommended by Hall et al. (2001), I use time fixed effects to eliminate any systematic 
time-related effects that might affect the citation rate over time. Second, there is a lag 
between the invention time and the time when the patent is actually granted by USPTO. 
To deal with this problem, I followed Hall et al.‘s (2001) recommendation to use the 
application date of the granted patents, because the application date is closest to the 
actual timing of the invention. Finally, following prior research, I used U.S. Patent and 
Trade Office data for all firms including non-U.S. firms. This approach reduces the 
inconsistencies and incompatibilities between the patent systems across different nations 
(Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). In addition, because the United States is the largest technology 
                                                          
4
 ―Inventors have a strong incentive to apply for a patent as soon as possible following the completion of 
the innovation, whereas the grant date depends upon the review process at the Patent Office, which takes on 
average about 2 years, with significant variance…Indeed, the mode of operation of the patent Office 
underwent significant changes in the past decades, thereby introducing a great deal of randomness (that 
have noting to do with the actual timing of the inventions (into any patent time series dated by grant year‖ 
(Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001: 10) 
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market, most of the major non-U.S. headquartered firms submit their patent applications 
in the United States (Stuart & Podolny, 1996).  
I measured firms‘ innovativeness using three items: innovation intensity, 
innovation radicality, and innovation generality. The first item captures the total quantity 
of innovative activity, whereas the other two items capture the technological significance 
of the inventions (Morris & Sexton, 1996).  
Innovation intensity 
Innovation intensity is simply a count of the total number of patents a firm has 
applied for in a given year. Although this measure does not directly capture the radicality 
of the inventions, I included this measure for two reasons. First, entrepreneurship 
research suggests that firms‘ entrepreneurial activity can be more closely depicted using 
measures of both the amount and the magnitude of innovativeness (Moris & Sexton, 
1996). Second, it is possible that a firm has strong entrepreneurial (advantage-creating) 
tendency, but in a given period has not discovered radically new technology. Because I 
use patent activity of firms to depict firms‘ innovative strategy (tendency), a more 
reliable measurement would include both firms‘ entrepreneurial intent and 
entrepreneurial outcome. To approximate the innovative tendency of firms, I averaged 
the number of patents for each firm over the past three years. Thus, innovation intensity 
refers to the average number of patents that a firm has applied for (and was subsequently 
granted) in the past three years. On average, firms applied for 43 patents per year.  
Innovation radicality  
This item captures the tendency of firms to discover radical (breakthrough) 
innovations. I used ―citations received‖ to approximate the impact of a given patent on 
the subsequent innovations in the industry. More specifically, when patent B cites patent 
A, it means that patent B builds on the knowledge previously created by patent A. The 
more subsequent patents that cite patent A, the greater the technological significance of 
patent A (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001).  
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I first ranked all patents in a given year by the number of ―citations received.‖ 
Then, I identified the top 1% most cited patents in the industry for that year. Innovation 
radicality is the total number of patents that each firm has in the top 1% most cited 
patents in the industry in a given year (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001, refer to these patents as 
breakthrough patents). To approximate the firms‘ strategic tendency to generate radical 
innovation, I averaged this measure over the past three years. On average firms issued 
0.43 patents per year in the top 1% most cited patents in the industry (min 0 – max 17). 
Innovation generality  
Innovation generality refers to the tendency of firms to discover innovations that 
have broad impact on subsequent technologies in wide range of industries. I measured 
innovation generality as the firm‘s number of patents in the top 1% most cited patents 
across different technological domains in a given year. Similar to innovation radicality 
measure, I first ranked all patents in the industry in a given year. This time, however, the 
ranking was based on each patent‘s generality score. The generality score is computed 
using Blau‘s (1977) heterogeneity index: 
Generalityi = 1-∑pij
2
 
where pij is the proportion of citations received by patent i in technological category j.
5
 
―High generality score suggests that the patent presumably had a widespread impact, in 
that it influenced subsequent innovations in a variety of fields‖ (Hall et al., 2001:21). 
Innovation generality for each firm/year was computed as the number of patents 
in the top 1% most ―general‖ patents in the industry in a given year. I averaged this 
number over the past three years to approximate a firm‘s tendency to generate 
innovations with a broad impact across wide range of industries. On average, firms issued 
                                                          
5 I used two patent classification systems: (1) USPTO classification system based on 428 technological 
categories (j = 428) and (2) 36 higher-order technological categories (j = 36) developed by Hall et al. 
(2001). The two measures were highly correlated and the results were similar for both measures. The 
innovation generality item based on 36 technological categories was used in the factor analysis.  
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0.42 patents in the top 1% most cited patents across different technological categories 
(min 0 – max 11). 
Performance 
I measured firms‘ financial performance using the two most frequently used 
measures of firm and industry profitability: return on equity (ROE - net income divided 
by total equity) and return on assets (ROA - net income divided by total assets) 
(Schmalensee, 1989). To estimate the long-term impact of the network structure and 
competitive strategy, I used averages of these measures over the next three years. This 
approach reduces short-run fluctuations of firms‘ profitability and is more likely to 
capture the full effect of previous entrepreneurial and collaborative activity that may have 
both immediate and lagged effects. Both one-year and three-year averages of ROA and 
ROE produce similar pattern of regression results. The regression results in all tables are 
based on three-year average ROA.  
Control Variables 
Firm size was measured using the accounting value of firms‘ total assets as proxy. 
Firms with larger stocks of assets may systematically differ from smaller firms in their 
strategic behavior, their propensity to form alliances, and their performance.  
Performance was approximated using return on assets. Past performance can 
affect a firm‘s propensity to engage in innovative activity and undertake major 
investment activities. Organizational learning theory suggests that firms adjust their 
aspiration targets according to their present and past performance (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982). Therefore, future performance is also a function of the firm‘s 
prior performance (e.g., a firm that is underperforming may try to reduce the operational 
costs and thus increase its financial performance in the next years).  
Financial slack was measured using the quick ratio. I computed the quick ratio as 
a firm‘s current assets minus its current liabilities divided by its current liabilities. The 
availability of slack resources can affect the decision to enter new alliances and to invest 
in and introduce new products and services.  
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Betweenness centrality and Network Density were also included as control 
variables because previous research has found that past networking behavior can affect 
the future likelihood to form alliances (Gulati, 1999) by facilitating or constraining the set 
of available partnering opportunities (Ahuja, 2000b).  
Market Share. A firm‘s profitability can be affected by its monopolistic position 
in the market. I approximated this measure by the firm‘s market share. I computed market 
share as total sales divided by total industry sales in the firm‘s primary three-digit SIC 
code.  
Financial Leverage. I measured financial leverage as the firm‘s debt-to-equity 
ratio (total long-term debt divided by total shareholder equity). This measure controls for 
the firm‘s propensity to use debt to finance its major capital investments, which can 
affect the firm‘s performance in the next period.  
I also included firm and time fixed effects. Firm fixed effects controlled for all 
firm-specific factors that were invariant over time, such as industry segment, corporate 
level diversification, firms‘ reputation, firms‘ country of origin, top management team 
(TMT) experience and skills or other unobserved and idiosyncratic characteristics of 
firms. Time fixed effects controlled for time-related exogenous factors such as changes in 
tax policy, technological changes, financial crises, or wars and other conflicts. In 
addition, time fixed effects absorb the effect of variables with constant change such as 
firm age and TMT tenure.  
Construct Validity 
To establish the convergent and discriminant validity of advantage-creating and 
advantage-enhancing tendencies, I applied confirmatory factor analysis. I chose common 
factor analysis over principal component analysis (PCA) for two reasons: (1) the 
constructs above and the measures are theoretically driven, which renders confirmatory 
factor analysis more appropriate than the exploratory nature of PCA, and (2) my focus is 
predominantly on the common or shared variance (or underlying structure – latent 
constructs) and thus the unique variance or the error variance (which are both considered 
in PCA) is not of primary interest in deriving the underlying latent factors.  
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Table 5 shows the results of the factor analysis. Only the eigenvalues of the first 
three factors are greater than 1. Figure 11 plots Eigen values against the number of 
factors. This scree test criterion shows that the eigenvalues drop sharply after the third 
factor. For more accurate interpretation of the factors, I performed factor rotation using 
an oblique rotational procedure. Oblique rotation allows correlated factors in contrast to 
orthogonal rotation, which assumes that factors are not correlated. The oblique procedure 
is more appropriate for this study because value-creating tendencies and value-enhancing 
tendencies are likely to be closely related, although firms may differ in their emphasis on 
each tendency. I used the PROMAX rotation method available in STATA to perform the 
oblique factor rotation.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Eigenvalues 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion 
Factor1 4.88005 2.24999 0.5461 
Factor2 2.63006 1.20314 0.2943 
Factor3 1.42692 1.33179 0.1597 
Factor4 0.09513 0.04459 0.0106 
Factor5 0.05054 0.06106 0.0057 
 
Figure 12: Scree Plot 
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Table 6 also shows the factor loadings for all items. The number of marketing 
actions, product improvements, price reductions, and market expansions represent the 
construct of advantage-enhancing tendency (AET). The number of patents, the radicality 
of those patents, and the generality of those patents are all measures of innovativeness 
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(the first dimension of advantage-creating tendency – ACT). The factor analysis results 
indicated that proactiveness is a distinctive dimension of advantage-creating tendency 
(ACT). All factor loadings are statistically significant at the .001 level.  
 
Table 6: Factor Loadings 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 
Advertising (AET) 0.757 -0.0244 0.1367 
Improvements/Versions (AET) 0.7699 -0.0334 0.2776 
Pricing (AET) 0.8491 0.1409 -0.2098 
Market expansions (AET) 0.7029 -0.0005 0.1044 
Patent radicality (Innovativeness - ACT) 0.1678 0.5872 -0.0604 
Patent intensity (Innovativeness - ACT) -0.0378 0.9856 0.0241 
Patent generality (Innovativeness - ACT) -0.0363 0.9524 0.0688 
Proactiveness (ACT) 0.2614 0.0445 0.5977 
 
To provide additional support for convergent validity, I also computed variance 
extracted. Variance extracted (VE) refers to the variance explained by the factor and is 
computed as the average of the squared standardized factors loadings. VE for factor 1 is 
.5935 and for factor 2 is .7395, which are both greater than the rule of .5. I also conducted 
two tests for providing evidence for discriminant validity. A comparison of three-factor 
solution, with two and one factor models, showed that the model fit of three factor 
structure is significantly better than either the one- or two-factor model. Second, variance 
extracted for both constructs is greater than the square of the correlation estimates 
between the three constructs (.15, .09, and .38). This implies that each factor explains its 
items better than it explains another construct.  
Research Design  
This study‘s research design is shown in Figure 12. The independent variables 
and control variables are computed as average values over the past three years (t-1, t-2, 
and t-3) and the dependent variables are measured over the next three years (t, t+1, and 
t+2). To illustrate, I use network structure as the dependent variable, which is measured 
on the basis of the alliance formed in the next three years. The measures of the 
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independent variables (including prior network position) and control variables are 
averaged over the past three years.  
Figure 13: Research Design 
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Model Specification  
I considered several potential issues that may affect the interpretation of the 
empirical findings. First, I addressed endogeneity issues that arise from the effect of 
unobservable factors that may affect the observed relationships. According to resource-
based theory of the firm, firms gain sustainable competitive advantage because they 
possess unique resources that are inimitable and non-substitutable by rivals. As such, 
these strategic resources are often unobservable and difficult to identify, or observable 
but difficult to adequately measure. This can cause serious statistical problems because 
firms‘ unique resources and capabilities can affect both the independent and dependent 
variables. Not controlling for this endogeneity can bias the regression estimates. 
Assuming that these firm-specific factors (e.g., unique resources) are relatively stable 
over time, fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) panel data models can adequately 
account for this unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed effects model uses time-demeaned data 
(subtracting each variable from its average value over time), which eliminates any 
invariant unobserved effect from the model. Random effects model uses quasi-demeaned 
data by subtracting only a fraction of each variable from the time average. Both models 
have some advantages and disadvantages. Random effects model can account for 
unobserved effects that change over time. It also allows for examining the effect of 
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invariant independent variables. In addition, a random effects model is preferable to a 
fixed effects model because fixed effects lead to a large loss of degrees of freedom, 
especially in large cross-sectional panels. Finally, random effects produce more efficient 
estimates for samples with large N (number of firms) and small T (number of time 
periods). However, the random effects model must satisfy one additional assumption: the 
unobserved individual effects should be uncorrelated with the other independent variables 
Cov(xitj, ai) = 0, where xitj denotes all independent variables and ai is the unobserved 
effect. Violation of this assumption produces inconsistent estimates. I used Hausman‘s 
(1978) specification test to detect violation of this assumption. When this assumption was 
not violated I used random effects model (see below).  
Furthermore, the relationship between a firm‘s strategy and network formation or 
its strategy and performance can also be affected by time-specific factors, such as abrupt 
changes in oil prices, government interventions, or economic downturn and recession. 
One way to control for these time-related factors is to include dummy variables for each 
time period. One last consideration in selecting an appropriate model and estimation 
technique was the use of lagged dependent variables. Because both firm performance and 
the firm‘s position in the network structure can be affected by the value of these variables 
in the previous period, it is important to control for this possibility. Inclusion of lagged 
values of the dependent variables was also important for providing more confidence for 
the direction of causality. Given all these considerations, all models in this dissertation 
account for both firm- and time-specific effects and include lagged dependent variables.  
Finally, I computed variance inflation factors (VIFs) to test for any possible 
multicollinearity problem. Multicollinearity can be especially present in the models that 
use fixed effects and interaction terms. The VIFs for all variables in the analysis 
(including the interaction terms) was lower than 3 (which is below the critical value of 
10), ruling out any potentially major multicollinearity problems.  
Modeling performance 
I applied a random effects model with time fixed effects to test the hypotheses 
predicting performance. One reason for selecting random effects over fixed effects model 
was that the Hausman test was insignificant (Chi2 = 3.37; prob>Chi2 = .91). A rejection 
   
70 
 
of the Hausman test means that the assumption that the unobservable effects are not 
correlated with the independent variables Cov(xitj, ai) = 0 is violated. Failure to reject the 
Hausman test implies that the estimates of RE and FE models are very similar. Another 
reason for selecting RE model is that the estimates of RE model are consistent and more 
efficient than those estimated by FE model for panels with a large N and small T. Given 
that the panel examined in this study has a large N (112 firms after listwise deletion) and 
small T (5 years), the random effects model was preferable. In addition, because I also 
control for the past values of the dependent variables (in this case firm‘s past 
performance), the presence of a lagged dependent variable is a source of serial correlation 
(i.e., the lagged dependent variable and the error term are correlated). Indeed, 
Wooldridge‘s test for autocorrelation in panel data showed the presence of serial 
correlation in all models. To correct for serial correlation, I used a random-effects model 
with an autoregressive error term—AR(1). The random effects model can be formulated 
as follows: 
Yit = ái + äYit-1 + â'Xit-1 + åit 
where subscripts i and t represent firms (i = 1 to 8) and years (t = 1 to 5) respectively. β'xit 
is the coefficient (slope) of the independent variables that is assumed to be constant 
across firms. εit represents the two-way error component disturbances (εit=µi+λt+νit), 
where µi denotes the unobservable individual effect, λt denotes the time-specific effect 
and νit represents the remaining stochastic disturbance term (Baltagi, 2008). It is assumed 
that Xit is independent of µi, λt, and νit for all i and t, and that µi ~ IID (0 , λt~ 
IID(0  vit~ IID (0  are independent of each other. I also included an 
autoregressive AR(1) parameter ρ with zero mean, homoskedastic and serially 
uncorrelated: εit = ρεit-1 + zi,t and -1<ρ<1. The coefficients are estimated using generalized 
least squares method (GLS).  
 Previous research suggests that firms adjust their competitive activity and 
aspiration targets as a function of their previous performance (Ferrier, MacFhionnlaoich, 
Smith, & Grimm, 2002; Cyert & March, 1963). In addition, including past values of 
dependent variables provides more confidence about the causality of the relationships 
between the IVs and DVs. Finally, in panel data with short T (time periods) and large N 
(number of firms), the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable may be biased in both 
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FE and RE models with AR(1). This is because the presence of a lagged dependent 
variable is correlated with the error term, which produces biased estimates (Baum, 2006). 
Hence, to deal with this problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) recommended a two-step 
approach: (1) following Anderson and Hsiao (1981), the model is first-differenced to 
remove the firm-specific effects (which eliminates any endogeneity because of the 
correlation between the unobserved firm-specific effects and the other independent 
variables), and (2) a generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure is used to 
produce consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters. In the first step, Arelano and 
Bond‘s (1991) approach takes the first difference to remove the constant term and any 
unobserved and invariant individual (firm) effect. Because this transformation does not 
eliminate the correlation between the change in the lagged dependent variable and the 
change in the error term, they proposed using the other lags (the second or third lags) as 
instruments for the dependent variable. These lagged values Δyit-2 and Δyit-3 are 
instruments that are correlated with Δyit-1 and uncorrelated with the error term (εt-1) 
(Baum, 2006). The Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator assumes that the original 
disturbances are serially uncorrelated and that the differenced error is MA(1) with unit 
root (Baltagi, 2008).This procedure was developed further by Blundell and Bond (1998), 
who proposed the extended system of GMM estimator, which uses extra moment 
conditions. This approach produces unbiased and consistent estimates and, in the GMM 
context, the most efficient estimates. Hence, I also estimated the coefficients using this 
system GMM technique. 
Modeling network structure 
 For network structure variables (network density and betweenness centrality), the 
Hausman test was statistically significant (Chi2 = 401; prob>Chi2 = .0000), rejecting the 
assumption that the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with independent variables. I, 
therefore, used the firm and time effects model (Greene, 2003), which can be formulated 
as follows:  
Yit = ái + äYit-1 + â'Xit-1 + åit 
where subscripts i and t represent firms (i = 1 to 8) and years (t = 1 to 5) respectively. εit 
represents two-way error component disturbances (εit=µi+λt+νit), where µi denotes the 
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unobservable individual effect, λt denotes the time-specific effect and νit represents the 
remaining stochastic disturbance term (Baltagi, 2008). Here, µi and λt are assumed to be 
fixed parameters to be estimated and the remaining disturbances are stochastic with vit~ 
IID (0 . Xit is assumed to be independent only from the νit for all i and t. Because I 
also controlled for the firm‘s previous network position, the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable can cause serial correlation. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
available within STATA (Wooldridge, 2002) did not provide support to reject the null 
hypothesis (H0: no first-order autocorrelation) for all models. To correct for serial 
correlation, I used fixed effects model with a first order autoregressive disturbance term - 
AR (1), using Durbin–Watson estimator of rho (the autocorrelation coefficient).  
I estimated Poisson regression coefficients for the network density variable 
because of the distribution of that variable. Many of the firms in my sample (almost 40%) 
had a zero score on network density. This is because there were many cases where a focal 
firm‘s partners had not formed alliances with one another within a three-year period. 
Hausman, Hall, and Grilliches (1984) suggested that panel data Poisson regression model 
might be a more appropriate model when the dependent variable is a count variable 
containing many zeros and non-negative integers. The Poisson panel regression can be 
formulated as follows:  
 
where yit = 0, 1, 2, …; i denoting firms, and t denoting time. Because the computed 
network density measure also included some non-integer values, I rounded the decimals 
to the closest integer. This transformation did not change the distribution of this variable 
as the correlation coefficient between transformed variables and the original ones was 
.99. As a robustness check on the regression results, I also report the estimated 
coefficients and standard errors using a panel data Poisson regression model with firm 
and time fixed effects. The coefficients of this model were estimated using a maximum 
likelihood algorithm.  
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CHAPTER VI: RESULTS 
Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Table 7 below shows the summary statistics and correlations among all variables. 
The correlation coefficients are bivariate and based on pooled data across all firms and 
years. Larger firms have greater market share, use more debt to finance their capital 
investments (financial leverage), have less slack resources, are more likely to be 
embedded in a sparse network structure, form more ties (strong/equity or weak/non-
equity), and exhibit greater advantage-creating (proactivenes and innovativeness) and 
advantage-enhancing strategic tendencies than smaller firms. Firms‘ performance (ROA) 
is not related to firm size, but is positively related to their betweenness centrality, their 
number of weak (non-equity) ties, their advantage-creating tendencies (specifically, 
proactiveness), and their advantage-enhancing tendencies. Betweenness centrality is 
negatively related to the proportion of strong ties in the firm‘s alliance portfolio (i.e., a 
sparse network is associated with more weak/non-equity ties than strong/equity ties), and 
positively related to firm size, market share, performance (ROA), and both advantage-
creating and advantage-enhancing tendencies. Network density, on the other hand, is 
positively related to the proportion of strong ties in the firms‘ alliance portfolio (at 10% 
level), but not related to advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing tendencies.  
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Table 7: Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Firm size (total assets) 4682.44 11917.82 1
2 Market share 0.01 0.02 0.5174* 1
3 Financial Leverage 0.28 1.16 0.0914* 0.0974* 1
4 Financial Slack 2.10 1.85 -0.1350* -0.1825* -0.0748* 1
5 Performance 0.04 0.11 0.0707 0.0717* 0.0409 0.0317 1
6 Network Density 3.55 9.55 0.0245 -0.008 -0.0141 0.0517 0.0201 1
7 Betweenness Centrality 0.11 0.09 0.5000* 0.3143* 0.027 -0.0507 0.1221* -0.0429 1
8 Strong ties to total ties 0.52 0.12 -0.0674 -0.0271 -0.0067 -0.0523 -0.1865* 0.1189 -0.2231* 1
9 Strong ties 24.07 22.33 0.5797* 0.4082* -0.0132 -0.0392 0.1321 -0.2041* 0.7749* -0.1812* 1
10 Weak ties 25.84 26.95 0.3672* 0.2768* -0.0563 0.1208 0.1971* -0.2062* 0.7640* -0.3997* 0.8963* 1
11 Advantage-creating tendency - Proactiveness 0.00 0.81 0.4837* 0.2411* -0.0061 0.0194 0.0967* -0.0195 0.4415* -0.3079* 0.5955* 0.6667* 1
12 Advantage-creating tendency - Innovativeness 0.00 0.98 0.5185* 0.1940* 0.0448 -0.0982* 0.0753 0.0162 0.4108* -0.2390* 0.2156* 0.2093* 0.3464* 1
13 Advantage-enhancing tendency 0.00 0.95 0.3799* 0.2022* -0.0191 -0.0377 0.1219* 0.0616 0.5264* -0.2382* 0.6449* 0.7187* 0.5217* 0.3949* 1
* significant at 5% level
N=415 to 545  
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Competitive Strategy and Firm Performance 
Table 8 shows the GLS estimates with AR (1), and Table 9 shows the system 
GMM estimates. All models in Tables 8 and 9 account for time and firm-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity. Model 1 presents the coefficients for all control variables. The 
coefficients for past performance and market power are statistically significant. Firms 
with greater performance and a possibly monopolistic position in the previous period 
perform better in the next three years. The coefficients for year dummies are jointly 
significant (Chi2 (4) = 12.32; Prob>Chi2 = .0151) indicating influential macroeconomic 
factors affecting firms‘ performances.  
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that high advantage-creating strategic tendencies (ACT) 
will have a positive effect on firm performance. Model 2 in Table 8 shows the 
coefficients of the two dimensions of ACT. Both proactiveness and innovativeness are 
positively related to performance. The coefficient for proactiveness is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level (b = .0199; p <.017) and the coefficient for 
innovativeness is statistically significant at the 10% level (b = .0086; p <.082). Table 9 
(Model 2) shows the GMM estimates for proactiveness and innovativeness. The GMM 
estimates of the coefficients for proactiveness and innovativeness in Table 9 (Model 2) 
are also positive and statistically significant at the 10% level (b = .0268; p <.074 and b = 
.017; p <.064). Given that I use the more conservative two-tailed significance test (even 
though the direction of the effects is predicted), these results suggest some support for 
Hypothesis 1. Firms with higher advantage-creating strategic tendencies exhibit better 
performance than do other firms.  
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 states that advantage-enhancing strategic tendencies (AET) will be 
positively related to firm performance. Model 3 in Table 8 shows the results for the 
relationship between advantage-enhancing tendencies and firm performance. The 
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coefficient for AET is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (b = .0334; p 
<.003), which provides support for Hypothesis 2. The GMM estimates of the coefficient 
of AET in Table 9 (Model 2), are also positive and statistically significant at the 5% level 
(b = .053; p <.018). These findings provide support for Hypothesis 2. Firms with higher 
advantage-enhancing strategic tendencies exhibit better financial performance than do 
firms with lower level of advantage-enhancing strategic tendencies.  
Post-hoc analysis 
Model 4 in Tables 8 and 9 includes both AET and ACT (proactiveness and 
innovativeness) simultaneously. The coefficients for AET and one dimension of ACT 
(proactiveness) remain statistically significant at the 5 % level (b = .022; p <.038, and b = 
.016; p <.043 respectively). The coefficient for innovativeness, however, becomes 
insignificant (b = .0029; p <.678). These results suggest a potential mediating effect of 
advantage-enhancing on the relationship between innovativeness and firm performance. 
For example, firms that have had greater innovative abilities in the past period may have 
a greater ability to intensively introduce advantage-enhancing actions going forward. 
Therefore, I also tested whether innovativeness in the previous period affects 
proactiveness and AET in the future period. Table 10 shows the results of this post-hoc 
analysis. Model 1 shows that the coefficient of innovativeness is positive and significant 
(b = .136; p <.04) in predicting future degree of proactiveness (controlling for past 
innovativeness). In Model 2, the coefficient of innovativeness is also marginally 
significant in predicting future advantage-enhancing tendency (b = .053; p <.09). These 
results suggest that innovativeness has a positive effect on the future ability of the firms 
to be proactive and to compete intensively using advantage-enhancing actions. 
Controlling for the lagged dependent variable and using lagged values of the independent 
variables suggests support for the causality of these relationships. To further investigate 
the causal direction of these relationships, I tested whether there is a reciprocal 
relationship (that is, whether proactivenses and AET in the previous period also affect 
innovativeness in the future period). Model 3 shows that the effect of AET on 
innovativeness is negative and nonsignificant (b = - .069; p <.32). Model 4 shows that the 
effect of proactiveness on innovativeness is negative and nonsigificant (b = - .64; p <.19). 
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The coefficients remain nonsignificant when both are included in predicting future 
innovativeness (Model 5). Hence, these results suggest that past innovativeness positively 
affects the firm‘s future ability to proactively introduce new products and intensively 
initiate advantage-enhancing actions such as new product versions, product 
improvements, or market expansions.  
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that firms that are high in both ACT and AET will exhibit 
the best performance. The GLS estimates in Table 8 Model 5 do not provide support for 
the interaction effect between ACT and AET. The coefficient of PROXAET is negative 
and significant at 5% level (b = -.0104; p <.024), whereas INNXAET is not significant. 
GMM estimates in Table 9 are also consistent with GLS estimates. The coefficient of 
PRO x AET is negative and significant at 5% level (b = -.0155; p <.041). In addition, the 
coefficient of INN x AET is negative and marginally significant at 10% level (b = -.0087; 
p <.075). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Figure 13 illustrates the form of the 
interaction.  
 
Figure 14: Interaction between ACT (Proactiveness) and AET  
in Explaining Firm Performance 
 
Although firms with high levels of proactiveness and high levels of advantage-
enhancing tendencies exhibit the best performance, this effect is not significantly higher 
   
78 
 
than firms with low levels of proactiveness and high levels of advantage-enhancing 
tendencies. The chart in Figure 13 also shows that when firms exhibit low levels of both 
proactiveness and advantage-enhancing tendencies, they are least profitable. In addition, 
the positive relationship between advantage-enhancing tendencies and firm performance 
is stronger for firms that exhibit low levels of proactiveness. Alternatively, the effect of 
proactiveness on firm performance is stronger at low levels of advantage-enhancing 
tendencies.  
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Table 8: ACT, AET and Performance  
Random Effects Model – GLS estimator 
 DV: Performance (average ROA over the next three years) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Performance (past ROA) 0.2385* 0.2314* 0.2289* 0.2251* 0.2186* 
 (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
Firm size (total assets) -8.27e-07 -7.80e-07 -2.31e-07 -4.19e-07 -4.33e-07 
 (5.61e-07) (5.74e-07) (3.85e-07) (7.39e-07) (7.39e-07) 
Market Power 0.8029+ 0.8398+ 0.7645+ 0.7919+ 0.7808+ 
 (0.456) (0.459) (0.440) (0.448) (0.441) 
Financial Leverage 0.006 0.0068 0.0069 0.0071 0.0073 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Financial Slack 0.0132 0.012 0.0131 0.0125 0.0124 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Year dummy 1996  -0.0474* -0.0540* -0.0494* -0.0523* -0.0533* 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Year dummy 1997 -0.036 -0.0507+ -0.0429+ -0.0489+ -0.0518* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Year dummy 1998  -0.0808* -0.0959* -0.0928* -0.0978* -0.1016* 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) 
Year dummy 1999  -0.0805* -0.0955* -0.0921* -0.0974* -0.1040* 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.042) 
ACT
 
 - Proactivenes (PRO)  0.0199*  0.0157* 0.0207* 
  (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009) 
ACT - Innovativeness 
(INN)  0.0086+  0.0029 0.0013 
  (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007) 
AET   0.0334** 0.0221* 0.0666* 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.028) 
Interaction (PRO X AET)     -0.0104* 
     (0.005) 
Interaction (INN X AET)     -0.0032 
     (0.003) 
Constant -0.0063 0.0047 0.0055 0.0084 0.0201 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) 
R-squared 0.500  0.520  0.530  0.550  0.600  
Observations 521 521 521 521 521 
Number of i 113 113 113 113 113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant at 10%   
ACT - advantage-creating strategy     
AET - advantage-enhancing strategy     
 
 
 
   
80 
 
Table 9: ACT, AET and Performance  
Dynamic Panel Data Model - System GMM Estimator 
  DV: Performance (average ROA over the next three years) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Performance (past ROA) 0.0601 0.3463** 0.3437** 0.3448** 0.3422** 
 (0.049) (0.119) (0.121) (0.120) (0.119) 
Firm size (total assets) -1.61e-06 -4.53e-06 -5.62e-08 -8.00e-07 -1.01e-06 
 (1.11e-06) (1.53e-07) (1.07e-06) (1.29e-06) (1.31e-06) 
Market Power 1.0205 1.8357 1.6592 1.7427 1.6585 
 (0.804) (1.206) (1.102) (1.162) (1.081) 
Financial Leverage 0.0032 0.0043 0.0044 0.0047 0.0055 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Financial Slack 0.0074 0.0072 0.0079 0.0076 0.0073 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year dummy 1996 0.0304* 0.1417** 0.1403** 0.1441** 0.1520** 
 (0.012) (0.045) (0.041) (0.045) (0.048) 
Year dummy 1997 0.0573** 0.1318** 0.1361** 0.1364** 0.1430** 
 (0.017) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043) 
Year dummy 1998 0.0273 0.0847** 0.0927** 0.0898** 0.0952** 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Year dummy 1999 0.0148 0.0287** 0.0277** 0.0273* 0.0322** 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
ACT - Proactivenes (PRO)  0.0268+  0.0123 0.0158 
  (0.015)  (0.015) (0.015) 
ACT - Innovativeness (INN)  0.0171+  0.009 0.0083 
  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.008) 
AET   0.0533* 0.0439* 0.1131** 
   (0.023) (0.021) (0.042) 
Interaction (PRO X AET)     -0.0155* 
     (0.008) 
Interaction (INN X AET)     -0.0087+ 
     (0.005) 
Constant  -0.0095*  -0.0163*  -0.0155*  -0.0157*  -0.0144* 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Observations 535 535 535 535 535 
Number of i 113 113 113 113 113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant at 10%   
ACT - advantage-creating strategy     
AET - advantage-enhancing strategy     
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Table 10: The Effect of Innovativeness on AET and Proactiveness  
Dynamic Panel Data Model - System GMM Estimator 
  ACT-Proactiveness
1
 AET ACT-Innovativeness ACT-Innovativeness ACT-Innovativeness 
  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Firm size             
(total assets) -1.09e-05** 6.56e-05 -1.12e-05 -1.88e-05 -1.20e-05 
 (4.14e-06) (6.72-e06) (7.44-e06) (1.41e-05) (9.20-e06) 
Market Power 1.7967 1.5982 1.556 1.8973 1.5095 
 (1.199) (1.782) (1.149) (1.551) (1.247) 
Financial Leverage -0.0133 -0.0221 0.0058* -0.0026 -0.0029 
 (0.015) (0.058) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Financial Slack 0.0043 0.0059 0.0048 0.0101 0.0082+ 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Year dummy 1997 0.6764** 0.0653 0.1396** -0.0429+ -0.0441+ 
 (0.108) (0.101) (0.043) (0.023) (0.023) 
Year dummy 1998 0.4417** 0.0714 0.0279 -0.1300** -0.1369** 
 (0.075) (0.067) (0.017) (0.042) (0.043) 
Year dummy 1999 0.4578** -0.0975* 0.0879 -0.1252** -0.1370** 
 (0.077) (0.040) (0.077) (0.043) (0.042) 
AET  0.7592** -0.0689  -0.1004 
  (0.075) (0.069)  (0.088) 
ACT -Proactiveness 0.9216**   -0.064 -0.0268 
 (0.047)   (0.049) (0.057) 
ACT -Innovativeness  0.1359* 0.1290+ 0.9450** 1.1985** 1.0975** 
  (0.066) (0.078) (0.134) (0.213) (0.127) 
Constant -0.2761** 0.0297 -0.1172** 0.0774+ 0.0498 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.039) (0.044) (0.034) 
Observations 552 552 552 552 552 
Number of i 112 112 112 112 112 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant at 10%    
AET - advantage-enhancing strategy     
1 - DV's are based on the next three years (t, t+1 and t+2), whereas IV's on the past three years (t-3, t-2, and t-1) 
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Competitive Strategy and Alliance Network Formation 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 proposes that advantage-creating tendencies will be positively 
associated with betweenness centrality. The regression results for this hypothesis are 
shown in Table 11. Models 1, 2, and 3 show the result for betweenness centrality, while 
Models 4 through 7 show the results for network density. Model 2 in Table 11 shows that 
the coefficient for proactiveness is positive but not significant (b = .003; p <.69), whereas 
the coefficient for innovativeness is positive and significant at the 5% level (b = .013; p 
<.037). Thus, Hypothesis 4 is supported only for one dimension of ACT – innovativeness 
(i.e., the tendency of firms to pursue technological leadership). Additional support for this 
hypothesis provides the negative and statistically significant coefficients for 
proactiveness in Model 7 (b = -.361; p <.0001) in predicting network density. Thus, the 
overall pattern of these results provides support for Hypothesis 4. Firms with a greater 
emphasis on advantage-creating tendencies are more likely to be embedded in a network 
with many structural holes and are less likely to be locked in a dense network compared 
with firms that are low on advantage-creating tendencies.  
Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that firms with a high level of advantage-creating 
tendencies will form more non-equity alliances. The results for this hypothesis are shown 
in Table 12. The dependent variable is expressed as a proportion of strong ties to the total 
number of ties. As predicted, the coefficients for proactiveness (b = -.033; p <.008) and 
innovativeness (b = -.022; p <.047) are negative and statistically significant, providing 
support for Hypothesis 5. Thus, firms with high advantage-creating tendencies are more 
likely to form weak ties (i.e., non-equity alliances) than strong ties (i.e., equity alliances).  
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Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 states that firms with a high level of advantage-enhancing strategic 
tendencies will become embedded in a dense network of alliances in the future period. 
The coefficients for advantage-enhancing tendencies (ACT) in Models 5 and 7 (Table 11) 
are positive and significant (b = 1.382; p <.007 and b = .368; p <.001, respectively) in 
predicting future network density. In addition, Model 2 in Table 11 shows that the 
coefficient of AET is negative and significant (b = -.027; p <.001) in predicting 
betweenness centrality. These results provide support for Hypothesis 6. Firms with a high 
level of advantage-enhancing tendencies are more likely to form dense network structures 
and less likely to span many structural holes.  
Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 states that firms with high advantage-enhancing tendencies will 
form more equity alliances in the future period. The coefficient for AET in Table 12‘s 
Model 2 is positive (as predicted) but nonsignificant (b = .0003; p <.997). Thus, 
Hypothesis 7 is not supported. This was surprising because a dense network is likely to 
provide incentives for firms to establish more stable ties and further enhance the 
exchange of fine-grained information and know-how. To further examine this 
proposition, I conducted additional (post hoc) analyses. Instead of the ratio of strong ties 
to total ties, I estimated two additional models where the dependent variables were the 
―number of strong ties‖ and the ―number of weak ties.‖ This approach would estimate the 
effect of ACT and AET on the propensity of firms to form strong or weak ties. Model 5 
in Table 12 shows that the coefficient of AET is positive and statistically significant in 
predicting the number of strong ties formed over the subsequent in the next three years (b 
= 3.96; p <.009). At the same time, the coefficients of ACT dimensions (proactiveness 
and innovativeness) are negative (as predicted), though not statistically significant. 
However, the coefficient of AET in Model 6 in Table 12 is, contrary to the prediction, 
positive and not significant in predicting weak ties. Thus, these results provide somewhat 
mixed results for Hypothesis 7.  
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The overall pattern of these results suggest that firms with high advantage-
creating strategic tendencies are more likely to be embedded in sparse network structures 
with a greater proportion of weak/non-equity alliances, whereas firms with high levels of 
advantage-enhancing strategic tendencies are more likely to be embedded in dense 
networks with a large proportion of strong/equity ties. 
Hypotheses 8a and 8b 
Hypotheses 8a and 8b tested the effect of strategically entrepreneurial firms on 
network formation. These hypotheses predict a negative interaction between AET and 
ACT in predicting the type of network structure (betweenness centrality and network 
density). The results of the tests of these moderating hypotheses are shown in Table 11. 
The interaction between proactiveness and advantage-enhancing tendency in predicting 
betweenness centrality in Model 3 is negative and statistically significant (b = -.005; p 
<.002), providing some support for Hypothesis 8a. The same interaction effects in 
Models 6 and 8, when network density is dependent variable, are positive and statistically 
significant (b = .402; p <.057, and b = .105; p <.001), providing support for Hypothesis 
8b. I did not find support for the interaction effect between innovativeness and 
advantage-enhancing tendencies in predicting either betweenness centrality or network 
density. The coefficient for the interaction between innovativeness and AET is negative 
and nonsignificant (b = -.0001; p <.885) in Model 3 and positive and nonsignificant in 
Models 6 and 7 (b = .067; p <.743, and b = .011; p <.724).  
Taken together, these findings provide some support for moderating effects. 
Figure 14 below displays the form of the moderating effect of AET on the relationship 
between proactiveness and betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality is highest 
when a firm is pursuing highly proactive advantage-creating tendencies and very low 
advantage-enhancing tendencies. However, as the firm is increasing its level of AET, 
betweenness centrality also decreases. Advantage-enhancing tendencies stimulate greater 
collaboration among a firm‘s partners, which leads to the closure of the firm‘s structural 
holes. Therefore, the rate of decrease in the betweenness score is higher for firms with a 
high level of proactiveness than for firms with a low level of proactiveness. There is no 
effect of AET on betweenness centrality at low levels of proactiveness.  
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Figure 15:  Interaction between ACT (proactiveness) and AET in Explaining Future 
Betweenness Centrality 
 
 
The results for the interaction effects between ACT and AET in predicting 
network density depicted in Figure 15 below show a similar pattern. Initially, firms with 
low levels of proactiveness are embedded in a highly dense network. However, as 
proactiveness increases, network density rapidly decreases to moderate-to-low levels. 
The negative slope is steeper for firms that have low levels of advantage-enhancing 
tendencies. For firms with high levels of AET, the increase in proactiveness decreases the 
density of the alliance network, but at a slower rate than that of the firms with low levels 
of AET.  
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Figure 16: Interaction between ACT (proactiveness) and AET in Explaining Future 
Network Density 
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Table 11: ACT, AET and Network Structure  
Fixed Effects Model – OLS Estimator 
  DV: Betweenness Centrality DV: Network Density  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7p Model 8p 
Betweenness Centrality  -0.638** -0.666** -0.582** - - - - - 
 (0.116) (0.112) (0.086) - - - - - 
Network Density  - - - -0.289+ -0.244+ -0.246+ -0.025** -0.026** 
 - - - (0.164) (0.148) (0.149) (0.003) (0.003) 
Financial Slack  0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.181 1.837 1.895 -0.018 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.497) (1.468) (1.477) (0.036) (0.036) 
Performance  -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.127 -0.688 -0.699 0.219* 0.241* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.147) (0.419) (0.424) (0.092) (0.094) 
Firm size (assets) -1.71e-05** -1.30e-05** -1.08e-05** -5.48e-05 -1.54e-04 -2.51e-04* -1.45e-05 -3.56e-05+ 
 (2.90e-06) (2.66e-06) (1.17e-06) (6.55e-05) (1.15e-04) (1.17e-04) (1.76e-05) (1.85e-05) 
Advantage-creating tendency 
(proactiveness)  - 0.003 0.017** - -1.000 -1.501+ -0.361** -0.525** 
 - (0.007) (0.006) - (0.698) (0.784) (0.089) (0.102) 
Advantage-creating tendency 
(innovativeness)  - 0.013* 0.001 - 0.429 0.666 0.079 0.149+ 
 - (0.006) (0.005) - (0.528) (0.563) (0.075) (0.080) 
Advantage-enhancing tendency - AET - -0.027** -0.015 - 1.382+ 0.146 0.368** 0.142 
 - (0.007) (0.009) - (0.764) (1.337) (0.102) (0.135) 
Proactiveness X AET  - - -0.005** - - 0.402+ - 0.105** 
 - - (0.002) - - (0.211) - (0.026) 
Innovativeness X AET  - - -0.0003 - - 0.067 - 0.011 
 - - (0.002) - - (0.205) - (0.030) 
Constant 0.127** 0.137** 0.120* 6.431** 2.804 2.671 - - 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (1.604) (3.027) (3.080) - - 
R-squared 0.380  0.440  0.450  0.180  0.270  0.310  - - 
Observations 514 514 514 514 514 514 284 284 
Number of i 112 112 112 112 112 112 74 74 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ; Time dummies included       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant at 10%       
p - Poisson regression estimates         
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Table 12: ACT, AET and Strength of Ties  
Firm and Time Fixed Effects Model 
  DV: Strong ties / total ties Number of strong ties Number of weak ties 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Strong ties / total ties -0.210+ -0.448** -0.427** - - - - 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) - - - - 
Number of strong ties - - - 0.603** 0.126 - - 
 - - - (0.08) (0.17) - - 
Number of weak ties - - - - - 0.610* 0.572* 
 - - - - - (0.25) (0.26) 
Financial Slack  -0.023 -0.03 -0.036 7.725* 1.123 -5.763 -3.643 
 -0.018 -0.026 -0.025 -3.655 -3.611 -4.789 -4.521 
Performance  -0.033** -0.022** -0.023** -4.630** -2.383+ -1.455 -1.448 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (1.03) (1.23) (1.34) (1.42) 
Firm size (assets) -6.55e-07+ -3.32e-06+ -2.47e-06 -2.55e-04 -2.61e-04 -2.64e-04 -1.47e-04 
 (5.39e-07) (1.72e-06) (1.75e-06) (1.33e-04) (3.45e-04) (2.82e-04) (4.13e-04) 
Advantage-creating tendency (proactiveness)  - -0.033** -0.023 - -1.112 - 3.744* 
 - (0.01) (0.02) - (1.72) - (1.74) 
Advantage-creating tendency (innovativeness)  - -0.022* -0.027* - -0.641 - 1.196 
 - (0.01) (0.01) - (2.23) - (2.15) 
Advantage-enhancing tendency - AET - 0.000 0.003 - 3.960** - 2.548 
 - (0.01) (0.02) - (1.48) - (1.84) 
Proactiveness X AET  - - -0.003 - - - - 
 - - (0.00) - - - - 
Innovativeness X AET  - - 0.002 - - - - 
 - - (0.00) - - - - 
Constant 0.656** 0.867** 0.851** -11.255+ 25.887* 10.674 12.884 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (6.50) (11.52) (11.37) (11.23) 
R-squared 0.13  0.39  0.43  0.18  0.27  0.31  0.57 
Observations 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 
Number of i 112 112 112 112 112 112 74 
Standard errors in parentheses ; Time dummies included      
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant at 10%       
 
   
89 
 
Competitive Strategy, Alliance Network Structure and Firm Performance  
Hypothesis 9 
Hypothesis 9 predicts that the positive effect of advantage-creating strategic 
tendencies on firm performance will be stronger when the firm is embedded in a sparse 
network structure. Table 13 shows the GLS estimators and Table 14 shows system GMM 
estimators. Model 1 in Table 13 regresses firm performance on all control variables and 
the two dimensions of advantage-creating strategic tendencies: proactiveness and 
innovativeness. Model 2 adds betweenness centrality. The coefficient for betweenness 
centrality is positive and statistically significant (b = .129; p <.015). Model 3 introduces 
the two interaction terms. Only the coefficient for the interaction between proactiveness 
and betweenness centrality is negative and significant (b =. -047; p <. 009). The GMM 
estimates in Table 14 exhibit a similar pattern. The coefficient for betweenness centrality 
is significant at the 10% level (p <.059); the interaction between proactiveness and 
betweenness centrality is negative and significant (b = - .067; p <. 029). The interaction 
between innovativeness and betweenness centrality is not significant (b = -.064; p <.127). 
Thus, Hypothesis 9 is supported only for proactiveness. Figure 16 below illustrates this 
moderating effect. Highly proactive firms embedded in a network with many structural 
holes exhibit the highest level of performance. The chart below also shows that firms that 
span structural holes across distant clusters exhibit better performance than highly 
proactive firms that do not span structural holes. However, this chart also suggests that 
firms with low advantage-creating capabilities (proactiveness) benefit more from sparse 
network structures than do firms with high advantage-creating capabilities. These 
findings confirm the complementary role of sparse network structure and further suggest 
that firms that lack advantage-creating capabilities benefit more from sparse network 
structure.  
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Figure 17: Moderating role of Betweenness Centrality on the Relationship Between 
ACT (proactivenes) and Performance 
 
 
Hypothesis 10 
Hypothesis 10 proposes that firms with high advantage-creating capabilities can 
use network density as a substitute for advantage-enhancing capabilities. More 
specifically, it predicts that network density will strengthen the positive effect of 
advantage-creating strategic tendencies (being highly proactive and innovative) on firm 
performance. Models 4 and 5 in Tables 13 and 14 show the results for Hypothesis 10. 
The main effect for network density in Model 4 is not significant (b = -.0007; p <.26). 
Model 5 shows that the coefficient for the interaction term between innovativeness and 
network density is positive and significant (b = .0017; p <.004), whereas the interaction 
between proactiveness and network density is not significant (b = .0005; p <.32). GMM 
estimates in Table 14 show a similar pattern. The interaction between innovativeness and 
density is marginally significant at the 10% level (b = .0014; p <. 054), whereas the 
interaction between proactiveness and density is not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 10 is 
supported only for innovativeness. Figure 17 below shows the form of the interaction 
between innovativeness and network density in explaining firm performance. Firms with 
strong innovative capabilities (advantage-creating strategic tendencies) that are embedded 
in highly dense networks exhibit better performance than other firms. The positive effect 
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of innovativeness on firm performance becomes stronger as the firm becomes more 
densely embedded in the alliance network. Note also that at low levels of network 
density, innovativeness has no effect on firm performance. Thus, firms with high 
advantage-creating tendencies can increase their performance when they use dense 
network structures to substitute for advantage-enhancing tendencies.  
Figure 18: Moderating role of Network Density on the Relationship between ACT 
(Innovativeness) and Performance 
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Table 13: ACT, Network Structure and Performance 
Random Effects Model – GLS estimator 
  DV: Performance (average ROA over the next three years) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Performance (past ROA) 0.2314* 0.2395* 0.2341+ 0.2294* 0.2295+ 
 (0.0944) (0.1209) (0.1211) (0.0941) (0.1231) 
Firm size (total assets) -7.80e-07 -8.07e-07 -5.51e-07 -7.88e-08 -7.16e-07 
 (5.74e-07) (-5.69e-07) (6.77e-07) (1.15e-06) (9.97e-07) 
Market Power 0.8398+ 0.909 0.8805 0.8653+ 0.8868 
 (0.4586) (0.7147) (0.6928) (0.4497) (0.6571) 
Financial Leverage 0.0068 0.006 0.0058 0.0069 0.0069 
 (0.0080) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0080) (0.0096) 
Financial Slack 0.012 0.0338* 0.0339* 0.012 0.0119 
 (0.0096) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0097) (0.0081) 
Year dummy 1996 -0.0540* -0.0623+ -0.0616+ -0.0545* -0.0543* 
 (0.0247) (0.0339) (0.0342) (0.0246) (0.0239) 
Year dummy 1997 -0.0507+ -0.0736* -0.0724* -0.0512* -0.0522* 
 (0.0259) (0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0257) (0.0217) 
Year dummy 1998 -0.0959* -0.0573* -0.0558* -0.0971* -0.0976* 
 (0.0388) (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0386) (0.0454) 
Year dummy 1999 -0.0955* -0.0542** -0.0543** -0.0962* -0.0960* 
 (0.0390) (0.0166) (0.0172) (0.0388) (0.0459) 
ACT - Proactivenes (PRO) 0.0199* 0.0089+ 0.0167** 0.0202* 0.0208 
 (0.0083) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0083) (0.0148) 
ACT - Innovativeness (INN) 0.0086+ 0.0137 0.0026 0.0088+ 0.0041 
 (0.0049) (0.0084) (0.0069) (0.0049) (0.0064) 
Betweenness Centrality  0.1291* 0.3335*   
  (0.0530) (0.1602)   
Interaction (PRO X Betweenness)   -0.0470**   
   (0.0180)   
Interaction (INN X Betweenness)   -0.0205   
   (0.0345)   
Network Density    -0.0007 0.0003 
    (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Interaction (PRO X Density)     0.0005 
     (0.0005) 
Interaction (INN X Density)     0.0017** 
     (0.0006) 
Constant 0.0047 -0.0052 -0.0054 0.0074 0.0051 
 (0.0251) (0.0309) (0.0302) (0.0257) (0.0255) 
R-squared 0.44 0.58 0.62 0.45 0.52 
Observations 521 523 523 521 523 
Number of i 113 113 113 113 113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant at 10%    
ACT - advantage-creating strategy     
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Table 14: Advantage-creating strategy, Network Structure and Performance  
Dynamic Panel Data Model - System GMM Estimator 
 
  DV: Performance (average ROA over the next three years) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Performance (past ROA) 0.3463** 0.3441** 0.3189* 0.3446** 0.3058* 
 (0.1192) (0.1172) (0.1385) (0.1202) (0.1244) 
Firm size (total assets) -4.54e-07 -4.32e-07 -2.54e-07 -7.42e-07 -5.84e-07 
 (1.53e-06) (1.52e-06) (9.80e-07) (6.98e-07) (7.55e-07) 
Market Power 1.8357 1.3111* 1.0584 1.8178 1.3030+ 
 (1.2062) (0.6540) (0.6494) (1.1892) (0.7738) 
Financial Leverage 0.0043 0.0046 0.0028 0.0045 0.0021 
 (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0020) 
Financial Slack 0.0072 0.0154+ 0.0144+ 0.0072 0.0113+ 
 (0.0072) (0.0080) (0.0076) (0.0072) (0.0069) 
Year dummy 1996 0.1417** 0.0522 0.0595 0.1413** 0.1150* 
 (0.0453) (0.0372) (0.0404) (0.0452) (0.0477) 
Year dummy 1997 0.1318** 0.0514 0.0577 0.1318** 0.1040* 
 (0.0407) (0.0325) (0.0367) (0.0408) (0.0435) 
Year dummy 1998 0.0847** 0.0444+ 0.0466+ 0.0847** 0.0603** 
 (0.0143) (0.0233) (0.0261) (0.0143) (0.0172) 
Year dummy 1999 0.0287** 0.0388** 0.0397* 0.0295** 0.0307** 
 (0.0108) (0.0134) (0.0161) (0.0108) (0.0112) 
ACT - Proactivenes (PRO) 0.0268+ 0.0086 0.0139 0.0265+ 0.016 
 (0.0150) (0.0082) (0.0089) (0.0148) (0.0142) 
ACT - Innovativeness (INN) 0.0171+ 0.0131+ 0.0169* 0.0170+ 0.0045 
 (0.0094) (0.0071) (0.0083) (0.0092) (0.0066) 
Betweenness Centrality  0.1538+ 0.4591*   
  (0.0816) (0.1793)   
Interaction (PRO X Betweenness)   -0.0674*   
   (0.0309)   
Interaction (INN X Betweenness)   -0.0636   
   (0.0417)   
Network Density    0.0005 0.0007 
    (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Interaction (PRO X Density)     0.0005 
     (0.0005) 
Interaction (INN X Density)     0.0014+ 
     (0.0007) 
Constant  -0.0163*  -0.0136**  -0.0138**  -0.0165*  -0.0158** 
 (0.0066) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0067) (0.0060) 
Observations 520 520 520 520 520 
Number of i 112 112 112 112 112 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant at 10%    
ACT - advantage-creating strategy     
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Hypothesis 11 
Hypothesis 11 proposes that being embedded in a dense network structure will 
strengthen the positive effect of advantage-enhancing strategic tendencies on firm 
performance (and thus network will play a complementary role). Model 5 in Table 15 
shows that the coefficient for AET and network density is positive and statistically 
significant (b = .0033; p >.01). The GMM estimates are also consistent (b = .0028; p 
<.01). Figure 19 shows the form of this interaction. The positive effect of advantage-
enhancing strategic tendencies on firm performance is stronger when a firm is embedded 
in a dense network structure. Firms with high levels of advantage-enhancing strategic 
tendencies that are highly embedded in a dense network exhibit the best performance. 
Thus, Hypothesis 12 is supported. Firms with high levels of advantage-enhancing 
tendency can extract greater value from dense network structures than firms with low 
levels of advantage-enhancing tendencies. In addition, no effect is seen for advantage-
enhancing tendencies when firms are not embedded in a dense network structure.  
 
Figure 19: Moderating Role of Network Density on the Relationship Between AET 
and Performance 
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Hypothesis 12 
Hypothesis 12 predicts that being embedded in a network structure with many 
structural holes can increase the positive effects of advantage-enhancing strategic 
tendencies on firm performance. Model 3 in Table 15 shows that the coefficient for the 
interaction between AET and betweenness centrality is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level (b = - .088; p <.02). The system GMM estimates in Table 16 
confirm the GLS results (b = - .093; p <.03). Figure 18 illustrates this moderating effect. 
Firms exhibit the highest performance at high levels of betweennness centrality and high 
levels of advantage-enhancing strategic tendencies. Thus, Hypothesis 11 is supported. 
Firms with low levels of betweenness centrality and high levels of AET, or vice versa, 
exhibit lower performance than firms with high level of AET that are embedded in sparse 
network structures. However, Figure 18 also shows that at low levels of advantage-
enhancing tendency, the increase in the degree of structural holes is greater than that at 
high level of advantage-enhancing tendencies. This suggests that firms with low 
advantage-enhancing capabilities benefit more from highly sparse networks than firms 
with low level of advantage-enhancing capabilities do.  
 
Figure 20: Moderating role of Betweenness Centrality on the Relationship Between 
AET and Performance 
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Table 15: Advantage-enhancing strategy, Network Structure and Performance  
Random Effects Model – GLS Estimator 
  DV: Performance (average ROA over the next three years) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Performance (past ROA) 0.2289* 0.2395* 0.2350* 0.2269* 0.2245* 
 (0.0943) (0.0971) (0.0968) (0.0939) (0.0933) 
Firm size (total assets) -2.31e-07 -3.68e-07 -5.30e-07 -3.68e-07 -5.30e-07 
 (3.85e-07) (5.29e-07) (7.83e-07) (5.29e-07) (7.83e-07) 
Market Power 0.7645+ 0.8561+ 0.8547+ 0.7865+ 0.7891+ 
 (0.4401) (0.4764) (0.4771) (0.4311) (0.4267) 
Financial Leverage 0.0069 0.006 0.0062 0.007 0.007 
 (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
Financial Slack 0.0131 0.0344* 0.0349* 0.0131 0.013 
 (0.0098) (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0099) (0.0098) 
Year dummy 1996 -0.0494* -0.0598* -0.0609* -0.0498* -0.0514* 
 (0.0241) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
Year dummy 1997 -0.0429+ -0.0703+ -0.0728* -0.0432+ -0.0434+ 
 (0.0249) (0.0364) (0.0369) (0.0248) (0.0247) 
Year dummy 1998 -0.0928* -0.0616* -0.0612* -0.0938* -0.0947** 
 (0.0369) (0.0257) (0.0255) (0.0368) (0.0367) 
Year dummy 1999 -0.0921* -0.0580** -0.0589** -0.0926* -0.0937* 
 (0.0368) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0367) (0.0366) 
AET 0.0334** 0.0239* 0.0388** 0.0337** 0.0224+ 
 (0.0111) (0.0100) (0.0136) (0.0112) (0.0118) 
Betweenness Centrality  0.0133 0.3332*   
  (0.0846) (0.1403)   
Interaction (AET X Betweenness)   -0.0883*   
   (0.0378)   
Network Density    -0.0006 0.0001 
    (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Interaction (AET X Density)     0.0033** 
     (0.0011) 
Constant 0.0055 -0.0048 -0.0049 0.0079 0.0043 
 (0.0250) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0256) (0.0254) 
R-squared 0.51 0.64 0.68 0.51 0.54 
Observations 521 521 521 521 521 
Number of i 113 113 113 113 113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant at 10%    
AET - advantage-enhancing strategy     
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Table 16: AET, Network Structure and Performance  
Dynamic Panel Data Model - System GMM Estimator 
  DV: Performance (average ROA over the next three years) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Performance (past ROA) 0.3437** 0.3428** 0.3177* 0.3419** 0.3047* 
 (0.1205) (0.1170) (0.1381) (0.1216) (0.1250) 
Firm size (total assets) -5.62e-08 -6.20e-08 -3.33e-07 -3.01e-07 -4.94e-07 
 (1.07e-06) (1.07e-06) (6.43e-07) (7.16e-07) (7.78e-07) 
Market Power 1.6592 1.1979* 1.0016 1.6428 1.1637+ 
 (1.1016) (0.5895) (0.6120) (1.0852) (0.6970) 
Financial Leverage 0.0044 0.0045 0.003 0.0045 0.002 
 (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0036) (0.0021) 
Financial Slack 0.0079 0.0156+ 0.0144+ 0.0079 0.0119+ 
 (0.0072) (0.0083) (0.0078) (0.0072) (0.0070) 
Year dummy 1996 0.1403** 0.0562 0.0618 0.1400** 0.1116* 
 (0.0408) (0.0350) (0.0384) (0.0407) (0.0434) 
Year dummy 1997 0.1361** 0.0581+ 0.0610+ 0.1362** 0.1042* 
 (0.0388) (0.0306) (0.0353) (0.0388) (0.0418) 
Year dummy 1998 0.0927** 0.0523* 0.0498* 0.0927** 0.0647** 
 (0.0143) (0.0208) (0.0247) (0.0144) (0.0165) 
Year dummy 1999 0.0277** 0.0382** 0.0381* 0.0285** 0.0299** 
 (0.0105) (0.0131) (0.0156) (0.0106) (0.0112) 
AET 0.0533* 0.0202 0.0387* 0.0530* 0.0194 
 (0.0226) (0.0134) (0.0174) (0.0224) (0.0150) 
Betweenness Centrality  0.0154 0.3361*   
  (0.1354) (0.1434)   
Interaction (AET X Betweenness)   -0.0933*   
   (0.0451)   
Network Density    0.0005 0.0012* 
    (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Interaction (AET X Density)     0.0028** 
     (0.0011) 
Constant  -0.0155*  -0.0135**  -0.0132**  -0.0157*  -0.0155** 
 (0.0063) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0064) (0.0057) 
Observations 520 520 520 520 520 
Number of i 112 112 112 112 112 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses      
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; + significant at 10%    
AET - advantage-enhancing strategy     
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Robustness check 
Advantage creating (proactiveness and innovativeness) and advantage-enhancing 
strategic tendencies are measured as the observable and realized strategic activity of firms 
over time. This activity, however, may reflect not only firms‘ internal advantage-creating 
and advantage-enhancing capabilities; it may also capture firms‘ access to network 
resources in the previous period. This effect can be removed by partialling out the 
explained variance in competitive strategy due to the network structure effect in the 
previous period. Therefore, I first regressed each strategy variable (i.e., proactiveness, 
innovativeness, and AET) on each type of network structure (betweenness centrality and 
network density). Then, I used the residuals from this regression as a measure of firm 
strategy. For example, to remove the effect of prior network density on advantage-
enhancing tendency (AET), I regressed AET on network density and used the residuals 
from this regression as a measure of AET. This procedure partials out the variance in 
AET that is explained by past network density. Thus, the interaction between AET and 
network density is a product of the current period AET (without the effect from past 
network density) and the current period network density. I ran all models using these 
modified measures of AET and ACT. The results were consistent with those shown 
below, which used the original measures.  
In addition, all measures of the network structure are based on all types of 
alliances, including licensing alliances. Although licensing agreements also facilitate 
transfer of knowledge and information, they are different from other types of alliances 
because the transfer of knowledge mostly goes one-way: from a licensor to a licensee. 
Because firms that have many licensing agreements are more likely to have many 
structural holes (partners are less likely to collaborate with one another) for reasons other 
than their competitive strategy, I also computed alliance network measures excluding 
licensing agreements. The pattern of the results remained unchanged.  
Finally, my sample included the largest companies in computers and electronics 
industry. However, because some of the smaller firms may be important rivals in these 
industries, I also included those firms that were more newsworthy than some of the 
largest firms in the sample (selected by number of employees and the total revenues). The 
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inclusion of these firms can introduce some bias in the sample, because these additional 
firms added to the sample of the largest firms are not a random draw from the population 
of smaller firms in these industries. Therefore, I also tested the propositions excluding 
these firms. The results again remained consistent with those shown above. 
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CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Overview 
In this dissertation, I explore the interplay between alliance networks and firms‘ 
strategies in explaining firm performance. In hypercompetitive environments, in which 
firms compete with complex modular products, a firm‘s ability to systematically 
outperform rivals depends not only on its internally developed capabilities but also on the 
advantageous access to information, assets, and expertise controlled by the other firms. 
Recent research suggests that the sources of performance differences across firms reside 
in the firm‘s favorable pattern of alliance ties (Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000). For 
example, Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) qualitative research has shown that Toyota‘s 
productivity advantages over rivals can be, at least partially, attributed to its dense 
network of interconnected suppliers. Dense network stimulates knowledge sharing among 
network partners, discourages free riding and reduces the cost of accessing and 
mobilizing valuable external resources. On the other hand, Burt (1992) work suggests 
that firms can gain from sparse network structure in which a focal firm is connected with 
firms from disconnected clusters. This network structure provides access to diverse 
knowledge and resources, which increases firms‘ potential for discovering 
entrepreneurial opportunities and developing radical innovation. However, although this 
research has increased our understanding of how the structure of alliance network affect 
firm performance, we still have incomplete understanding of two fundamental questions 
for strategy researchers: 1) Why some firms (and not others) develop such advantageous 
positions in the alliance network structure, and 2) Why some firms benefit from dense 
network structure, whereas others benefit from sparse network structure?  
In this dissertation, I argue that firms develop and benefit from different alliance 
network structures because they pursue different competitive strategies. Different 
strategies create different needs, motivations, and opportunities for collaboration with 
other market participants. Because different network resources are needed for different 
types of strategies, the effect of network position on firm performance is contingent on 
the type of strategy a firm is pursuing. I find that firms with superior advantage-creating 
strategies tend to create sparse network structures with many non-equity alliances, 
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whereas those with superior advantage-enhancing strategies become embedded in dense 
network structures with many equity alliances. However, this tendency is not universally 
beneficial for all firms. Firms with superior advantage-creating or advantage-enhancing 
capabilities can benefit more from creating dense network structures, whereas firms that 
lack such capabilities will benefit more from network structures with many brokerage 
opportunities between disconnected clusters. Thus, network structure plays both 
supplementary and complementary role to the firm‘s advantage-creating and advantage-
enhancing capabilities. I discuss this point in more detail in Section 7.4. Here, I first start 
with discussion of the major findings in Chapter 1 (the relationship between competitive 
strategy and firm performance).  
Competitive Strategy and Firm Performance 
This dissertation extends the research in corporate entrepreneurship by showing 
that superior performance in hypercompetitive environments can be achieved not only 
through proactiveness and innovativeness (advantage-creating tendencies) but also 
through intensive advantage-enhancing activity. I find that advantage-creating and 
advantage-enhancing strategies have independent positive effects on firm performance. 
Firms with advantage-creating strategy are frequently first to introduce new products and 
technologies on the market and thus create series of short-term monopolistic market 
positions. Firms with strong advantage-enhancing capabilities, on the other hand, are 
better able to protect and extend a few well-established market positions and to quickly 
imitate the new products and technologies of first movers. In addition, I find that firms 
cannot pursue strategic entrepreneurship (frequent creation of new competitive 
advantages and ability to protect and sustain those advantages) relying solely on its 
internal capabilities; this study‘s results suggest, however, that firms can achieve strategic 
entrepreneurship through developing an optimal alliance network structure that can 
substitute for the capabilities that a firm is lacking. As such, this research study is among 
the few that has empirically examined some important aspects of the emergent ―strategic 
entrepreneurship‖ paradigm (I discuss this point in more detail below).  
This study advances the research in corporate entrepreneurship also by examining 
the relationship between the changes in entrepreneurial strategies and firm performance 
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over time. Using a longitudinal time-series research design, this study empirically 
examines the causal relationship between different dimensions of entrepreneurial 
strategies (proactiveness and innovativeness), advantage-enhancing strategies, and firm 
performance. For example, the post-hoc analyses reveal that the past level of firms‘ 
innovativeness affects the future ability of firms both to proactively introduce new 
products (proactiveness) and to intensively enhance the value of their existing products 
(advantage-enhancing tendencies). The confidence in the direction of the causality of this 
relationship is increased (1) by including lagged dependent variables, (2) by using lagged 
independent variables, (3) by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, and (4) by 
showing that the reverse effect is not statistically significant, none of which could have 
been possible using cross-sectional data. This additional analysis corroborates Covin and 
Miles‘s (1999) argument that innovativeness is a central characteristic of entrepreneurial 
firms and that the dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation may be sequentially related 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). It is possible, however, that the magnitude of the effect of each 
of these dimensions on firm performance may vary for different firm performance 
measures. For example, a firm‘s innovativeness and proactiveness may be more strongly 
related to measures of firm performances such as market share change or sales growth 
rate. Thus, future research may examine how advantage-creating and advantage-
enhancing tendencies are interrelated in explaining different measures of firm 
performance.  
Competitive Strategy and Network Formation 
This study also contributes to a better understanding of how strategic actors find 
their way into certain network positions. Firms are embedded in different network 
structures, because they pursue different strategies. Because firms exhibit recurring and 
stable strategic behavior over time, they also show consistent patterns of networking 
behavior. Thus, although the overall alliance network is changing dynamically, firms 
exhibit stable patterns of network ties, which in turn result in their being in a stable 
position in the alliance network structure over time.  
I find that firms with strong advantage-creating tendencies in the previous period 
exhibit enduring propensity to become embedded in sparse network structures and to 
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form more non-equity alliances in the future. These firms have a greater need and 
motivation to frequently bring new partners into their networks, often from distant 
network clusters; therefore, they constantly maintain sparse network structures. Because 
this frequent formation of new alliances requires greater flexibility (both to form new 
alliances and dissolve old alliances that are no longer useful), they are also more likely to 
form non-equity alliances. Non-equity alliances provide this flexibility because they 
involve less formal organizing mechanisms and are less costly to dissolve. On the other 
hand, firms with an emphasis on advantage-enhancing strategies are more likely to 
become embedded in a dense network with many equity-based alliances. Because the 
products are complex systems involving components supplied by independent firms, the 
component providers need to closely collaborate with one another. A dense network 
structure facilitates the flow of information and resources and decreases the incentives of 
network members to behave opportunistically. This increased exchange of information 
ensures greater fit among components and modules, which leads to a reduced risk of 
product malfunctioning. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that firms with advantage-
enhancing strategies will intensively form alliances with the other firms as well as 
encouraging greater collaboration among the other network members. Because equity 
alliances are more effective in managing interdependencies among firms, we would 
expect that these firms will be more likely to form equity rather than non-equity alliances.  
This research provides new insights into how firms that try to pursue strategic 
entrepreneurship use their alliances to outperform rivals. Because these firms are able to 
simultaneously pursue advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing strategies, they 
dynamically change their network positions. They form new ties with firms from distant 
network clusters and at the same time encourage their partners to collaborate with one 
another. Thus, their network structure is changing from dense to sparse and back again as 
a function of their relative needs and motivations to pursue advantage-enhancing and 
advantage-creating strategic tendencies.  
This study also addresses Stuart and Sorenson‘s (2007) concerns with the 
endogeneity problems in current network research. Firms‘ competitive strategies may 
affect both their position in the network structure and their performance. The results of 
this study suggest that future studies should account for firms‘ competitive strategies 
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when they investigate the relationship between network structure (and portfolio 
configuration) and firm performance.  
It is important to note that in this chapter, I examine how individual decisions of 
firms to form alliances leads to recognizable network structure at the interfirm level of 
analysis. I did not initially assume that firms are aware of their network structure and they 
purposefully shape their position in the network structure. Adopting methodological 
individualism (Hayek, 1948; Mises, 1949), I try to understand the formation of the 
overall network structure by examining the strategic and entrepreneurial actions of 
individual actors in the network. However, to examine how firms can maximize their 
performance, I adopt the Granovetter (1985) embeddeddness perspective by taking a 
―middle ground‖ approach between an oversocialized and undersocialized view of firms‘ 
market activity (Granovetter, 1985). Specifically, I assume that firms pursue different 
strategies, but that the effectiveness of these strategies is affected by the network 
structure in which they are embedded. This approach can lead to normative statements 
about what would be the optimal network structure for each strategy to maximize firm 
performance. Thus, if in this chapter I examine ―what firms do,‖ I next examine ―what 
firms should do‖ to enhance their performance.  
Competitive Strategy, Network Structure, and Firm Performance  
This dissertation shows that the effect of network structure on firm performance 
depends on the strength of the firm‘s internally developed capabilities. Firms that possess 
superior advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing capabilities can benefit more from 
dense network structures, whereas firms that lack superior internal capabilities find sparse 
network structures more beneficial.  
More specifically, I find that network density, although not having a direct effect 
on firm performance, plays an important moderating role on the relationship between 
competitive strategy and firm performance. The positive relationship between advantage-
creating and advantage-enhancing tendencies and firm performance is much stronger 
when firms are embedded in a dense network structure. This suggests that firms with 
superior advantage-creating capabilities can use a dense network of collaborators to 
continuously improve their newly created advantages and thus stay ahead of competitors. 
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In this case, network density plays a supplementary role by enabling firms with strong 
advantage-creating capabilities to achieve strategic entrepreneurship. Firms can focus 
their internal resources on building advantage-creating capabilities while using network 
density to substitute for their lack of advantage-enhancing capabilities.  
I also find that network density plays a complementary role by enabling firms 
with superior advantage-enhancing capabilities to extract greater value from a dense 
network of collaborators. This combination of strategy and dense network structure 
provides firms with the capability to intensively and incrementally improve their existing 
complex products and thus sustainably retain a leadership position in the market. An 
obvious example (outside of computers and electronics industry) of this finding is the 
ability of Toyota to continuously improve its existing vehicle models and sustainably 
outperform rivals. Because the vehicles are also complex systems, Toyota‘s 
embeddedness in a dense network of suppliers ensures greater diffusion of knowledge 
among suppliers, which partially explains its ability to outperform rivals. Dyer and 
Nobeoka (2000) found that Toyota‘s dense supply network encourages exchange of 
knowledge (both tacit and explicit), ideas and expertise, discourages ―free riding,‖ and 
prevents leakage of strategic information and knowledge to rivals. Hence, this study helps 
to generalize Dyer and Nobeoka‘s (2000) findings to other industries, such as computers 
and electronics.  
In contrast to network density, a sparse network structure has a positive direct 
effect on firm performance, which supports Burt‘s (1992) structural hole argument and is 
consistent with the empirical findings at the firm level of analysis (Baum et al., 2000; 
Zaheer & Bell, 2005). This study, however, extends this research by showing that firms‘ 
without superior internal capabilities can benefit more from spanning global structural 
holes. Although the firms with strong advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing 
capabilities do increase their performance when they form sparse network structures, 
these effects are much stronger for firms that lack such capabilities. As Figure 20 and 21 
below illustrate, the effects of an increase in betweenness centrality is much stronger 
when advantage-creating and advantage-enhancing tendencies are at low levels, as 
compared with when these tendencies are at high level.  
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Figure 21: Moderating role of Betweenness Centrality on the Relationship Between 
AET and Performance 
 
 
Figure 22: Moderating role of Betweenness Centrality on the Relationship Between 
ACT (proactivenes) and Performance 
 
 
These findings suggest that firms that lack superior internal capabilities can 
increase their performance when they have access to diverse knowledge and 
technologies. On one hand, firms that lack advantage-creating tendencies can use a sparse 
network structure to increase their innovative and proactive capabilities in the future and 
thus enhance their performance. On the other hand, firms that lack advantage-enhancing 
capabilities are less likely to be considered attractive network partners either because this 
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firms have higher risk of free riding (i.e., they can gain much more than what they can 
contribute to the network members) or because they cannot provide the needed resources. 
Hence, forming new alliances from distant technological domains may be used to 
leverage their internal innovative capabilities, which in turn may increase their legitimacy 
as valuable network partners in the future.  
Finally, this study also extends the research in competitive dynamics area (e.g., 
Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001; Grimm, Lee, & Smith, 2006). It suggests that firms 
systematically differ in their tendencies to initiate ―proactive‖ versus ―advantage-
enhancing‖ competitive actions. The extent to which firms exhibit tendencies to carry out 
either proactive or advantage-enhancing competitive actions is powerful predictor of the 
intensity and the pattern of collaborative actions (i.e., strategic alliances). Relatedly, this 
study extends the application of the awareness-motivation-capability (A-M-C) framework 
(Chen, 1996) to the relationship between competitive strategy and alliance network 
structure. On one hand, different types of network structure increase the effectiveness of 
each type of competitive strategy by increasing the firm‘s awareness of profit 
opportunities and by leveraging its capabilities with those of network partners. On the 
other hand, firms with different types of capabilities have different needs and motivation 
to collaborate with other firms. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This study measures competitive strategy and alliance network structure based on 
the firm‘s competitive and collaborative activity over a three-year window. Indeed, the 
reliability of the strategic and network variables could be increased as the time over 
which these variables are measured becomes longer. In addition, the stability of firms‘ 
positions in the network structure would be more reliably estimated over longer periods. 
Nevertheless, previous research suggests that in the computers and electronics industries, 
the intensity of new product introduction is almost one new product per year (Nadkarni & 
Narayanan, 2007), and the firms in my sample initiated 43 patents per year on average. 
This indicates sufficient variation of the advantage-creating strategic tendencies across 
firms. In addition, the alliance duration in highly competitive environments is about three 
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years (e.g., Pangarkar, 2003), which provides justification for using a three-year moving 
window in mapping network structure.  
Another limitation of this study is that the data are drawn from several interrelated 
industries in hypercompetitive context. This choice is important for this study to isolate 
the effect of firms‘ strategies from other industry-specific factors that may affect firm 
performance. However, this approach also limits the external validity of the findings. For 
example, the type of strategy and the rate of change in alliance and innovative activity of 
firms is likely to be different in more stable industries. Future research should, therefore, 
examine how the competitive environment in different industries affects the propositions 
tested in this study.  
Relatedly, this dissertation focuses on only two types of strategies that the recent 
research in dynamic capabilities, first mover advantages, and strategic entrepreneurship 
has suggested can enable firms to gain superior performance in hypercompetitive 
environments. Other typologies of competitive strategies such as those proposed by Miles 
and Snow (1978) or Porter (1985) may also be used to study the interplay between 
network structure and competitive strategy in multi-industry samples.  
Furthermore, the focus of this study is at firm level of analysis. Future research 
should examine the effect of competitive strategy on alliance formation at the dyadic 
level of analysis. For example, the likelihood of alliance formation between two firms 
will also be affected by their type of competitive strategy. Firms with advantage-creating 
capabilities may choose to collaborate with partners with strong advantage-enhancing 
capabilities beyond the effect of prior alliance activity and the position in the network 
structure (Gulati & Garguilo, 1999). On the other hand, we can expect a higher level of 
competitive tension between two firms pursuing a similar competitive strategy and thus 
have a lower likelihood of alliance formation. In addition, rivals with similar strategic 
tendencies may also be prone to terminate their alliances sooner and at a faster rate than 
firms that pursue different strategies. The risk of leakage of proprietary knowledge and 
technologies between partners can have more adverse effect when firms pursue similar 
strategies, because they are more likely to perceive each other as direct rivals. This can 
create higher tension and distrust between partners, which increases the risk of 
terminating the alliance.  
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In addition, I collected data on advantage-enhancing activity of firms at the firm 
level of analysis. An alternative approach would be to collect data at the product level 
and examine how the intensity and the type of advantage-enhancing actions will affect its 
market share and profits. Future research could examine how the alliance network at the 
product level would increase the firm‘s ability to continuously enhance the value of a 
given product and whether the network structure varies over different stages in the 
product life cycle.  
This study focuses mainly on two types of network structure: sparse versus dense. 
Future research is needed to explore how differences in firms‘ strategies will affect other 
relational and structural network measures such as alliance network diversity (i.e., 
functional variety of alliance in the firm‘s portfolio) (Powell et al., 1996) or closeness 
centrality (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). In addition, the similarities in strategic 
orientation between two firms can be important predictor of their tendency to occupy 
structurally equivalent position in the network structure. Two firms pursuing same 
competitive strategies may exhibit similar patterns of network ties (i.e., being structurally 
equivalent) despite being disconnected with one another. This interplay between 
competitive strategies and the degree of structural equivalence between two firms can 
have important implications for predicting the intensity of the competitive interaction 
between firms. On one hand, firms with similar strategies that are also structurally 
equivalent may become fierce competitors because they will closely monitor each other 
and because they have access to similar information and resources from third parties. On 
the other hand, firms that are connected with the same partners may have more 
opportunities to interact and tacitly collude (through third parties) and thus decrease their 
level of rivalry. Hence, future research should empirically investigate these opposing 
arguments.  
In explaining why firms with high advantage-creating strategies will become 
embedded in sparse network structures, I argue that proactive firms have a greater need 
for forming new alliances and thus will frequently bring new partners into their networks 
(because the new partners are not connected with the existing network partners, these 
firms are more likely to span structural holes). This in turn implies that proactive firms 
will have a higher rate of alliance termination, assuming that all firms face resource 
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constraints (i.e., firms cannot maintain an infinite number of alliances.) However, more 
rigorous examination is needed to establish whether proactive firms do terminate their 
alliances sooner or they just form alliances of shorter duration.  
In this study, I measured advantage-enhancing strategy as a count of advantage-
enhancing actions such as price cuts, marketing, product improvements and market 
expansions, initiated by firms in a given year. These four types of competitive actions 
loaded in one factor, which represents the firm‘s strategic focus and capability toward 
continuously enhancing the existing product and services. However, it is possible to use 
other operationalizations of advantage-enhancing activity of the firm. Researchers in 
competitive dynamics literature have used measures that capture more interactive and 
dynamic aspects of competitive behavior of firms. For example, the extent to which a 
firm uses different types of actions – competitive repertoire complexity (Ferrier, 2001; 
Miller & Chen, 1994) can capture finer distinction between different types of advantage-
enhancing activity (e.g., some firms may have greater emphasis on price cuts and 
advertising, whereas others may launch more balanced repertoire of actions. Another 
potentially useful operationalization of advantage-enhancing tendency is to measure the 
degree of conformity of the firm‘s advantage-enhancing tendency with the industry 
norms (Ferrier, 2001; Deephouse, 1999). Firms‘ conformity with industry norms can be 
assessed based on the type and timing of actions over time (in calendar days or months). 
The greater overlap of the type and timing of advantage-enhancing actions with those of 
rivals can mitigate the positive effect of advantage-enhancing capability on firm 
performance. As a result, firms may have greater need for collaboration with rivals to 
reduce the intensity of rivalry.  
Furthermore, in this study, I did not directly capture the firm‘s order and speed of 
response to rivals‘ new products. Competitive dynamics research have provided more 
nuanced measures of the firms‘ speed of response to rivals‘ new products by counting the 
number of days elapsed between the proactive action and the subsequent reaction of 
rivals (Basdeo et al. 2006; Lee, Smith, & Grimm, 2003; Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Ferrier, 
Smith, & Grimm, 1999). Although, this study‘s focus was to capture the firm‘s 
advantage-enhancing capability rather than the firm‘s propensity to quickly respond to 
rivals‘ actions, measuring directly a firm‘s responsive capability can provide additional 
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understanding of how the access to information through network partners can affect 
firms‘ ability to quickly imitate and respond to the pioneering products of first-movers.  
This dissertation focused on the firm‘s observable product-market activity of 
firms to capture its advantage-enhancing capability. I assume that firms‘ strategies can be 
more comprehensively measured by examining the consistency in their observable 
competitive behavior over time. By focusing on the realized competitive activity of firms, 
I was able to capture both the intended and emergent strategies of firms (Mintzberg, 
1978). This approach, however, prevented me to examine the firm‘s resource allocation 
decisions that lead to market-based actions such as new products, improvements, or new 
market entry. Future research should examine how firms‘ internally oriented actions such 
as changes in human resource management practices (e.g., initiation of new employee 
training programs, profit-sharing plans, or recruiting practices), or the top management 
team‘s decision making processes affect firms‘ advantage-creating and advantage-
enhancing tendencies.  
Finally, this dissertation uses a combination of archival sources and structured 
content analysis of published news announcements to measure competitive strategies of 
firms. An alternative approach to obtain data on competitive activity of firms is through 
use of survey-based techniques. This approach increases the construct validity of the 
measures, as managers are directly asked to report their perceived and intended strategies 
(Lyon, Lumpkin, & Dess, 2000). Both approaches have some limitations. For example, 
using questionnaire as a data collection instrument may bias the results due to systematic 
differences between respondents and non-respondents. In addition, because this method 
often relies on single informants, the responses on different measures can be 
systematically affected by managers‘ unobservable and stable characteristics, which in 
turn can bias the results because of the presence of common method variance. On the 
other hand, content analysis of published news announcements is susceptible to media 
reporting bias (e.g., toward more prominent firms) and fails to capture many internal 
strategic actions that the media do not report. Because it was critical for this study to 
examine changes in firms‘ strategies and network positions over time, the combination of 
content analysis and archival data was the preferable data collection method. The 
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shortcoming of this approach was reduced to some extent by careful sample selection 
process and by achieving high interrater reliability coefficients.  
Conclusion 
Performance differences across firms can be explained, at least partially, by the 
extent to which firms enjoy favorable access to external resources and capabilities 
developed by other market participants. Previous research has suggested that two types of 
network structure – dense and sparse – are especially beneficial for firms to maximize the 
effect of their internally developed entrepreneurial and strategic capabilities. Given that 
these two types of network structure are important sources of firms‘ competitive 
advantages, it is critical for strategic management research and practice to explain why 
some firms (and not others) enjoy such advantageous access to network resources. In this 
dissertation I attempt to provide greater understanding of (1) why some firms become 
embedded in a sparse alliance network structure rich with structural holes, whereas others 
form dense network structure, and (2) why some firms benefit from sparse network 
structure, whereas others benefit from dense network structure.  
My results show that firms become embedded in different types of network 
structure because they pursue different competitive strategies. As firms increase the 
degree of advantage-creating tendency, they tend to frequently bring new partners into 
their alliance network and thus continuously create new structural holes. On the other 
hand, when firms exhibit strong advantage-enhancing tendency, they tend to stimulate 
greater collaborative activity between network partners and thus form dense network 
structure. Despite the frequent and dynamic evolution of the overall alliance network, 
firms occupy stable positions in the network structure because they pursue recurrent 
patterns of strategic behavior.  
However, this study reveals that these tendencies of firms are not universally 
beneficial for all firms. I found that firms with superior advantage-creating or advantage-
enhancing capabilities could benefit more from dense network structure, whereas firms 
with inferior capabilities are better off when they form alliances with firms from distant 
network clusters and thus form a network structure rich with global structural holes. 
These findings suggest that managers should carefully construct their alliance networks. 
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Firms with superior advantage-creating or advantage-enhancing capabilities should 
encourage partners to actively collaborate with one another. On the other hand, firms that 
lack superior capabilities need to economize their network structure by forming 
nonredundant ties with firms from distant technological areas and thus increase their 
potential to discover new entrepreneurial opportunities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
114 
 
REFERENCES 
Abegglen, J. & Stalk, G. 1985. Kaisha, The Japanese Corporation. New York: Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc.  
Ahuja, G., & Lampert, CM. 2001. Entrepreneurship in the large corporation: a 
longitudinal study of how established firms create breakthrough inventions. 
Strategic Management Journal, 22(6-7):521-543. 
Ahuja, G. 2000a. Collaboration networks, structural hoes, and innovation: a longitudinal 
sturdy. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(3):425-455 
Ahuja, G. 2000b. The duality of collaboration: Inducements and opportunities in the 
formation of interfirm linkages. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 317-343.  
Andersen, T.W., & Hsiao, C. 1981. Estimation of dynamic models with error 
components. Journal of American Statistical Association, 76: 598-606.  
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 58(2): 277-297. 
Baldwin, C.Y., & Clark, K.B. 2003. Managing in an age of modularity. In Garud, R., 
Kumaraswamy, A., & Langlois, R.N. (Eds.), Managing in the Modular Age. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
Baltagi, H.B. 2008. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. West Sussex, UK: John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 
Barney,J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17(1):99-120.  
Basdeo, D.K., Smith, K.G., Grimm, C.M., Rindova, V.P., Derfus, P.J., & Smith, R.H. 
2006. The impact of market actions on firm reputation. Strategic Management 
Journal, 27, 12 ; 1205-1219. 
Baum, C.F. 2006. An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata. College 
Station, TX: A Stata Press Publication.  
Baum, JAC, Calabrese, T., & Silverman, BS. 2000. Don‘t go it alone: Alliance network 
composition and startups‘ performance in Canadian biotechnology. Strategic 
Management Journal, 21(3):267-294 
Baum, J.A.C., & Oliver, C. 1991. Institutional linkages and organizational mortality. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2): 187-218 
Bettis, R.A., & Hitt, M.A. 1995. The new competitive landscape. Strategic management 
journal, 16(summer):7-19 
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic 
panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1): 115-143. 
Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002. Ucinet for Windows: Software for 
Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies. 
Boyd, J.L., & Bresser, R.K.F. 2008. Performance implications of delayed competitive 
responses: evidences from the U. S. retail industry. Strategic Management 
Journal, 29(10): 1077-1096. 
Brass, D.J, Galaskiewicz, J., Greve, H.R. & Tsai, W. 2004 Taking stock of networks and 
organizations: A multilevel perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 
47(6):795-817. 
   
115 
 
Brown, S.L. & Eisenhardt, K.M. 1998. Competing on the edge: Strategy as structured 
chaos. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Blau, P.M. 1977. Inequality and Heterogeneity. Free Press: New York.  
Burt, R.S. 1992 Structural Holes: The social structure of competition. Cambridge, UK: 
Harvard University Press. 
Burt, R.S. 2000. The network structure of social capital. Research in Organizational 
Behavior, 22: 345-423.  
Burt, R.S. 2005. Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital. Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Chandler, A.D. 1962. Strategy and Structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chen, M-J. 1996. Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward A theoretical 
integration. Academy of Management Review, 21, 1: 100-134.  
Chen, M-J., & Hambrick, D.C. 1995. Speed, stealth and selective attack: How small 
firms differ from large firms in competitive behavior. Academy of Management 
Journal, 38: 453-482. 
Coleman, JS. 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of 
Sociology, 94:95-120.  
Comanor, W., & Scherer, F.M. 1969. Patent statistics as a measure of technical change. 
Journal of Political Economy, 77: 392-398.  
Covin, J.G., & Slevin, D.P. 1989. Strategic management of small firms in hostile and 
benign environments. Strategic Management Journal, 10(1): 75-87 
Covin J.G, & Slevin DP. 1991. A conceptual model of entrepreneurship as firm behavior. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 16(1): 7-25. 
Covin J.G., & Miles M.P. 1999. Corporate entrepreneurship and the pursuit of 
competitive  
advantage. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 23(3): 47-63. 
Cyert, R.M., & March, J.G. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
D‘Aveni, R.A. 1994. Hypercompetition: Managing the dynamics of strategic 
maneuvering. New York, NY: Free Press.  
Dess, GG, Lumpkin, GT, & Covin, JG. 1997. Entrepreneurial strategy making and firm 
performance: tests of contingency and configurational models. Strategic 
Management journal, 18(9)677-695. 
Earl, J, Martin, A, McCarthy, JD, & Soule, SA. 2004. The use of newspaper data in the 
study of collective action. Annual Review of Sociology, 30:65-80. 
Dacin, MT, Oliver, C, & Roy, JP. 2007. The legitimacy of strategic alliances: an 
institutional perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 28(2):169-187. 
Damanpour, F. 1991. Organizational innovation: A meta-analysis of effects of 
determinants and moderators. Academy of Management Journal, 34 (3): 555-
590.  
Damanpour, F., & Wischnevsky, D.J. 2006. Research on innovation in organizations: 
Distinguishing innovation-generating from innovation-adopting organizations. 
Journal of Engineering and Technology Management, 23: 269-291.  
Das, T.K., & Teng, B. 2000. A resource-based theory of strategic alliances. Journal of 
Management, 26 (1): 31-61. 
   
116 
 
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. 2000. Data management and analysis methods. In Gery Ryan 
and Russell Bernard (eds) Handbook of Qualitative Research, Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE publication.  
Deephouse, D.L. 1999. To be different, or to be the same? It‘s a question (and theory) of 
strategic balance. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 147-166.  
Diamantopoulos, A. & Siguaw, J.A. 2006. Formative versus reflective indicators in 
organizational measure development: A comparison and empirical illustration. 
British Journal of Management, 17: 263-282.  
DiMaggio, P.J., & Powell, W.W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American 
Sociological Review, 48(2): 147-160. 
Dyer, J.H., & Singh, H. 1998. The Relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23 
(44):660-679.  
Dyer, J.H., & Nobeoka, K. 2000. Creating and managing a high-performance knowledge-
sharing network: the Toyota case. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3): 345-
367. 
Edwards, J.R., & Bagozzi, R.P. 2000. On the nature and direction of relationships 
between constructs and measures. Psychological Methods, 5(2): 155-174.  
Eisenhardt, KM, & Schoonhoven, CB. 1996. Resource-Based view of strategic alliance 
formation: Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms. Organization 
Science, 7(2):136-150 
Emerson, R.M. 1962. Power-dependence relations. American Sociological Review, 
27(1): 31-41 
Ferrier, WJ, Smith, KG, & Grimm, CM. 1999. The role of competitive action in market 
share erosion and industry dethronement: A study of industry leaders and 
challengers. Academy of Management Journal, 42(4):372-388.  
Ferrier, W.J., MacFhionnlaoich, C., Smith, K.G., & Grimm, C.M. 2002. The impact of 
performance distress on aggressive competitive behavior: A reconciliation of 
conflicting views. Managerial and Decision Economics, 23: 301-316. 
Garcia-Canal, E., Duarte, CL, Criado, JR, & Llaneza, AV. 2002. Accelerating 
international expansion through global alliances: a typology of cooperative 
strategies. Journal of World Business, 37(2):91-107 
Garud, R., & Kumaraswamy, A. 2003. Technological and organizational designs for 
realizing economices of substitution. In Garud, R., Kumaraswamy, A., & 
Langlois, R.N. (Eds.), Managing in the Modular Age. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd. 
Gnyawali,D.R., & Madhavan, R. 2001. Cooperative networks and competitive dynamics: 
A structural embeddedness perspective. The Academy of Management Review, 
26(3): 431-445. 
Gnyawali, D.R., He, J. & Madhavan, R. 2006. Impact of co-opetition on firm competitive 
behavior: An empirical examination. Journal of Management, 32: 507-530. 
Gopalakrishnan, S. & Damanpour, F. 1997. A review of innovation research in 
Economics, Sociology and Technology Management. Omega, The International 
Journal of Management Science, 25, (1): 15-28.  
   
117 
 
Granovetter, MS. 1973. The strength of weak ties. The American Journal of Sociology, 
78(6):1360-1380. 
Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of 
embeddedness. The American Journal of Sociology, 91(3): 481-510  
Greene, W.H. 2003. Econometric Analysis (5th ed). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall 
Grimm, C.M. & Smith, K.G. 1997. Strategy as Action: Industry Rivalry and 
Coordination. South-Western College Pub. 
Gulati, R. 1998. Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal. 19(4): 293-317 
Gulati, R. 1999. Network location and learning: the influence of network resources and 
firm capabilities on alliance formation. Strategic Management Journal, 
20(5):397-420 
Gulati, R, & Gargiulo, M. 1999. Where do interorganizational networks come from? The 
American Journal of Sociology, 104(5):1439-1493 
Gulati, R., Nohria, N., & Zaheer, A. 2000. Strategic networks. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21:203-215 
Gulati, R. 1995. Social structure and alliance formation patterns: A longitudinal analysis. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(4):619-652 
Gulati, R., & Singh, H. 1998. The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination 
costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 43(4):781-814. 
Hagedoorn, J., & Cloodt, M. 2003. Measuring innovative performance: Is there an 
advantage in using multiple indicators? Research Policy, 32: 1365-1379.  
Harrigan, K.R. 1988. Strategic alliance and partner asymmetries. Management 
International Review, 9: 53-72.  
Hall, B., Jaffe, A., & Trajtenberg, M. 2001. The NBER patent citation data file: Lessons, 
insights, and methodological tools. NBER Working Paper 8498 (2001). 
Hausman, J, Hall, BH, & Griliches, Z. 1984. Econometric models for count data with an 
application to the patents-R & D Relationship. Econometrica, 52(4):909-938 
Hausman, J.A. 1978. Specification test in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 46(6): 1251-1271.  
Hayek, F.A. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Huff, L.C., & Robinson, W.T. 1994. The impact of leadtime and years of competitive 
rivalry on pioneer market share advantages. Management Science, 40 (10): 1370-
1377.  
Hitt, M. A., Ireland, R. D., Camp, S. M., & Sexton, D. L. 2002. Strategic 
entrepreneurship: Integrating entrepreneurial and strategic management 
perspectives. In M. A. Hitt, R. D. Ireland, S. M. Camp, & D. L.Sexton (Eds.): 
Strategic entrepreneurship: Creating a new mindset, 1–16. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Ireland, RD, Hitt, MA, Camp, SM, & Sexton, DL. 2001. Integrating entrepreneurship and 
strategic management actions to create firm wealth. The Academy of 
Management Executive, 15(1):49-63. 
Ireland, RD, Hitt, MA, & Sirmon, DG. 2003. A model of strategic entrepreneurship: The 
construct and its dimensions. Journal of Management, 29(6):963-989.  
   
118 
 
Ireland, R.D., Covin, J.G., & Kuratko, D.F. 2009. Conceptualizing corporate 
entrepreneurship strategy. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(1): 19-46. 
Jauch, LR, Osborn, RN, & Martin, TN. 1980. Structured content analysis of cases: A 
complementary method for organizational research. The Academy of 
Management Review, 5(4):517-525.  
Jennings, D.F. and Lumpkin, J.R., 1989. Functionally modeling corporate 
entrepreneurship: an empirical integrative analysis. Journal of Management , 15: 
485–502. 
Kirzner, I.M. 1973. Competition and entrepreneurship. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Kalyanaram, G., Robinson, W.T., & Urban, G.L. 1995. Order of market entry: 
Established empirical generalizations, emerging empirical generalizations, and 
future research. Marketing Science, 14 (3): G212-221.  
Kerin, R.A., Varadarajan, P.R., & Peterson, R.A. 1992. First-mover advantage: A 
synthesis, conceptual framework, and research propositions. The Journal of 
Marketing, 56(4): 33-52. 
Kirzner, I.M. 1979. Perception, Opportunity, and Profit: Studies in the Theory of 
Entrepreneurship. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Lavie, D. 2007. Alliance portfolios and firm performance: A study of value creation and 
appropriation in the U.S. software industry. Strategic Management Journal, 
28(12): 1187-1212. 
Lee, H., Smith, K., Grimm, C., and Schomburg, A. 2000. Timing, order and durability of 
new product advantages with imitation. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 23-
30. 
Levinthal, D.A., & March, J.G. 1993. The myopia of learning. Strategic Management 
Journal, 14(S2):95-112. 
Lieberman, MB, & Montgomery, DB. 1988. First-mover advantages. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9(5):41-58. 
Lilien, G.L., & Yoon, E. 1990. The timing of competitive market entry: An exploratory 
study of new industrial products. Management Science, 36(5): 568-585.  
Linden, G., Kramer, K.L., & Dedrick, J. 2007. Who captures value in a global innovation 
systems? The case of Apple‘s iPod. Unpublished paper. Personal Computing 
Industry Center – An Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Center. UCIrvine.  
Lumpkin, GT, & Dess, GG. 1996. Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct and 
linking it to performance. The Academy of Management Review, 21(1):135-172. 
Lumpkin, GT, & Dess, GG. 2001. Linking two dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation 
to firm performance: The moderating role of environment and industry life cycle. 
Jounal of Business Venturing, 16(5):429-451.  
Lyon, D.W., Lumpkin, G.T., & Dess, G.G. 2000. Enhancing entrepreneurial orientation 
research: Operationalizing and measuring a key strategic decision making 
process. Journal of Management, 26(5): 1055-1085. 
Madhavan, R., Koka BR, & Prescott, JE. 1998. Networks in transition: How industry 
events (re) shape interfirm relationships. Strategic Management Journal, 
19(5):439-459 
   
119 
 
Makadok, R. 1998. Can first-mover and early-mover advantages be sustained in an 
industry with low barriers to entry/imitation? Strategic Management Journal, 
19(7):683-696 
March, J.G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization 
Science, 2(1): 71-87. 
McGrath RM, MacMillan IC. 2000. The Entrepreneurial Mindset. Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Mendelson, H., & Pillai, RR. 1999. Industry Clockspeed: Measurement and operational 
implications. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 1(1):1-20 
Miller, D. 1983. The Correlates of entrepreneurship in three types of firms. Management 
Science, 29(7):770-791. 
Miles, R.E., & Snow, C.C. 1978. Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process. New 
York: McGraw-Hill 
Miller, D., & Friesen, P. 1978. Archetypes of strategy formulation. Management 
Science, 24(9):921-933.  
Mintzberg, H. 1978. Patterns in strategy formation. Management Science, 24(9):934-948 
Mintzberg, H. & Waters, J.A. 1985. Of strategies, deliberate and emergent. Strategic 
Management Journal, 6(3): 257-272. 
Mises, L.V. 1949. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. New Haven, MA: Yale 
University Press.  
Morris, MH, & Sexton, DL. 1996. The concept of entrepreneurial intensity: Implications 
for company performance. Journal of Business Research, 36(1):5-13 
Nadkarni, S, & Narayanan, VK. 2007. Strategic schemas, strategic flexibility, and firm 
performance: the moderating role of industry clockspeed. Strategic Management 
Journal, 28(3):243-270. 
Nelson, R.R., & Winter, S.G. 1982. Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
O‘Driscoll, G.P. and Rizzo, M.J. 1985.  The Economics of Time and Ignorance.  New 
York, N.Y.: Basil Blackwell Inc. 
Oliver, C. 1990. Determinants of interorganizational relationships: integration and future 
directions. The Academy of Management Review, 15(2): 241-265. 
Osborn, RN, & Baughn, CC. 1990. Forms of interorganizational governance for 
multinational alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 33(3):503-519. 
Pangarkar, N. 2003. Determinants of alliance duration in uncertain environments: The 
case of the biotechnology sector. Long Range Planning, 36: 269-284.  
Penrose, E. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm.London, UK: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Perreault, W.D., & Leigh, L.E., 1989. Reliability of nominal data based on qualitative 
judgments. Journal of Marketing Research, 26, 2. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. New York, NY: Harper & Row.  
Porter,M.E. 1980. Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors. New York: Free Press 
Porter, M.E. 1985 Competitive advantage. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Porter, M.E. 1991. Towards a dynamic theory of strategy. Strategic Management 
Journal, 12 (Winter): 95-117.  
   
120 
 
Portes, A. 1998. Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 24(1): 1-24. 
Powell, WW, Koput, KW, & Smith-Doerr, L. 1996. Interorganizational collaboration and 
the locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 41(1):116-145. 
Reagans, R., & Zuckerman, E.W. 2001. Networks, diversity, and productivity: The social 
capital of corporate R&D teams. Organization Science, 12(4): 502-517. 
Robinson, W.T. & Fornell, C. 1985. Sources of pioneer advantages in consumer goods 
industries. Journal of Marketing Research, 22, (3): 305-317.  
Robinson, W.T. 1988. Sources of market pioneer advantages: The case of industrial 
goods industries. Journal of Marketing Research, 25, (1): 87-94.  
Robinson, W.T., Fornell, C., & Sullivan, M. 1992. Are market pioneers intrinsically 
stronger than later entrants? Strategic Management Journal, 13: 609-624.  
Rothaermel, F.T., & Deeds, D.L. 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in 
biotechnology: A system of new product development. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25(3): 201-221. 
Rowley, T.J. 1997. Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of stakeholder 
influences. The Academy of Management Review, 22(4): 887-910.  
Rowley, T., Behrens, D., & Krackhardt, D. 2000. Redundant governance structures: An 
analysis of structural and relational embeddedness in the steel and semiconductor 
industries. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3):369-386.  
Salancik, G.R. 1995. Wanted: A good network theory of organization. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 40(2): 345-349. 
Sarkar, MB, Echambadi, RAJ, & Harrison, JS. 2001. Alliance entrepreneurship and firm 
market performance. Strategic Management Journal, 22(6-7):701-711. 
Schilling, M.A. 2009. Understanding the alliance data. Strategic Management Journal, 
30: 233-260.  
Schumpeter, J.A. 1947. The creative response in economic history. Journal of Economic 
History, 7, (2): 149-159. 
Scott, J. 1991. Social Network Analysis: A Handbook. Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Shane, S. 2000. Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Organization Science, 11 (4): 448-469. 
Sharma, P. & Chrisman, J.J. 1999. Toward a reconciliation of definitional issues in the 
field of corporate entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 23(3): 
11-27. 
Sirmon, D.G., Hitt, M.A., & Ireland, R.D. 2007. Managing firm resources in dynamic 
environments to create value: Looking inside the black box. The Academy of 
Management Review, 32(1):273-292.  
Schmalensee, 1989. Inter-industry studies of structure and performance. In R. 
Schmalensee, and Willig, R.D. (Eds.), Handobook of Industrial Organization, 
Volume II, Chapter 16. New York, NY: Elsevier Science Publishers. 
Smith, K.G., Ferrier, W.J., and Ndofor, H. 2001. Competitive dynamics research: 
Critique and future directions. In M.A. Hitt, Freeman, R.E., and Harrison, J.S. 
(Eds.), The Blackwell Handbook of Strategic Management. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
   
121 
 
Smith, KG, Grimm, CM, Gannon, MJ, & Chen, MJ. 1991 Organizational information 
processing, competitive responses, and performance in the U.S. domestic airline 
industry. Academy of Management Journal, 34(1):60-85.  
Smith, K. G., & Di Gregorio, D. 2002. Bisociation, discovery, and the role of 
entrepreneurial action. In M. A.Hitt, R. D. Ireland, S. M. Camp, & D. L. Sexton 
(Eds.), Strategic entrepreneurship: Creating a new mindset, 129–150. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
Sorenson, O., & Stuart, T. 2008. Bringing the context back in: Settings and search for 
syndicate partners in venture capital investment networks. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 53(2):266-294.  
Stuart, T.E., & Podolny, J.M.1996. Local search and the evolution of technological 
capabilities. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 21-38.  
Stuart, T.E. 2000. Interorganizational alliances and the performance of firms: A study of 
growth and innovation rates in a high-technology industry. Strategic 
Management Journal, 21: 791-811.  
Stuart, T.E., & Sorenson, O. 2007. Strategic networks and entrepreneurial ventures. 
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 1: 211-227.  
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic 
management. Strategic Management Journal, 18, (7): 509-533.  
Tolbert, P.S., & Zucker, L.G. 1983. Institutional sources of change in the formal structure 
of organizations: The diffusion of civil service reform, 1880-1935. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 28(1): 22-39. 
Trajtenberg, M. 1990. A penny for your quotes: Patent citations and the value of 
innovations. The RAND Journal of Economics, 21(1): 172-187. 
Uzzi, B. 1997. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of 
embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42 (1): 35-67.  
Walker, G., Kogut, B., & Shan, W.1997. Social capital, structural holes and the formation 
of an industry network. Organization Science, 8(2): 109-125. 
Waserman, S., & Faust, K. 1994. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
Wiklund J. 1999. The sustainability of the entrepreneurial orientation–performance 
relationship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 24(1): 37-48. 
Wiklund J, Shepherd D. 2003. Knowledge-based resources, entrepreneurial orientation, 
and the performance of small and medium-sized businesses. Strategic 
Management Journal, 24(1): 1307-1314. 
Williamson, 0. E. 1975. Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. 
New York, NY: Free Press. 
Wooldridge, J.M. 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
Zaheer, A., & Bell, G.G. 2005. Benefiting from network position: firm capabilities, 
structural holes, and performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26(9):809-
825. 
Zahra, S.A.,& George, G. 2002. Absorptive capacity: A review, reconceptualization, and 
extension. The Academy of Management Review, 27(2): 185-203.  
Zahra S. 1991. Predictors and financial outcomes of corporate entrepreneurship: an 
explorative study. Journal of Business Venturing, 6(4): 259-285. 
   
 
1
2
2
 
 APPENDIX 
Table 17: Selected News Reports on Apple and Rivals 
 
 
 
 
October, 23, 2001 Apple introduces iPod: ―Apple today introduced iPod(TM), a breakthrough MP3 music player that packs up to 1,000 CD-quality songs into an ...‖ 
March 21, 2002 
Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple today announced a second model of its groundbreaking iPod(R) digital music player that features a 10GB hard drive 
…‖ 
October 14, 2002 Creative imitates iPod: ―Creative launches its NOMAD Jukebox Zen , a pocket-sized, 20GB MP3 player priced 40% less than Apple's iPod…‖ 
July 17, 2002 
Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple chief Steve Jobs said on Wednesday that Apple has expanded the audience for its popular iPod music player with new 
versions of the device designed to work with Windows-based personal computers...‖ 
March 1, 2003 
Creative enhances Zen: ―Thanks for the R&D, Apple! Creative takes a look at Apple‘s iPod and—thankfully—bites its design in new product 
extension…‖ 
April 28, 2003 Creative enhances Zen: ―Creative introduces three exciting new speaker systems to match the Apple iPod…‖ 
November 11, 2003 Gateway imitates iPod: ―Gateway's new digital jukebox is $100 less than Apple iPod; the 20GB Jukebox delivers industry's best value…‖ 
December 8, 2003 
Dell imitates iPod: ―Hoping to duplicate the success of Apple's iPod and iTunes music store, Dell introduces DJ Player with Dell Jukebox powered 
by Musicmatch ($249 for 15 GB; $299 for 20 GB)…‖ 
January 6, 2004 
Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple today introduced iPod(TM) mini, the smallest portable music player ever to hold up to 1,000 CD-quality songs. The 
new iPod mini is encased in an ultra-portable, lightweight...‖ 
June 21, 2004 
Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple Computer Inc. and BMW Group on Monday introduced an adapter that allows iPod and BMW customers to plug their 
music collections directly into their car sound systems…‖ 
July 19, 2004 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple introduces the new fourth-generation iPod featuring Apple's ‗click wheel‘ and 12-hour battery life…‖  
October 26, 2004 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple introduces iPod Photo, your entire music and photo library in your pocket…‖ 
November 3, 2004 Apple enhances iPod: ―iTunes 4.7, the version of Apple‘s music player released to coincide with iPod Photo…‖ 
January 11, 2005 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple introduces iPod shuffle, first iPod under $100…‖ 
September 7, 2005 
Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple today introduced the iPod(R) nano, a revolutionary full-featured iPod that holds 1,000 songs, yet is thinner than a 
standard #2 pencil and less than half the size of…‖ 
September 7, 2005 Apple enhances iPod: ―Motorola, Apple unveil ‗iPod Phone‘…‖ 
October 12, 2005 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple unveils new video iPod, Disney TV deal…‖ 
November 20, 2005 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple launches iPod Movie…‖ 
February 5, 2006 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple introduces cheaper iPod…‖ 
February 28, 2006 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple unveils iPod hi-fi home stereo system…‖ 
March 29, 2006 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple Computer unveils iPod max volume software update…‖ 
May 24, 2006 Apple enhances iPod: ―Nike and Apple team up to launch Nike+iPod…‖ 
July 10, 2006 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple introduces talking iPod…‖ 
September 12, 2006 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple‘s CEO Jobs unveils games for iPod…‖ 
April 16, 2007 Apple enhances iPod: ―Apple to release WiFi iPod…‖ 
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Table 18: Summary Statistics of Alliances 
1993 3771 2520 1251 1549 2222
1994 4471 2952 1519 2095 2376
1995 4402 2964 1438 2454 1948
1996 2620 1732 888 1341 1279
1997 3090 1866 1224 1353 1737
1998 3415 2078 1337 1061 2354
1999 3837 2175 1662 1069 2768
2000 4577 2617 1960 1431 3146
2001 2953 1842 1111 847 2106
2002 1971 1327 644 689 1282
2003 1659 1076 583 332 1327
Total 36766 23149 13617 14221 22545
Year
Total Number of 
Alliances
International 
Alliances
Domestic 
Alliances
Equity 
Alliances
Non-Equity 
Alliances
 
1993 3771 486 12.9% 1010 26.8% 1134 30.1% 1541 40.9% 167 4.4%
1994 4471 707 15.8% 1237 27.7% 1411 31.6% 1593 35.6% 169 3.8%
1995 4402 826 18.8% 940 21.4% 1477 33.6% 1410 32.0% 82 1.9%
1996 2620 534 20.4% 397 15.2% 729 27.8% 653 24.9% 32 1.2%
1997 3090 651 21.1% 544 17.6% 702 22.7% 603 19.5% 40 1.3%
1998 3415 661 19.4% 252 7.4% 730 21.4% 521 15.3% 88 2.6%
1999 3837 494 12.9% 181 4.7% 693 18.1% 436 11.4% 53 1.4%
2000 4577 141 3.1% 309 6.8% 460 10.1% 452 9.9% 103 2.3%
2001 2953 101 3.4% 244 8.3% 391 13.2% 357 12.1% 166 5.6%
2002 1971 78 4.0% 202 10.2% 430 21.8% 290 14.7% 53 2.7%
2003 1659 162 9.8% 177 10.7% 261 15.7% 309 18.6% 28 1.7%
Total 36766 4841 13.2% 5493 14.9% 8418 22.9% 8165 22.2% 981 2.7%
Marketing
% of 
total
Supply 
Alliances
% of 
total
Total Number 
of Alliances
Licensing 
Agreements
% of total R&D
% of 
total
Manufacturing
% of 
total
Year
 
Note: A single alliance maybe coded in two or more categories (e.g., marketing and manufacturing). Thus, the alliance 
categories shown above are neither exhaustive nor unique.  
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Table 19: Examples of Words that Indicated “Proactiveness” of New Products 
 Most innovative to date 
 First to offer 
 Revolutionary  
 Breakthrough (technology/product) 
 Industry’s first 
 First of its kind 
 First ever 
 First generation  
 First product to bring 
 First company  
 Revolutionary design 
 World’s first 
 World’s fastest 
 Fastest and most versatile model ever 
 Smallest and lightest in the industry 
 Industry’s only 
 The world’s smallest and most cost-effective 
 First commercially available 
 Smallest module on the market 
 First to market new technology 
 “there isn’t anything like this on the market” 
 Takes the lead in… 
 It is the first company to have brought c.d. technology to the stage of practical use 
 Highest performance available 
 Superior to industry standard 
 The only device on the market 
 New world standard 
 Moves ahead of competitors 
 Pioneering  
 Up to 10 (100,1000) times/faster, better etc. 
 Set industry standards 
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Table 20: List of Sample Companies 
# SIC COMPANY NAME # SIC COMPANY NAME # SIC COMPANY NAME
1 3570 HEWLETT-PACKARD CO 43 3577 XEROX CORP 84 3674 MACRONIX INTL LTD  -ADR 
2 3570 HITACHI LTD  -ADR 44 3578 DIEBOLD INC 85 3674 MAXIM INTEGRATED PRODUCTS 
3 3571 APPLE INC 45 3578 HYPERCOM CORP 86 3674 MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC 
4 3571 CONCURRENT COMPUTER CP 46 3578 NCR CORP 87 3674 NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 
5 3571 DELL INC 47 3579 PITNEY BOWES INC 88 3674 QLOGIC CORP 
6 3571 GATEWAY INC 48 3651 EMERSON RADIO CORP 89 3674 SIGMA DESIGNS INC 
7 3571 NEC CORP  -ADR 49 3651 HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDS 90 3674 SILICON STORAGE TECHNOLOGY 
8 3571 SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC 50 3651 RECOTON CORP 91 3674 STMICROELECTRONICS NV  -ADR 
9 3571 XYBERNAUT CORP 51 3651 SONY CORP  -ADR 92 3674 TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR  -ADR 
10 3572 DATARAM CORP 52 3670 AVX CORP 93 3674 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 
11 3572 EMC CORP/MA 53 3670 CTS CORP 94 3674 THREE-FIVE SYSTEMS INC 
12 3572 IOMEGA CORP 54 3670 EPCOS AG  -ADR 95 3674 XILINX INC 
13 3572 NETWORK APPLIANCE INC 55 3670 KEMET CORP 96 3674 ZILOG INC 
14 3572 QUANTUM CORP 56 3670 VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY INC 97 3678 AMPHENOL CORP 
15 3572 READ-RITE CORP 57 3672 ACT MANUFACTURING INC 98 3678 METHODE ELECTRONICS  -CL A 
16 3572 SANDISK CORP 58 3672 BENCHMARK ELECTRONICS INC 99 3678 MOLEX INC 
17 3572 WESTERN DIGITAL CORP 59 3672 FLEXTRONICS INTERNATIONAL 100 3679 CORNING INC 
18 3575 BOUNDLESS CORP 60 3672 JABIL CIRCUIT INC 101 3679 HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGY INC 
19 3576 3COM CORP 61 3672 PARK ELECTROCHEMICAL CORP 102 3679 SPARTON CORP 
20 3576 ADAPTEC INC 61 3672 PARK ELECTROCHEMICAL CORP 103 3679 STONERIDGE INC 
21 3576 CIRRUS LOGIC INC 62 3672 SANMINA-SCI CORP 104 3679 TDK CORP  -ADS 
22 3576 CISCO SYSTEMS INC 63 3672 SOLECTRON CORP 105 3679 TECHNITROL INC 
23 3576 DIGI INTERNATIONAL INC 64 3672 VIASYSTEMS INC 106 3861 AVID TECHNOLOGY INC 
24 3576 EMULEX CORP 65 3674 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES 107 3861 EASTMAN KODAK CO 
25 3576 FOCUS ENHANCEMENTS INC 66 3674 ALTERA CORP 108 3861 FUJIFILM HOLDINGS CORP -ADR 
26 3576 INTERPHASE CORP 67 3674 AMKOR TECHNOLOGY INC 109 3861 OCE NV  -ADR 
27 3576 NETWORK EQUIPMENT TECH INC 68 3674 ANADIGICS INC 110 7372 ADOBE SYSTEMS INC 
28 3576 PLAINTREE SYSTEMS INC 69 3674 ANALOG DEVICES 111 7372 CA INC 
29 3577 AMPEX CORP/DE  -CL A 70 3674 ATMEL CORP 112 7372 CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS INC 
30 3577 CANON INC  -ADR 71 3674 BROADCOM CORP  -CL A 113 7372 COMPUWARE CORP 
31 3577 CREATIVE TECHNOLOGY LTD 72 3674 CELESTICA INC 114 7372 ELECTRONIC ARTS INC 
32 3577 FRANKLIN ELECTRONIC PUBLISH 73 3674 CHARTERED SEMICONDUCTR  -ADR 115 7372 JL HALSEY CORP 
33 3577 GEMPLUS INTL SA  -ADR 74 3674 CONEXANT SYSTEMS INC 116 7372 MICROSOFT CORP 
34 3577 HAUPPAUGE DIGITAL INC 75 3674 CYPRESS SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 117 7372 ORACLE CORP 
35 3577 INTERMEC INC 76 3674 EXAR CORP 118 7372 SUNGARD DATA SYSTEMS INC 
36 3577 KEY TRONIC CORP 77 3674 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG-ADR 119 7372 SYBASE INC 
37 3577 LEXMARK INTL INC  -CL A 78 3674 INTEGRATED DEVICE TECH INC 120 7373 AUTODESK INC 
38 3577 LOGITECH INTL SA 79 3674 INTEL CORP 121 7373 FUJITSU LTD  -ADR 
39 3577 MEDIA 100 INC 80 3674 INTL RECTIFIER CORP 122 7373 MENTOR GRAPHICS CORP 
40 3577 PRINTRONIX INC 81 3674 KYOCERA CORP  -ADR 123 7373 SAFEGUARD SCIENTIFICS INC 
41 3577 RADISYS CORP 82 3674 LINEAR TECHNOLOGY CORP 124 7373 TYLER TECHNOLOGIES INC 
42 3577 SCM MICROSYSTEMS INC 83 3674 LSI CORP 125 7373 UNISYS CORP  
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Table 21: Key Word Searching Criteria 
New Product/Version/Improve 
―Firm Name‖/f15/ and (premier*/f15/ or release*/f15/ or launch*/f15/ or introduce*/f15/ or 
unveil*/f15/ or roll out/f15/ or unwrap*/f15/ or new product*/f15/ or to create/f15/ or has 
created/f15/ or debut*/f15/ or to start*/f15/ or newest/f15/ or replace/f15/ or improv*/f15/ or 
enhance*/f15/ or update*/f15/ or upgrade*/f15/ or modif*/f15/ or (new/f15/ and line/15/) or 
version*/f15/ or generation/f15/ or design*/f15/ or (range/f15/ and product*/f15/) or bolster*/f15/ 
or strengthens*/f15/) not percent not stock/f15/ not sale*/f15/ not slowdown/f15/ not report*/f15/ 
not earning*/f15/ not profit/f15/ not cent*/f15/ not alliance/f15/ not joint venture/f15/ not 
dividend/f15/ not quarter*/f15/ not acquisiton/f15/ not acquire/f15/ not equity funding/f15/ not 
campaign/f15/ not team up/f15/ not collaborate/f15/ not pact/f15/ not develop*/f15/  
Price/Sale Incentives: 
―Firm Name‖/f15/ and [(Price*/f15/ and drop/f20/) or (price*/f20/ and cut*/f20/) or (price*/f20/ 
and decrease*/f20/) or (price*/f20/ and reduc*/f20/) or (price*/f20/ and new*/f20) or (price*/f20/ 
and lower*/f20/) or (price*/f20/ and slash*/f20/) or (price*/f20/ and slice*/f20/) or (price*/f20/ 
and halv*/f20/) or (price*/f20/ and undercut*/f20/) or (price*/f20/ and plunge*/f20/) or 
(price*/f20/ and fall*/f20/) or (price*/f20/ and plummet/f20/) or (price*/f20/ and slump/f20/) or 
(price*/f20/ and shrink*/f20/) or cheaper/f15/ or rebate/f15/ or saving*/f15/ or coupon*/f15/) not 
profit*/f15/ not stock price/f30/ 
Advertising/Promotions: 
―Firm Name‖/f15/ and (Advert*/f15/ or promot*/f15/ or campaign/f15/ or marketing*/f15/ or 
commercial*/f15/ or donat*/f15/ or contest/f15/ or sponsor*/f15/ or celebrat*/f15/ or 
promot*/f15/ or film*/f15/ or movie*/f15/ or milestone/f15/ or organizing*/f15/ or exhibit*/f15/ 
or celebrat*/f15/ or seminar*/f20/ or showcase/f20/ or brand*/f20/ or trademark/f20/ or 
conference*/f20/ or reward*/f20/ or contest/f20/ or expo/f20/ or show* off/f20/ or ad/f20/ or 
ads/f20/ )  
Market Expand: 
―Firm Name‖/f15/ and [ns=24 or (open/f15/ and store/f15) or (market/f15/ and expansion/f15/) or 
expand*/f15/ or distribut*/f15/ or dealer*/f15/ or outlet/f15/ or (build/f15/ and plant/f15/) or new 
facility/f15/ or (start*/f15/ and services/f15/)]. 
 
Additional notes:  
 The criteria were developed inductively through trial and error process. The 
criteria that provided the most comprehensive coverage with the fewest articles 
that were unrelated to a given action category were retained. Once developed, the 
criteria was used for all firms in the sample.  
 /f15/ above indicates that the word is searched in the first 15 words of the article.  
  Factiva‘s team of experts also provides internal codes attached to each news 
article. These codes allow for more efficient search for action types, as each 
action category (e.g., new products, advertising, pricing or capacity expansion) 
can be searched by specific Factiva code. I tested the reliability of these codes. 
For example, the internal Factiva code for new products is ―ns=c22‖. For Dell Inc 
/f15/ the number of retrieved articles using ns=c22 was 924, which was very 
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similar to the number of articles retrieved using my own criteria – 926 (for the 
period 1993 - 1999). I chose to use the Factiva code because the number of 
unrelated articles was lower. In the Dell‘s example, from 924 articles generated 
using Factiva code, 203 news articles were unrelated with new product 
announcements, whereas from 926 articles generated with my own criteria 312 
were unrelated (Factiva reports the number of articles in each content area – new 
products, political/general news, analysis comments, commodity/financials, 
equity markets etc.).  
 The code used for Market Expand, ns=24 is used in addition to my own criteria, 
because it generated additional unique news articles that were not generated using 
my own criteria. Ns=24 is assigned to articles that are related to ―production or 
service facilities and their capacity...‖ 
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